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Introduction
Foreign investment has become a major focus for Americans. It was
an issue during the 1988 and 1992 Presidential races, and some policymakers believe that there is a link between more foreign investment in
the United States and the growth of our federal government budget
deficits. In particular, foreign investment inflows balance the deficit in
our export-import account, which could result from a lack of private
and government saving or government deficits.
Some Americans have even come to view foreign investment in the
United States negatively. In a recent appearance in the then Federal
Republic of Germany, Bob Hope joked to his audience of United States
military personnel, "You remember back home, that's the country you
are protecting for the Japanese (investors)." While the remark drew
much laughter, it also suggests that most people misunderstand the
extent to which foreign investors own our country, exactly what they
own, who the investors are, and what benefits might be associated with
foreign investment.
Foreign portfolio and direct investments in the United States have
increased dramatically during the past two decades. 1 By 1989 for
example, expenditures on new plants and equipment by foreign firms
located in the United States accounted for 12.3 percent of total nonresidential gross private investment in the United States and the percent
age grew steadily throughout the 1980s (Bezirganian 1991). Such
trends have caused alarm in some quarters, because the earnings on
capital in the United States will increasingly accrue to persons living
outside of the United States.
On the other hand, direct foreign investment creates jobs, about 4.4
million jobs as of 1989. In 1989,4.8 percent of the United States work
force were employed by a foreign-held firm, and 9.3 percent of the
manufacturing workforce were employed by a foreign-held firm
(Bezirganian 1991).
In addition, aggregate saving for use in financing domestic invest
ment in the United States is low, and foreign investment augments our
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capital stock and enhances the productivity of our workforce. Not only
may additional capital raise productivity and real wages of workers,
but the new capital may embody technological advances that com
pound the effect of added capital on our economic growth. Moreover,
foreign plants have brought to the workplace new management prac
tices which, in many cases, have arguably heightened worker satisfac
tion and efficiency. Thus, it could be said that foreign investment has
spared our nation from an otherwise more dire employment picture and
national recession. If there is a problem with foreign investment being
an increasing share of our total investment, the problem might be bet
ter cast as our investing too little in our physical capital rather than for
eigners investing too much.
While a broad overview may belie the title of this book, we believe
that a thorough understanding of what foreign investment is and the
theory that surrounds its origins is necessary to understand the implica
tions of foreign investment for a nation or a state. Ultimately, however,
we want to help state policymakers understand what drives the location
choices of foreign plants. Our findings may help states shape, refocus,
and refine their recruitment strategies for foreign plants.
A number of studies of foreign plant locations exist. We augment
the evidence by using a larger data set spanning many more years and
by experimenting with more general and efficient econometric tech
niques. In examining the factors that influence the state location deci
sions of new foreign plants, we use a pooled cross-section and timeseries data set for states of individual manufacturing plant location
choices for the period 1978 to 1987. 2 In the end, we are not as con
vinced as others seem to be that certain aspects of state and local taxa
tion and spending significantly influence foreign plant location
decisions.
The difficulty of modeling the taxation of foreign corporations
should not be underestimated, however. As we show in more detail
later in this chapter, the taxation of companies in general, and of multi
national companies in particular, is so complex that making a priori
predictions about the effects of tax policy is heroic indeed. We empha
size that in a domestic corporate setting it seems generally safe to
argue that specific changes in tax policy will likely have the expected
incentive effects on whatever behavior is being modeled, other things
equal. However, in the case of multinational companies, the system of
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intercountry tax credits and treaties and the opportunities to avoid taxa
tion may make it difficult to understand whether a specific tax action in
a country indeed raises taxes to multinational corporations located
within its borders.
We have two main objectives in this chapter. First, we elaborate on
the broader economic and taxation issues that surround foreign direct
investment. Beginning with the definitions of foreign direct invest
ment, we then explain inward (foreign investments in the United
States) and outward (U.S. investments outside the United States)
trends in foreign investment over time. The discussion turns to an
examination of economic theories of foreign investment, or why inves
tors produce in other countries. We then examine the economic impli
cations of our debtor nation status for investment and growth in the
United States.
Armed with this overview of aggregate investment trends and their
implications, we turn to how taxation might affect foreign investment
at both the national and the state and local levels. In that context, we
discuss "economically efficient" taxation of international capital before
we introduce the complexities of actual tax laws as they apply to multi
national corporations.
A second objective of the chapter is to introduce the location data
used to examine the foreign direct investment trends in various states
and industries within the United States. Here, we present the types of
foreign direct investments by year and the number of new manufactur
ing plants by industry group and by country of the major investor.
The Larger Setting
An understanding of the broad picture surrounding foreign invest
ment is useful in making policy recommendations to states about
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Knowledge of the signifi
cance of FDI in our economy, whether national policies thwart FDI,
and how FDI affects our national well-being should all play a role in
the design of state policies to attract FDI. In this section of the chapter,
we focus on the broad implications of FDI to deepen the understanding
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of our FDI location results and the policy recommendations that may
flow from them.
Definitions of Foreign Investment
At an aggregate level, foreign investment includes both portfolio
and direct investment. Portfolio assets are stocks, bonds, and other pri
vate and government-held securities. FDI, however, does not corre
spond to investment in plant and equipment as we know it. An
awareness of the differences between the definition of FDI and more
common National Income and Product Account definitions of invest
ment in plant and equipment will illuminate some of the results pre
sented in the empirical literature.3
FDI is measured as earnings retained by subsidiaries or branches in
the United States and transfers of funds from parent firms to their for
eign subsidiaries in the United States. The transfers include both debt
and equity raised capital. The measurement of FDI, therefore, omits
the investment made by the foreign subsidiaries when the capital is
borrowed either within the host country or in a third country. In addi
tion, aggregate FDI includes purchases of existing companies and real
estate transactions. The latter transactions are better described as a
transfer of assets rather than as new investments in plant and equip
ment. FDI then is actually a measure of the financial flow of assets.
Similarly, when the term "foreign investment position" is used, it
should be understood to mean the financial stock of assets held by for
eigners, which includes purchases of existing assets but omits invest
ment financed from the subsidiaries' borrowed funds.4
In addition to the above definitional problems with the measure, the
U.S. Department of Commerce has measured until recently both
inward and outward FDI based on the book value of the assets. Thus, it
failed to revalue the FDI assets to account for inflation and deprecia
tion as discussed in Slemrod (1989) and Glickman and Woodward
(1989). The historical or book-value measure of the stocks of FDI in
countries likely underestimates the value of U.S. outward investment
(investment abroad) relatively more than inward investment of other
countries in the United States, as many of the investments of U.S. firms
were made longer ago than the more recent investments in the United
States by the Japanese and several other countries.
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Recently, however, the U.S. Department of Commerce has mea
sured the current-cost and market values of U.S. aggregate inward and
outward FDI flows.5 The agency also retrospectively converted the
aggregate measures of historical or book-value data since 1982 to cur
rent-cost and market values. But disaggregated FDI flows by country
or by industry are at this time only available on historical or bookvalue bases.
Another issue in measuring FDI is that the value of foreign invest
ment is converted to U.S. dollars using exchange rates between coun
tries, and exchange rate fluctuations can bring large and sometimes
temporary swings in the measures of investment values. Using the
more stable, but also controversial, purchasing power parity measure
to convert investment from foreign currencies to U.S. dollars could
also change the relative investment standing of the United States vis-a
vis its inward investors.6
Despite the above-mentioned limitations of the data, it is clear by
any method of measurement that inward investment in the United
States has accelerated and U.S. outward investment has decelerated,
especially in the 1980s. We examine the aggregate trends in U.S.
inward and outward foreign investment below.

Aggregate Trends in Foreign Investment
Portfolio assets—stocks, bonds, private and government securi
ties—dominate the U.S. holdings by foreign investors, accounting for
79 percent of their total (portfolio plus direct) cumulative assets evalu
ated on a current-cost basis in 1991. FDI, defined as investment in real
estate and investment in industry, accounts for 21 percent of foreigners'
total cumulative U.S. asset holdings in 1991 evaluated on a currentcost basis (see table 1.1). While the stock of FDI has decreased as a
percentage of the total foreign capital stock since 1982, when it was 24
percent of the total inward foreign investment position, FDI stock eval
uated on a current-cost basis in the United States still grew at a 14 per
cent annual rate between 1982 and 1991.7
In fact, the rapid increase in inward foreign investment in the United
States put the net overall investment position of the United States into
deficit on a current-cost basis in 1987. Moreover, the deficit on a cur
rent-cost basis increased steadily thereafter and reached $362 billion

Table 1.1 Foreign Investment Position in the United States and U.S.
Investment Abroad: Historical, Current-Cost and Market
Value, 1982,1986,1990,1991
1986
1982
Total United States Investment Abroad (outflow positions)
939,691 1,248,883
Historical
1,1 19,178 1,410,190
Current Cost
958,577 1,507,734
Market Value
United States Direct Investment Abroad
259,860
207, 752
Historical
421,167
387,239
Current Cost
518,711
226,638
Market Value
United States Portfolio
989,023
731,939
Investment Abroad
Total Investment in the United States (inflow position)
688,052 1,346,036
Historical
740,245 1,391,455
Current Cost
693,803 1,398,588
Market Value
Direct Investment in the United
States
220,414
124,677
Historical
176,870
265,833
Current Cost
272,966
130,428
Market Value
Portfolio Investment in the
563,375 1,125,622
United States
Net Total Investment (outflow less inflow)
(97,153)
251,639
Historical
18,735
378,933
Current Cost
264,774
109,146
Market Value
Net Direct Investment Position
39,446
83, 075
Historical
155,334
210,369
Cost
Current
245,745
96,210
Market Value
168,564 (136,599)
Net Portfolio Investment
SOURCE: Scholl, Mataloni, and Bezirganian (1992).

1990

1991

1,684,698
1,884,199
1,977,053

1,755,237
1,960,301
2,107,041

424,086
623,587
716,441

450,196
655,260
802,000

1,260,612

1,305,041

2,109,222
2,179,035
2,249,080

2,242,359
2,321,804
2,488,876

396,702
466,515
536, 560

407,577
487,022
654,094

1,712,520

1,834,782

(424,524)
(294,836)
(272,027)

(487,122)
(361,503)
(381,835)

27,384
157,072
179,881
(451,908)

42,619
168,238
147,906
(529,741)
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by 1991 (see table 1.1). The net positions of portfolio and direct invest
ments are quite different, however. The U.S. net position of portfolio
investment became negative in 1985 and has ballooned to over half a
trillion dollars by 1991. By contrast, the United States maintained a
surplus position in FDI of $168 billion on a current-cost basis. None
theless, inflows of FDI have exceeded outflows during most years in
the 1980s and the U.S. net surplus position in FDI has been shrinking
(see figure 1.1).
Panel A of table 1.2 lists the FDI asset values (excluding portfolio)
in the United States by country of the investor. In 1991, investors in the
United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada held 70 percent
of the FDI asset values in the United States (see table 1.2 Panel B). As
a percent of total direct foreign asset value, the United Kingdom's
share has increased from about 23 percent of the total in 1982 to 26
percent of the total in 1991. During the same nine-year period, Japa
nese investors increased their share of total FDI stock in the U.S. from
8 to 21 percent. In contrast, the shares held by Canada, the Nether
lands, and the group of all other countries have fallen during the 1982
to 1991 period.
As shown in Panel C of table 1.2, the inward total foreign direct
investment asset value in the United States grew at a 14 percent annual
rate during the 1982 to 1991 period. Japanese investors led the growth
with a 28 percent annual increase, while United Kingdom asset values
grew at a 16 percent annual rate. The asset values of Canada, the Neth
erlands, and the aggregate of other countries grew less rapidly than
those of the United Kingdom and Japan, but still the former group
averaged annual growth rates between 10 and 11 percent during the
1982 to 1991 period.
The rapid inflows of FDI to the United States in the 1980s have
decelerated significantly, however. Between 1990 and 1991, FDI assets
in the United States increased by less than 3 percent, with Canada and
the Netherlands not increasing their book value of FDI in the United
States. The values for the United Kingdom, Japan, and all other coun
tries also slowed down considerably compared to their growth rates in
the 1980s. The recession in the United States, as well as slower real
income growth worldwide, probably contributed to the slowdown in
U.S. inward FDI.
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Figure 1.1 Net Investment of the United States

Net Portfolio Investment

1982

1986

Years

1990

1991

To summarize, investors from four countries make most of the
inward foreign investment in the United States. States that actively
seek foreign investment might usefully focus their efforts on these four
countries. Nonetheless, the rate of increase in inward investment from
all four countries has decreased since 1990 compared to the rates of
increase during the 1980s. While states are probably less likely to find
foreign investors in the 1990s than in the 1980s, they may still have a
higher probability of attracting investments from the heavily investing
countries of Japan and the United Kingdom than from other countries.

Table 1.2 Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States, by Country of the Major Investors, 1982,1986,
1990,1991 (based on historical values)
Year
1982
1986
1990
1991

Total
124,677
220,414
396,702
407,577

1982
1986
1990
1991

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

1982 to
1982 to
1986 to
1990 to

1991
1986
1990
1991

14.1
15.3
15.8
2.7

Panel A (in millions of dollars)
Canada
United Kingdom
Netherlands
11,708
28,447
26,19
20,318
40,717
55,935
30,037
63,938
102,790
30,002
106,064
63,848
Panel B (as a percent of total)
9.4
22.8
21.0
9.22
5.41
8.51
7.6
25.9
16.1
7.4
26.0
15.7
Panel C (annual percentage growth rates)
11.0
15.7
10.4
14.8
18.4
11.7
10.3
11.9
16.4
-0.1
-0.1
3.2

Japan
19,677
26,824
81,775
86,658

Other
48,654
76,620
118,162
121,005

7.8
2.2
20.6
21.3

39.0
34.8
29.8
29.7

27.5
29.0
32.1
6.0

10.6
12.0
11.4
2.4

Sources: Scholl, Mataloni, and Bezirganian (1992), U.S. Department of Commerce (1988), Chung and Fouch (1983).
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Rationales for Investing in Foreign Countries
Why invest in other countries? To address this issue, it is useful to
distinguish between portfolio and direct investment, as the motivations
for each type of investment differ. Portfolio investment is motivated by
differentials in the return to capital between countries and by diversifi
cation of investors' portfolios. Tax considerations, exchange rate risk,
and other factors that affect the return to capital will enter investors'
decisions about where (in which countries) to invest.
Cost of capital might also drive decisions about direct investment in
other countries. But industrial organization motivations may also
explain FDI. Given the competing theories explaining FDI, we turn to
a fuller discussion of the motivations for FDI.
In a smooth neoclassical world, for example, factors and goods
would flow freely among countries and leave little scope for direct
investment. But sustained differentials among countries in the cost of
capital could induce FDI, because lower capital costs in some countries
will reduce production costs and create competitive advantages.
Graham and Krugman (1991) note that more sophisticated cost-ofcapital theories might explain some of the investment flows. For exam
ple, foreign investors might discount long-term corporate profit flows
at lower real interest rates and thus value a U.S. firm more highly than
a domestic investor would. A second capital-cost theory begins with
foreign corporations generating higher profits than domestic firms.
Then, if internally generated funds are viewed as less costly than rais
ing equity or borrowing, foreign firms with cash will have a lower cost
of capital for investment than domestic firms, while domestic firms
with lower earnings might have to finance the investment using highercost equity or borrowing instruments.
In addition, tax differentials among countries could also cause varia
tion in the marginal effective returns to direct investments among
investors from different countries. Due to the complexities involved in
the taxation of international capital, however, perceived differentials in
tax rates will not necessarily translate directly to different marginal
effective tax rates among countries. International tax aspects of capital
are discussed in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.
A troublesome point, however, with the differential cost-of-capital
explanation of FDI is that differentials in the cost of capital among
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countries explain one-way but not the two-way flows of capital that are
commonly observed between countries. Some economists, therefore,
have suggested that imperfect competition and industrial organization
considerations rather than the cost of capital explain FDI flows among
countries. In fact, industrial organization theories of foreign direct
investment have competed with the cost-of-capital approach for some
time (Hymer 1976). Industrial organization explanations rely on com
petitive advantages inherent in the technology, the management, the
organization of labor, and the vertical integration of key suppliers of
intermediate inputs to the finished product as primary explanations of
foreign direct investment. In effect, an imperfect market for informa
tion about production and organization and first-mover advantages into
markets with products that have increasing returns to scale cost struc
tures give some firms a competitive advantage that may last for a con
siderable period of time. The advantage means the foreign firms will
outbid domestic firms for land and plants in an industry.
For some time, it seems U.S. firms enjoyed a competitive advantage
over foreign firms, and U.S. firms invested heavily overseas. Recently,
the competitive advantage in some industries may have shifted to firms
headquartered in certain other countries, and those firms have invested
heavily in the United States.
Added to the inherent competitive advantages that underlie much of
the industrial organization theory of foreign firms' investment in cer
tain industries may be a layer of U.S. tariffs or quotas aimed at protect
ing domestic firms from international trade in these same industries.
Ironically, the tariffs or quotas give foreign firms with competitive
advantages further incentive to invest in the United States to exploit
the competitive advantage and to circumvent the tariff or quota.

How Mobile is Foreign Capital?
Attracting foreign investors could be viewed as a bright spot in our
economy. The fact that foreigners invest in the United States as well as
at home means that they are optimistic about the long-term prospects
for the United States economy. Foreign investment might promote pro
ductivity increases without increased domestic saving. The productiv
ity increase will lead to higher real wages for workers in the United
States, although foreign ownership of capital means that the capital
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earnings will accrue to persons external to the United States. With for
eign investment fueling our productivity surge, we will begin to
become a nation of workers and not capitalists.
For some time, however, economists have thought that there is an
important link between the amount of domestic saving in an economy
and the amount of total investment in the economy. The explicit link
between domestic saving and investment leaves little room for foreign
investment to play a significant investment role in the economic
growth of a country. The linkage between domestic saving and invest
ment not only relegates foreign investment to a minor role in the econ
omy, it also suggests that capital is relatively immobile among
countries. Overall, if capital is immobile across countries, the large
inward flow of capital to the United States during the 1980s may be an
aberration and may not be available in the future for sustaining our
economic growth. More to the point of this study, if capital is immo
bile, states may find foreign investment less available and more diffi
cult to attract in future years.
A long list of studies beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980)
have examined the extent of international capital flows or the strength
in the linkage between domestic saving and investment. Feldstein and
Horioka (1980) list three reasons why international capital may not
flow perfectly among countries, and why domestic saving tends to be
invested in the home country for investment. First, there are additional
uncertainties and risks associated with investments in other countries,
such as exchange rate risk when large liabilities or profits are denomi
nated in dollars. Second, investors may be wary of existing or future
export controls imposed by the host countries or increases in host
country tax policy on foreign investment. Finally, there are institu
tional rigidities in countries that hinder foreign investment. Feldstein
and Horioka indeed found evidence that domestic saving and aggre
gate investment were strongly related, or implicitly that international
capital was relatively immobile in their sample of 21 Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries during the
1960 to 1974 period.
Several other researchers have extended the Feldstein and Horioka
results to other countries and tested the hypothesis using data for more
recent years. Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson (1987) examined the
saving-investment link in 14 industrialized countries and 48 develop-
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ing countries. Reasoning that exchange rates may affect capital mobil
ity, they tested their model for the Bretton Woods era of fixed exchange
rates, 1960 to 1973, and the post-Bretton Woods era from 1974 to
1984. They also found a statistically robust relationship between
domestic saving and aggregate investment in both exchange rate
regimes.
Even so, large current account (export minus import) imbalances in
many countries during the 1980s require counterbalancing capital
flows among countries. That being the case, the empirical findings that
domestic saving is the strongest and almost the exclusive predictor of
investment in a country are inconsistent with the counterbalancing cap
ital flows predicted by theory. Obstfeld (1986) and other critics attempt
to resolve the inconsistency by arguing that spurious correlation exists
between domestic saving and investment, and that the Feldstein-Horioka results are based on spurious correlation and therefore incorrect.
The spurious correlation between saving and investment could result,
for example, when saving and investment are in fact related to a com
mon variable, such as Gross Domestic Product.
Responding to the spurious correlation criticism, Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) have recently updated the Feldstein and Horioka work by
re-estimating the models to account for the possibility of spurious cor
relation and by using data covering the 1960 through 1986 period.8
While the general result remains that savings tend to stay at home,
their results from the 1980s reveal a somewhat weakened link between
domestic saving and aggregate investment. In addition, Feldstein and
Bacchetta find that capital moves more freely among the countries in
the European Economic Community with their strong economic link
ages than it does among nations in the rest of the world. Nonetheless,
the findings suggest an unusually strong link between domestic saving
and aggregate investment; the link is certainly much stronger than
would be expected in a perfectly integrated capital market.
Empirical findings of domestic saving determining investment give
rise to theories about and tests of capital market integration or the
degree of capital mobility among countries (Frankel 1992). Given that
there are saving and investment imbalances and current account imbal
ances among countries, imperfect capital mobility among countries
would mean that the real returns to capital differ among countries. Put
another way, when domestic saving and investment imbalances exist
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among countries, perfect capital mobility among countries could lead
to equal (covered) real returns to capital among countries.
For example, Frankel suggests that real returns to capital measured
in terms of covered-interest rates should be equal among countries if
capital is perfectly mobile among countries. Covered-interest parity
accounts for differences in real interest rates among countries, for
expected changes in real interest rates, for expected changes in real
exchange rates between the currencies, and for a risk premium for real
exchange rate risk.9 The evidence shows that covered-interest rate dif
ferentials between the United States and other countries are at or very
near zero during each year of the 1974 to 1992 period. Put more
directly, the evidence suggests that capital markets are operating near
perfectly to equalize covered-interest rates. That evidence casts doubt
on the Feldstein-Horioka results. However, Frankel also notes that the
United Kingdom and Japan as recently as 1979, and France and Italy
as recently as 1986, had capital controls and other barriers to the move
ment of their capital to other nations. Nonetheless, the movement of
capital seems less restricted now in the absence of the financial con
trols, even if the controls once dampened world capital movements.
The evidence at present points to significant international capital
mobility and to a potentially significant role for foreign capital in the
economic growth of nations.
Direct Taxation and Foreign Investment: Principles and Practice
Given a significant degree of, if not perfect, capital mobility, capital
movements and direct investment may be expected to respond to tax
differentials among countries. While foreign investors are unlikely to
base their investment decision solely on taxation, especially in light of
the role of industrial organization considerations in the investment
decision, taxation can in some cases play a decisive role in the location
of the investment. If, for example, investors have already decided to
invest abroad, then federal, state, and local taxation policies can influ
ence where they invest and whether they raise the investment funds
through debt or equity. The research reported in this volume concerns,
in part, the role that state fiscal policy plays in the location of FDI
within the United States.
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Before we describe the taxation of foreign investors, it is useful to
describe the normative implications of several tax positions that busi
ness leaders or policymakers take in regard to the taxation of interna
tional capital. To that end we begin with a normative discussion of the
economic welfare implications of typical tax regimes that are applied
toward foreign investors, because different tax regimes can raise or
lower output in the world or in a country. We then focus more specifi
cally on the tax systems that apply to major foreign investors in the
United States.
Economic Welfare Implications of Tax Regimes
Applied to Foreign Investors
A tax principle that economic policymakers and business people
often advocate is a "level playing field." However, that term often has a
different meaning for economists than for business people. Economists
approach tax policy from an economic welfare perspective or the effi
cient allocation of capital, which implies maximizing output and, thus,
the return to capital. However, output maximization can be done from
a worldwide viewpoint or from a single-nation viewpoint. Those with a
world view of output maximization would start with the notion that
taxation should not distort the allocation of capital investment across
countries, nor should it reduce the level of overall investment in the
world. That being the case, maximizing world economic welfare
means that managers make the same location and investment decisions
with a tax system as they would in the absence of a tax system.
Worldwide Neutrality
Tax systems designed to achieve the maximization of world output
and return to capital are referred to as "capital-export neutral" (CEN).
Using a residence-based tax system, the home country generally taxes
foreign income at home country rates and grants a tax credit for taxes
paid in the host country. In many cases, the home country imposes
taxes on foreign income only when it is repatriated to the home country
(with deferral).
To achieve CEN, tax policy designers would insure that the mar
ginal effective tax rates are zero both for international investments (or
exported capital) and for home country investments. Capital income
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would still be taxed; a positive amount of tax would be paid on eco
nomic rents (returns above the marginal or normal rate of return)
earned on inframarginal capital investments. To the extent that eco
nomic rents on capital differ among countries, average tax rates on
inframarginal capital would still vary among investments within the
home country and between investments in the home and the host coun
tries (Caves 1982).
To reach a zero marginal effective tax rate and a completely neutral
tax system for capital, for example, McLure (1992) proposes using a
consumption-based corporate income tax. Using a residence-based tax
system, the home country would tax corporate income earned in a for
eign country (without deferral) and grant credits to foreign firms
against home country tax liabilities for taxes paid to foreign govern
ments. A zero effective marginal tax rate occurs if investment in plant
and equipment in foreign operations as well as in domestic operations
is expensed against corporate income rather than depreciated. Invest
ment expensing or immediate write-off of foreign and domestic invest
ment implies an efficient allocation of capital across countries as well
as an efficient level of investment. 10
Two other tax methods would achieve CEN in the allocation of cap
ital across countries; however, because the marginal effective tax rate
is not zero, each method reduces the level of investment in the world.
One approach exempts capital from taxation in the host country, while
the home country would tax the capital income. In this case, the need
for the tax credit in the home country for foreign taxes paid is elimi
nated. As capital income is not taxed by host countries, capital invest
ment at home and abroad is taxed at the same rate, or CEN is achieved.
Under a second tax method, the home country taxes corporate affiliates
in other countries (with no income deferral) but allows a full tax credit
for taxes paid to the host country. Both tax methods would neutralize
taxation as a determinant of location; however, without investment
expensing neither guarantees that the marginal effective tax rates are
zero. A nonzero marginal tax rate depresses the level of world invest
ment even if the tax system does not affect the relative location of cap
ital investment.
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A National Focus for Maximization
National policymakers are more typically concerned with maximiz
ing national income (private income plus government revenue) from
capital rather than worldwide income from capital. In this scenario,
when marginal effective tax rates are greater than zero, policymakers
would implement tax policy designed to keep capital at home until its
gross return (including taxes) at home equaled its after-tax return in
other countries. Under those conditions, the home country's income
maximization would include the sum of the private returns to investors
and the home government's revenue. To achieve national income max
imization, foreign taxes paid are deducted from the firm's total foreign
income and the home country tax rate is applied to the capital income
net of foreign taxes. 11 (Figure 1.2 contains a summary of the economic
welfare effects of residence-based tax systems.)
A Third Viewpoint
Business leaders hold a third view of a "level playing field." They
consider neither worldwide nor national capital income maximization
principles. Instead, they generally feel that "foreign plants" operating
in the United States, for example, should pay the same tax rate as
domestic plants operating in the United States. Foreign operations pay
ing lower taxes than domestic plants are viewed as receiving a subsidy
compared to counterpart domestic plants. That being the case, business
leaders would favor territorial tax systems, under which the foreign
investors pay the taxes of the host country with no home country taxa
tion of foreign capital. Such a system is known as "capital-import neu
tral," as foreigners investing in the host country pay the same tax rates
as domestic investors. A territorial tax system has no particular norma
tive economic welfare implications. However, territorial tax systems
can be "capital-export neutral," if the marginal effective tax rates are
uniform across countries, or, for example, if all countries operate a ter
ritorial tax system and allow the expensing of investment in plant and
equipment in the calculation of taxable income.
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Figure 1.2 Economic Implications of Hypothetical Residence-Based Tax
Systems
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Breaking the Molds
Hufbauer (1992) suggests an alternative to the traditional thinking
about the influence of taxation on the mobility of capital across coun
tries. He notes, as discussed above, that modern international trade the
ory places industrial-organization reasons ahead of tax policies as a
motivation for multinational investment decisions. Stated in its pure
form, imperfectly competitive firms choose locations based purely on
market advantages. Location decisions based on industrial-organiza
tion considerations would significantly blunt the welfare implications
of CEN as direct foreign investment is not responsive to taxation. 12
Hufbauer's view of the motivations for the investment decisions of
multinational firms allows him to argue for a territorial tax system in
which the United States, for example, develops tax policies designed to
capture a greater share of desirable foreign investments. He suggests
that corporate tax credits for a generous portion of research and devel
opment expenses for both domestic and foreign firms might induce
more high-technology firms, which tend to pay higher wages, to
expand in the United States. 13 Such a tax system, however, might stir
international competition in tax systems to attract firms. Nonetheless,
given that business generally favors a territorial tax system, domestic
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business competitors would perceive Hufbauer's strategic tax policy as
a "fair" method of taxation.
The examples of foreign tax systems leave many choices for policymakers. However, the taxation of foreign corporations is in fact much
more complex than even the stylized examples noted above. The maze
of complexities presently in any country's tax system means that a tax
system will not easily be categorized as capital-export or capitalimport neutral. Uncovering the role that taxation may play in the
mobility of capital across countries requires substantial knowledge of
tax systems. The brief overview provided below of the tax practices as
they apply to major investors in the United States will lead to more
precise formulations of empirical models of the tax systems and to
more exact interpretations of our empirical results.
Tax Practices That Apply to Foreign Corporations
Most countries operate either a residence-based or a territorial tax
system, although some countries use a combination of these two
approaches. 14 The residence-based system is typical for most countries,
including Japan, The United Kingdom and the United States. In coun
tries operating a residence-based system, the foreign corporation is lia
ble for host country taxes annually and for home country taxes when
profits are repatriated to the parent corporation in the home country.
Upon repatriation of net of foreign tax earnings to the home country,
the home country statutory tax rate is applied to gross earnings (net
earnings plus foreign taxes paid) and a tax credit is applied against the
home country tax liability for taxes paid to the foreign country. 15 In
practice, the tax credit is limited to the amount of home country tax lia
bility. When the foreign tax liability is higher than the home country
tax liability, the firm is in an excess credit position and essentially pays
the foreign tax rate on its earnings.
For example, consider a U.S. corporation that locates a subsidiary in
another country and retains the earnings within the subsidiary for some
time. The foreign corporation would always pay taxes to the host coun
try. In effect, if the corporation never repatriated the earnings to the
United States, it would never pay U.S. taxes. However, if the corpora
tion repatriates the earnings to the United States, the profits are then
taxed at corporate rates in the United States. To avoid double taxation
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of the profits in the host and the home countries, the United States has
established tax treaties with countries. The United States allows a tax
credit for the foreign taxes paid up to the tax liability that would have
been due in the United States. 16 Thus, if the host country taxes are
higher than the home country taxes, the corporation pays no tax to the
home country after applying the tax credit; the host country tax rates
are effectively the tax rates for the corporation. If, on the other hand,
the home country taxes are higher than the host country taxes, the cor
poration effectively pays the home country tax.
As explained above, the former situation amounts to a territorial tax
system or capital-import neutrality. The latter case appears to be CEN
(but see below), because capital that stayed within the United States
and capital that moved overseas are both taxed at home country tax
rates. Under CEN, it is worth reiterating, the incentive to invest over
seas is governed by the rates of return to capital invested domestically
compared to the rates of return to capital invested overseas. The tax
system plays a neutral role.
Several countries, notably Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and
Norway, operate a territorial tax system. Under that system, residents
who invest in other countries are subject to the tax liabilities of the host
country. The profits are never taxed in the home country. 17 A home
country that operates a territorial tax system provides obvious incen
tives for residents to seek investment locations in host countries with
lower tax rates.
To complicate matters, Canada and West Germany operate a mixed
tax system for foreign investments. 18 Canada, for example, applies a
residence-based tax system to foreign income with tax credits for for
eign taxes paid. However, dividends earned in foreign corporations and
repatriated to Canadian parent companies are not subject to Canadian
(home) country taxes. Thus, for example, a Canadian subsidiary oper
ating in the United States would pay home country taxes with a credit
for taxes paid in the United States. However, Canada would not tax
dividend income returned to the parent nor would it grant a tax credit
for U.S. taxes paid on the dividend income. 19
Beyond the aforementioned economic welfare implications of vari
ous tax policies, whether countries follow capital-export neutrality or
capital-import neutrality determines whether home or host country tax
rates are relevant for empirical work on the location decisions of for-
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eign investment. To be more specific, United States federal and state
corporate income tax rates can make a difference in the location choice
of foreign investors in the United States only if U.S. (host country)
taxes represent the marginal taxes on the investment. However, the fol
lowing sections will argue that determining a priori whether foreign
taxes are neutral in either an export or import sense is probably not
possible.

Residence-Based Tax Systems, Deferral,
and Capital-Import Neutrality
The literature on foreign taxation has until recently maintained that
residence-based tax systems combined with a credit for taxes paid to
foreign countries would produce capital-export neutrality. However,
when tax deferral, or payment of home country taxes only upon repa
triation of profits from foreign corporations, is layered onto the system,
some argue that the tax system is no longer capital-export neutral
(Caves 1982).20 Hartman's (1985) analysis shows that residence-based
tax systems with tax deferral until repatriation and tax credits for taxes
paid to foreign governments are capital-import neutral rather than cap
ital-export neutral. Hartman's analysis then implies that host country
taxes could become a significant determinant of its inward foreign
direct investment. (See appendix to this chapter for details on Hart
man's argument.)
Additional Complexities
Since Hartman's paper, a number of authors have examined other
aspects of the taxation of foreign direct investment. 21 The relatively
straightforward tax systems presented so far have many additional
complications. For example, host countries levy additional withhold
ing taxes on dividends before they are repatriated to the home corpora
tion. The withholding tax qualifies for the foreign tax credit in the
home country. However, as the total amount of tax credit is limited to
the total tax that would be due in the home country, the withholding tax
can put the corporation into an excess credit position, meaning that it
cannot use all of the tax credit.
The withholding tax and the possibility of excess credits may in turn
alter corporate financial behavior. For example, instead of paying a
dividend to the parent, the foreign corporation could pay interest on a
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loan from the parent. That strategy reduces the overall tax paid, as the
interest payment is not subject to withholding tax and is also deduct
ible from most corporate income tax bases in host countries. Thus, the
interest tax payment is subject to only the home country tax rate.
There are several additional complications. Using transfer pricing,
foreign corporations minimize aggregate tax burdens by transferring
costs to the highest tax countries, or the corporations effectively realize
profits or income in the lowest tax countries. There are also other limi
tations on credits for foreign taxes paid, such as the tax credit baskets
defined in the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act. The baskets add further lay
ers of intricacy to the system and help to make, a priori, the effect of
taxes on foreign direct investment unpredictable. In such a complex
system, empirical evidence can make an important contribution to our
understanding of the role of taxation in FDI flows.
Given the different tax treatments on FDI among the four countries
with the most investments in the United States, U.S. federal and state
corporate income taxes are more likely to affect investment from the
Netherlands and Canada with their territorial systems. There is more
uncertainty about the importance of U.S. taxes on investors from Japan
and the United Kingdom, which operate residence-based tax systems.
Thus, in the empirical research presented later in this study, we distin
guish between investors from countries with different treatments of
taxes paid in the United States.

The Role of State Corporate Tax Systems
State tax systems introduce more layers of taxation on foreign
source income and foreign investment. State corporate tax systems are
by their nature complicated systems when corporations are active in
more than one state. A host of complications are added to the system
when corporations operate in more than one country.
To begin, corporate income taxes generally differ among states in
the tax rates and the deductions and credits that determine taxable cor
porate income and tax liability. For example, corporations wholly resi
dent within a state have their total corporate income after deductions
subject to taxation. Corporations that operate affiliates in other states or
in other countries can have a portion of their affiliates' income subject
to taxation in the state. How much affiliated income is taxed in a state
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depends on the state's definition of an affiliate and on its formula to
apportion corporate income to the state.
To explain more fully, general accounting practice would encourage
corporations to report the corporate income separately for each of their
affiliates, taking into account transfers among affiliates. Some states
adopt separate accounting of corporate income for tax purposes, and
corporations in these states are allowed to report taxable corporate
income based on separate accounting of corporate income. However,
because of the potential for corporations to avoid taxation in high-tax
states through a system of transfer prices applied to commodity
exchanges among affiliates, many states start with a broad definition of
corporate affiliate income and then use a three-factor formula (the
Massachusetts formula or its variants) to allocate a portion of the com
bined income to itself. Typically the amount of combined income allo
cated to a particular state is based on the share of combined payroll,
sales, and property that resides in the state compared to the combined
total payroll, sales, and property of the affiliates. The allocated income
is then subject to the state's tax system.
States' definitions of an affiliated company differ substantially and,
thus, corporate tax liabilities can depend heavily on the definition used
to combine affiliates. For example, several states operate a unitary tax
system in that they have a more spatially expansive definition of the
corporation and its affiliates, resulting in higher corporate income
attributable to the state.22 The unitary states generally define a unitary
business to include other corporate operations that contribute to the
business conducted in the corporate group and that have 50 percent or
more common ownership or control between the corporation located in
the state and the corporate group. The group would then file a com
bined return for the state corporate income tax and use the three-factor
allocation formula mentioned above (or a variant of it) to determine the
proportion of the group income that is taxable in the state.
In fact, the unitary states operate one of two types of unitary tax sys
tems—worldwide and domestic—with domestic being a less expan
sive definition of the corporation than worldwide. Under a worldwide
unitary regime, any business located in the state would combine the
income from worldwide affiliates fitting the definitions of a unitary
business noted above. The worldwide definition includes in the apportionable tax base the foreign and domestic affiliates regardless of the
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place of incorporation, including the foreign parent and its foreign
affiliates. Under a domestic unitary regime, the apportionable base
includes both foreign and domestic affiliates of businesses incorpo
rated in the United States, regardless of where they do business.23
During the period of our analysis, a considerable portion of states
operated a worldwide unitary tax system. But the frequency of the
worldwide unitary tax shrank from thirteen states in the early 1980s to
five states by the end of our sample period or 1987. We account for this
extreme form of unitary taxation in our empirical work.24
Other Taxes and Expenditures
International corporations and their employees face the same indi
rect taxes in host countries as do the domestic corporations in the host
country. Thus, our full specification of the fiscal variables will account
for sales, property, excise, and other taxes in our empirical models.
Personal income taxes, while they are direct taxes, may also influence
corporate location decisions to the extent that these taxes affect the
type and number of employees in the labor supply. Personal income
taxes will also be accounted for in the empirical work.
The expenditure side of state and local tax systems may also play a
role in foreign corporations' choice of state. The sizable investments
mean a substantial number of employees will consume schools, parks,
highways, and other public goods. Higher taxes by themselves may not
play a major role in location if the taxes purchase a desirable bundle of
state and local goods and services. Thus, our empirical work will
account for both the spending and revenue sides of state and local bud
gets.
Summary
We have examined the broader issues related to foreign investment.
Our debtor nation status results from our negative portfolio investment
position, although our surplus position in FDI continues to shrink. We
highlighted the advantages of attracting foreign investment, as it adds
to the productivity of our economy and in the shorter-run allows us to
increase our consumption temporarily and stall repayment of our defi
cit.
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Despite the size of the investment positions in foreign countries,
researchers have raised questions about the long-term mobility of
international capital. By examining patterns of domestic saving and
investment, capital mobility among countries appears imperfect, sug
gesting that domestic saving will determine national economic growth.
Using an alternative approach to the issue, Frankel finds that the equal
ity of covered-interest rates across countries suggests perfect capital
mobility among countries.
The tax policy discussion suggests a variety of approaches to the
taxation of international capital, and enumerates the variety of methods
that countries actually use. The complicated tax systems actually
deployed suggest that there may be significant tax incentives affecting
the location of foreign direct investment. Others might contend that the
complications of the system, such as of transfer pricing and tax defer
ral, allow corporations to engage in significant tax avoidance; taxes,
therefore, affect their financial practices but do not affect their location
decisions on foreign investments. Exactly how tax policy affects the
movement of international capital or whether we want to affect its
movement with tax policy is not well understood. With all the com
plexities involved in taxation of foreign income and the opportunities
available to firms to adjust their tax burdens by altering their financial
policies, it seems unlikely that taxation would overtly play a significant
role in FDI decisions.
We restrict our empirical inquiry to FDI location choices within the
United States. The variation in state tax rates may have only secondorder implications for FDI location among the states, given the com
plexities that apply at national government levels. Nonetheless, even if
nontax factors govern inter-country FDI decisions, the effects of state
and local fiscal policy may influence intra-country FDI locations
among states.
Our Research: Direct Investment in New Plants
As is clear from above, foreign investment stems from many differ
ent sources and takes a number of different forms. For example, before
making an investment, a foreign investor can choose from a wide array
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of alternative investments at home and abroad. If the investor recog
nizes a market opportunity in the United States, he or she considers
how best to compete in that market. The options include exporting out
put to the United States, purchasing a portion or all of an existing com
pany in the United States, engaging in a joint venture with a U.S.
investor, expanding an existing production facility, or building a new
plant.
In the rest of this book, we use data from the International Trade
Administration (ITA) to analyze the location of new foreign plants
between 1979 and 1987, the last year the data are available. The ITA
data for foreign investments report the number of new plants, acquisi
tions and mergers, joint ventures, equity increases, and plant expan
sions. The agency gathers the data from newspaper and journal
announcements and from reports from other federal agencies. Once
compiled, no attempt is made to determine whether the investment
actually occurred. While the ITA data may not be quite as reliable as
the mandatory reports on United States investments that foreign firms
file with the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the BEAdata do not
contain information on new plants. The ITA, however, reports that
their information on foreign direct investments is consistent with the
BEA data. Despite that claim, Glickman and Woodward (1989)
express some reservations about the ITA data, but acknowledge that it
is the only data on new plant investment in the United States.
Indeed, we share their reservations about the ITA data, because no
verification is done on whether the reported investment announce
ments actually materialized. However, while acknowledging the short
comings of the data, we believe they are generally accurate.
The International Trade Administration data reveal that most foreign
direct investments take the form of either an acquisition or expansion
of an existing plant. Equity increases and corporate buyouts of existing
companies may create jobs through managerial efficiencies or revival
of moribund plants, but those employment benefits are less noticeable
to policymakers and the public. We choose to examine the location of
new plants with the idea that the so called "greenfield investments"
(new plants) might be the most interesting for policymakers.
From a discovery perspective, a greenfield investment, compared to
an acquisition or a joint venture, allows the investor almost complete
freedom to select a new plant site and to choose among sites within the
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United States. Thus, examining new plant locations has the advantage
of giving us the most insight into the location factors that attract for
eign investors.
To focus the discussion in the next chapters, using data from Inter
national Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce, there
were 4,326 direct non-real-estate investments in manufacturing during
the 1978 to 1987 period. The largest share of the investments were
acquisitions and mergers followed by new plants and then plant expan
sions (see table 1.3). There were 1,396 new foreign plant locations in
the United States between 1978 and 1987, and 1,197 of the plants were
in manufacturing.25 We examine the data on the 1,197 manufacturing
locations and attempt to explain the choice of investors among the 48
continental states.
The International Trade Administration data suggest that investors
from Japan were responsible for 34 percent of the new foreign plants
located in the United States between 1978 and 1987 (see table 1.4).
Investors from Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom accounted
for an additional 40 percent of new foreign manufacturing plants in the
United States between 1978 and 1987. Investors from France, Switzer
land and the Netherlands accounted for another 14 percent of the new
foreign manufacturing plants in the United States.
Also shown in table 1.4 is the distribution of the new plant invest
ments by two-digit SIC code within the manufacturing sector. Of the
1,197 new manufacturing plants for the 1978 to 1987 period, 57 per
cent are concentrated in four industry groups; namely, Chemicals and
Allied Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Electronic and
Other Electric Equipment and Transportation Equipment. 26 At the other
extreme, there were no new plants in Tobacco Products, Apparel, and
Other Textile Products; and Leather and Leather Products each had
only five new foreign plants during the 10-year period. The balance of
the new plants were distributed more evenly throughout the remaining
13 two-digit manufacturing industries (see figure 1.3).
The concentration of new manufacturing plants in four industry
groups holds when new plant investments are examined by country.
Canada investors 'have 46 percent of their number of new manufactur
ing plants in the same four industry groups noted above, and German
investors have 67 percent of their new plants in those same four indus-

Table 13 Number of Non-Real-Estate Investments in Manufacturing Industries by Year and Type of Investment
1978 to 1987
Investment type
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Total

Acquisitions
and mergers
107
130
187
160
107
119
161
189
222
290
1672

Equity
increase
19
13
26
17
21
22
25
15
25
34
217

Joint venture
13
22
29
28
41
24
47
27
28
55
314

New plant
56
175
171
107
81
116
190
63
95
14
1197

Other
53
97
34
23
34
29
43
32
40
34
434

Plant
expansion
7
68
79
44
40
93
92
24
41
948
492

Total
255
505
526
379
324
59
558
350
451
619
4326

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (various issues).
NOTE: These data represent investments with complete informadon on the transaction site. There are some transactions for which no location informa
tion are available. The transactions are relatively few in number.

Table 1.4 Number of New Manufacturing Plants by Industry Group and Home Country of the Foreign Investor:
1978-1987
Two-Digit
SIC Codes
Canada France Germany
20 Food and Kindred
4
4
6
Products
22 Textile Mill
7
0
Products
3
23 Apparel and Other
0
1
0
Textile Products
24 Lumber and Wood
6
0
4
Products
25 Furniture and
1
0
3
Fixtures
26 Paper and Allied
3
0
9
Products
27 Printing and
4
2
4
Publishing
28 Chemicals and
48
16
Allied Products
11
29 Petroleum and
2
2
2
Coal Products
30 Rubber and Mis
cellaneous Plastics
1
2
4
Products
31 Leather and
1
0
0
Leather Products
32 Stone, Clay, and
13
5
2
Glass Products

Korea Netherlands

Sweden

United
Switzerland Kingdom Other

Total

Italy

Japan

3

21

2

4

0

7

3

10

64

1

7

2

2

0

1

4

3

30

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

5

0

4

1

0

0

0

3

4

22

0

1

0

1

0

2

1

3

12

0

3

0

0

3

0

3

2

23

0

5

2

0

0

1

2

3

23

3

39

0

9

10

18

28

14

196

0

0

0

4

0

1

4

1

16

1

15

0

6

1

2

8

10

2

1

0

0

0

0

0

15

2

12

0

0

0

4

5

9

52

Two-Digit
United
SIC Codes
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Korea Netherlands Sweden Switzerland Kingdom Other
33 Primary Metal
Industries
6
1
0
7
1
11
17
1
0
8
8
34 Fabricated metal
Products
3
0
13
0
4
0
13
2
11
1
4
35 Industrial Machin
ery and Equipment
4
53
11
2
2
4
70
9
6
16
10
36 Electronic and
Other Electric Equip
ment
17
5
21
2
6
3
92
5
5
10
9
37 Transportation
Equipment
10
16
10
1
67
3
1
4
1
11
4
38 Instruments and
Related Products
1
2
9
2
20
0
2
6
3
3
4
39 Miscellaneous
Manufacturing Indus
tries
4
3
0
2
2
14
1
1
1
3
5
Column Total
66
215
24
105
402
18
43
35
61
123
105
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, various issues.

Total
60
51
187

175
128
52

36
1,197
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try groups. Japan and the United Kingdom have similarly large propor
tions of their new manufacturing plants in those four industry groups.
Foreign New Plants Compared Against America©s
Industrial Structure
The concentration of new foreign plants in four major industry
groups might be expected if one could compare them to the major
group concentrations of new plants built by domestic investors. With
no access to data on new domestic manufacturing plants, we compared
the industrial concentrations of new foreign manufacturing plants dur
ing the 1978 to 1987 period to the stock of assets in each major manu
facturing group (see table 1.5) for all foreign firms and all businesses
located in the United States in 1987. Four major groups, Chemicals
and Allied Products, Petroleum and Coal, Food and Kindred Products,
and Electric and Electronic Equipment, account for about 66 percent of
total foreign assets in manufacturing. For all businesses, assets in six
industries, Petroleum and Coal, Transportation Equipment, Chemicals
and Allied Products, Food and Kindred Products, Machinery Except
Electrical, and Electric and Electronic Equipment, account for 70 per
cent of assets in manufacturing. With the exceptions of Petroleum and
Coal and Food and Kindred Products, new foreign plants are con
structed in four of the major manufacturing groups that dominate the
manufacturing assets held in the United States (see figure 1.4). Thus,
based on asset data, we conclude that new foreign manufacturing
plants are built in major industry groups where investments are already
concentrated.

Outline of the Monograph

In chapter 2 of the book, we examine the patterns of new plant loca
tions within the United States. We then examine the empirical evidence
on the location of foreign direct investment among countries and what
role taxes and other factors play in the foreign investors' decision.
Next, we summarize the literature on the location choices that foreign
investors make among states.
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Figure 1.3 New Manufacturing Plants by Industry
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Figure 1.4 Assets of Manufacturing and New Foreign Plants, Six Major
Industry Groups
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Table 1.5 Total Assets of U.S. Affiliates, All U.S. Businesses, and New
Manufacturing Plants, 1987
All United
United
States
States
businesses New plants
affiliates
Industries

Stone, Clay and Glass
Chemicals and Allied Products
Primary Metals
Petroleum and Coal
Rubber and Plastics
Food and Kindred Products
Electric and Electronic

5.4
27.3
5.4
21.1
2.1
10.0
7.3

2.3
11.4
3.7
15.8
2.1
11.0
8.9

4.3
16.4
5.0
1.3
5.0
5.3
14.6

Equipment
Printing and Publishing
Instruments and Related

3.8
2.8

4.7
3.7

1.9
4.3

2.8
2.2
4.4
0.5
2.7
2.2
100.0

4.1
4.0
10.0
1.4
13.0
3.9
100.0

4.3
1.9
15.6
2.9
10.7
6.3
100.0

Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Paper and Allied Products
Machinery, Except Electrical
Textile Products
Transportation Equipment
Other
Manufacturing

SOURCES: Howenstine (1989); and U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration (various issues).

In the third chapter, we discuss how to model the location decision.
There are numerous theoretical and econometric choices about model
ing the location decision, and we discuss the background behind them.
We also lay out the econometric models that we use. In chapter 4, we
discuss the econometric estimation and present the results of the esti
mation. A fifth chapter contains some of the policy implications of this
research that flow from the simulation results reported there. Chapter 6
summarizes our findings and reports the conclusions from this
research.

34 Introduction

Appendix to Chapter 1
To understand Hartman's (1985) analysis and conclusion that residencebased tax systems are capital-import neutral, it is helpful to distinguish
between mature and immature foreign corporations. Mature foreign corpora
tions fund their own reinvestment out of retained earnings, while immature
corporations require transfers from the domestic parent to finance their invest
ment. Hartman's conclusion applies to mature corporations only. His conclu
sions also require the full offset of foreign direct taxes against home country
taxes. The implication is that home country tax rates are higher than host
country tax rates.
Hartman first shows that mature corporations with unexploited investment
opportunities in the host country would not simultaneously receive transfers
from the parent to finance investments, while making dividend payments to
the parent. This feature greatly simplifies the analysis, and the income of
mature firms flows only in one direction. Hartman then examines the mature
firm's decision either to return dividends to the parent for investment in the
home country or to invest in the host country. If the firm returns a $1 dividend
net of foreign taxes to the parent immediately, the dividends are incremented
by the foreign taxes deemed paid on the dividends, or by 1/(1 - f*), where t* is
the foreign tax rate and is assumed less than the home country tax rate of t.
After paying the home country tax and accounting for the tax credit for for
eign taxes already paid in the host country, the corporation pays a total tax rate
of t—the domestic tax rate—on the gross earnings. Thus, the corporation has
[(1 - 0/0 - /*)] to invest at home. The net return to the repatriated profit at the
end of the next period is [(1 - 0/0 - f *)]0+f/i)» where t is the domestic tax rate
and rn is the net rate of return to investment in the home country.
On the other hand, the firm can retain foreign earnings in the host country
for one year and repatriate the profits after a second year. In this case, the net
profit is [(1 - 0/0 - f*)] [1 + r*(l - /*)], where r* indicates the rate of return on
investment in the host country. Comparing the rates of return for home and
host country investments, the firm will return dividends if the after-tax rate of
return is higher in the home country (/•„) than the after-tax rate of return in the
host country [r*(l -t*)]. Thus, the net rate of return on investment and not the
tax due upon repatriation affects the decision to reinvest.
The important conclusion from Hartman's analysis is that there is capitalimport neutrality (not capital-export neutrality) as a result of the tax credit and
deferment, because the firm's investment abroad is determined by the rate of
return in the host country as is the domestic investment in the host country.27

NOTES
1. Unless otherwise noted, foreign investment refers to inward foreign investment or invest
ment in the United States. In the few instances when we discuss investment flows from the United
States to other countries, we use the term outward investment
2. The period of analysis is dictated by data availability. The source of the data is the U.S.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. While similar data on individual
plant locations are also available for the 1972 to 1977 period, it is our feeling, after examining the
data quite thoroughly, that the data before 1978 have many more problems with missing values
and other discrepancies than the post-1977 data.
3. For a discussion of the Department of Commerce's definition of foreign investment as dis
tinguished from investment in plant and equipment, see Slemrod (1989).
4. Investment is defined as the flow of capital typically during a one-year period. Investment
position is the stock of investment at a point in time.
5. Current-cost reflects the replacement cost of the capital stock after accounting for depreci
ation, depletion, and expensed exploration and development costs. Market value reflects valuation
of capital stock based on valuation in the stock and bond markets. The valuation could be subject
to short-term changes in valuation of stocks or bonds and year-to-year changes in market value
may not reflect accurately investment flows. For more detail see Scholl, Mataloni, and Bezirganian (1992) and references therein.
6. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Commerce data on foreign investment includes only
four benchmark or complete survey years: 1959, 1974, 1980 and 1987. Foreign investment data
for interim years are based on sample data from quarterly surveys and extrapolations from the
benchmark survey years. The data thus calculated are never revised when new benchmark results
are tabulated. (Slemrod 1989 and Glickman and Woodward 1989 (pp. 303-308) also note these
limitations in the foreign investment data.)
7. We examine aggregate trends in foreign investment, using the U.S. Department of Com
merce, Bureau of Economic Analysis data. The micro data in their raw form from the U.S. Depart
ment of Commerce, International Trade Administration, are not necessarily an accurate
description of aggregate totals.
8. Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) address the Obstfeld objection by adding economic growth
and distribution variables to their savings-investment retention equation. They find that the
growth argument does not diminish the strength of the relationship between domestic saying and
investment. Williamson (1991), however, casts doubt on the relationship, arguing that domestic
saving and investment are not strongly correlated. Therefore, the marginal flows of international
capital could play a critical role in a country's capital accumulation leading to more economic pro
ductivity. A separate issue is the effect of saving and investment on productivity growth in an
economy. Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1989) accept the view that productivity growth leads to
saving and investment rather than saving and investment fostering productivity.
9. Covered-interest parity means that capital flows would equalize interest rates across coun
tries when similar investments in the two countries are contracted in the same currency. For exam
ple, suppose a dollar-based investor contracted a three-month dollar denominated deposit and a
three-month German mark denominated deposit together with a three-month forward contract to
change German marks into dollars. As both investments are contracted in a common currency and
the yields are known in advance, covered-interest parity simply means that the two investments
yield the same return. This example is taken from The Economist (1992).
10.Note that CEN could also be achieved under a territorial tax system if all host countries
allowed investment expensing.
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11.The deduction of foreign taxes paid from income before calculating home country taxes
due leads to gross returns to domestic country investment equal to net of tax returns for foreign
country investment. For example, a home country domestic investor would receive after-tax
income of rd - td r^ where rd is the gross return to a dollar of domestic investment and td is the
domestic tax rate. With deducibility for foreign taxes paid, a foreign investor would receive afterdomestic-and-foreign-tax income of tf- td (TJ- tf r^ - tf rp where /yis the gross return to foreign
investment and I,is the tax rate in the foreign country.
Investors would maximize capital income when they equate the after-tax rates of return in
both countries or when (1 - tj) rd = (1 -1 J TJ - (1 - tj) tf rj<x rd = TJ - tf ff The latter condition
implies that the tax deduction for foreign taxes leads investors to equate the gross return on
domestic investment to the net of tax return on foreign investment. For more discussion of taxa
tion of foreign capital as well as its welfare implications, see All worth (1988).
12.Hufbauer (1992) suggests maintaining residence-based taxation for foreign portfolio
investment, as returns to capital more likely influence portfolio capital flows among countries.
13.Reich (1990) makes a similar case about firm location among countries and argues that
industrial policy in the United States might be used to attract high-tech firms.
14.This discussion of residential and territorial tax systems is based in part on Slemrod
(1989).
15.The United States tax code does not extend depreciation and investment tax credits to for
eign firms when profits are repatriated to the United States. Thus, foreign corporations, held by
U.S. investors, pay the statutory corporate income tax rate (see Gordon and Jun 1992).
16.The United States has operated a foreign tax credit system since 1921. The foreign tax
credit can take two forms: a credit for the total taxes paid to foreign governments or a credit given
for each country in which the corporation has an investment. There may be certain investment
advantages to a per country credit system if a corporation is in an excess credit position overall
but not in a country in which it intends to invest more capital. From 1921 to 1932 the credit was a
worldwide or overall limitation. Between 1932 and 1954, foreign tax credits were limited to the
lesser of the overall limitation or a limitation of credit per country. From 1954 to 1960, a per
country tax credit limitation was in effect; from 1960 to 1975 the corporation was allowed to
choose between a per country and the overall limitation. Since 1975 the overall limitation has
been in effect (see Joint Committee on Taxation 1987, Title XII, p.855).
17.Capital-export neutrality is violated under a territorial tax system unless the home and host
country tax systems happen to be the same.
18.For more discussion of foreign taxation in other countries, see Hines and Hubbard (1989).
19.The Canadian exemption of repatriated dividends from home country taxation stems from
the exemption of all intercorporate dividends from further taxation. The exemption avoids the
double taxation of dividends, as they have already been taxed as profits before distribution as div
idends (see Kitchen 1987, pp. 357-358).
20.1n fact, Horst (1977) states erroneously that the tax rate on foreign investment is a
weighted average of the home and host country tax rates, as repatriated profits are taxed at home
country rates and retained earnings are taxed at (relatively low?) host country rates. Thus, the res
idence-based U.S. tax code was alleged to favor foreign investment over domestic investment and
that pushed the U.S. Congress to introduce a number of tax bills in the 1960s and 1970s that
would have eliminated the deferral of home country taxes on retained earnings of foreign corpora
tions (Horst 1977). The repeal of tax deferral never passed Congress, however.
21.For a discussion of other aspects of the taxation of foreign direct investment in the United
States, see Hines (1988), Jun (1989), Goodspeed and Frisch (1989), Hines and Hubbard (1989),
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1990), Sinn (1990), and Hines and Rice (1990). Hufbauer (1992) pro
vides a blueprint for reforming U.S. taxation of foreign income.
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22.Some states, although not unitary per se, enforce strict rules about combining business
income for affiliates and corporations that have joint stock ownership and other aspects in com
mon, although the affiliates do not operate in their state. In effect the state operates a form of uni
tary taxation without being called a unitary state.
23.Some states operate a domestic waters edge combination which combines incomes only of
affiliates doing business in the United States. For a discussion of the unitary tax see Moore,
Steece, and Swenson (1987) and Hellerstein (1983). The discussion above relies-extensively on
information provided in both of these sources. For a discussion of affiliated business groups, see
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (1992).
24.We did not account for domestic unitary taxation in our analysis, although several other
authors have found its coefficient statistically significant in their analysis of the locations of for
eign plants. We believe that their findings may be a statistical artifact, as many of the domestic
unitary states, such as Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah, are very small and would probably
have few foreign manufacturing plants locating there with or without a domestic unitary tax.
25.Manufacturing plants are those classified in SIC codes 20 to 39.
26.The so-called high-tech industries are categorized within these major industry groups. For
a discussion of high-tech categories and the merits of high-tech firms, see Tyson (1992).
27.Hartman departs from Horst's (1977) analysis pointing out that Horst ignored the future
home country liabilities for foreign investments. Thus, averaging the host and home country tax
rates was not correct. Hartman points out that Horst's average tax rate results result from his fail
ing to take account of taxes ultimately due on repatriated foreign investment. Horst in effect treats
deferral as an exemption from home country taxes on retained earnings or as if retained earnings
will never be repatriated.

Location Choices
of
New Foreign Plants
in the
United States
Building on the empirical trends in chapter 1, we begin here by
examining the location patterns of new foreign manufacturing plants in
the International Trade Administration data base from 1978 to 1987.
Plant location is examined by country of origin for the four leading
investors as well as for the total of all foreign plants. We identify some
distinct concentrations of new foreign plants in particular states.
We next examine the findings and methodologies of empirical stud
ies of foreign direct investment. There are two types of studies in the
empirical literature. The first focuses on the determinants of aggregate
flows of FDI among countries. This literature will help us decipher
how important such variables as national tax policy and aggregate
location determinants are to FDI flows among countries. Unfortu
nately, the empirical literature does not test exactly the many aspects of
the theories of aggregate FDI flows examined in chapter 1, but we are
able to draw some implications from the findings.
A second strand of the literature examines the determinants of FDI
location among states within a given country or among a set of coun
tries located in a particular region, such as the European Economic
Community (EEC). We gain additional insight into why FDI might
locate in particular states of the United States and whether the policy
levers available to state governments can make a particular state more
attractive to foreign plants and investors. Finally, we compare the loca
tion results obtained for foreign investors to the results obtained in the
firm location literature in general. Are foreign investors looking for
something different in their locations from what domestic investors are
looking for?
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Location of New Foreign Manufacturing Plants
in the United States
As noted earlier, foreign investors located 1,197 new manufacturing
plants in the United States between 1978 and 1987. Figure 2.1 maps
the concentration of the 1,197 new plants by state. The largest concen
trations of new manufacturing plants occur in seven states: California,
Texas, Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, Illinois and New York.
Together, these states account for 47 percent of the total number of
plant locations during the 1978 to 1987 period. Those concentrations
aside, foreign investors locate the vast majority of their new manufac
turing plants in the eastern half of the United States.
Seventy-four percent of the new foreign manufacturing plants are
from four countries: Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United King
dom. The next four figures illustrate the concentrations of new plant
locations in states by country of the major investor. The 105 Canadian
plant locations are heavily concentrated in New York State, which has
26 percent of the new Canadian plants (see figure 2.2). North Carolina
accounts for another 10 percent of the new Canadian plant locations.
Tennessee and California each had about 8 percent of the new Cana
dian plants.
German plant locations are displayed in figure 2.3. Connecticut,
New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Cal
ifornia account for 45 percent of the 215 German plant locations in the
United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. The 215 plants are also
heavily concentrated in the eastern states.
By contrast, new Japanese plant locations are heavily concentrated
in California, Washington, and Texas (see figure 2.4). These three
states account for 30 percent of the 402 new Japanese plants locating in
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. Another six eastern
states—Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, New Jersey, and
New York—account for 33 percent of Japanese new plants. United
Kingdom investors concentrate 54 percent of their 123 manufacturing
plant locations in eight states, namely, North Carolina, Texas, Georgia,
Florida, New Jersey, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Ohio (see figure
2.5).

Figure 2.1 Location of Foreign Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (1,197 plants)
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Figure 2.2 Location of Canadian Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (105 plants)

Figure 2.3 Location of German Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (215 plants)
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Figure 2.4 Location of Japanese Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (402 plants)
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Several interesting patterns appear to emerge. For example, these
foreign investors tend to locate their plants in states that are geographi
cal nearer their own country. The Canadians have heavily concentrated
their locations in New York State, while Germany and the United
Kingdom have concentrated their investments in the Eastern states.
Japanese investors appear to prefer states on the West Coast. North
Carolina, and to some extent Georgia, are also popular location choices
for all four countries, while Tennessee was a popular location for three
of the four countries.
Concentration of Industry in States

As noted in chapter 1, about 57 percent of the 1,197 new foreign
manufacturing plant locations during the 1978 to 1987 period are in
four major industry groups: Chemicals and Allied Products (196
plants), Industrial Machinery and Equipment (187), Electronic and
Other Electric Equipment (175), and Transportation Equipment (128).
Plants in these major groups cluster in from five to nine states, depend
ing on the major industry group. For example, 47.5 percent of the
plants in the Chemicals and Allied Products category are concentrated
in five states: Texas, followed by North Carolina, New Jersey, Georgia
and Delaware (see table 2.1). About 60 percent of the foreign plants in
the industrial machinery and equipment group are concentrated in nine
states, with the largest concentrations in North Carolina, California,
Connecticut and Georgia, and lower concentrations in Tennessee,
Texas, New York, Illinois, and Michigan. Overall, about 61 percent of
the foreign plants in Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment are
concentrated in eight states, with California and Georgia having 28
percent of the foreign plants. Plants in this major group also concen
trate in North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, New York, Indiana and Del
aware. Almost 69 percent of the foreign plants in transportation
equipment are concentrated in the auto alley states and California, New
York, and Texas. For example, over 15 percent of the new plant loca
tions are in Ohio, while foreign plants in the Transportation Equipment
group are also concentrated in Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illi
nois, and Indiana.

Figure 2.5 Location of United Kingdom Manufacturing Plants in the United States, 1978 to 1987 (123 plants)
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Table 2.1 State Concentrations of New Foreign Plants for Four Major
Groups (percent of new plants by major industry group)

Alabama
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
North Caro
lina
Ohio
Tennessee
Texas

Chemicals
and Allied
Products
(28)
6. 1

Industrial
Machinery
and
Equipment
(35)
8.0
8.0

Electronic
and Other
Electrical Transportation
Equipment
Equipment
(36)
(37)
17.2

7.8

4. 1
4.1

7.0
5.4

4.6
10.9
.6

4.3

6.2
5.5
7.0
8.6

8.2
8.7

16.3

5.9

5.1

9.1

6.9

5.9
5.9

5.1
6.9

4.7

15.6
7.8
5.5

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, ITA data on new plants.
NOTE: If more than 4 percent of the new plants in a major group are located in a state, it qualifies
here as a concentration of the industry.

We cannot explain here the strong concentrations of new plants in
particular states. The location patterns may be tied to industry agglom
eration economies available in each state or to the availability of a
known workforce or environment due to previous investments in the
states. In the latter case, the locations may not appear to represent the
most attractive locations when a standard set of cost and market vari
ables is examined. However, when considerations internal to the firm
enter the calculations, the observed locations dominate the alternatives.
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For example, if a number of Canadian subsidiaries are already located
in New York State, the firm may consider locating an additional plant
there rather than in another state, even though the latter state now
appears to have lower costs. The firm can probably spread internal
economies of scope, such as managerial expertise, more easily among
plants located in proximity to one another than when plants are located
in areas more remote from one another.
In addition, there is some evidence (Tyson 1992) that Japanese firms
locate plants producing automobiles as well as parts suppliers in close
proximity to one another to increase parts and product reliability and
the overall quality of the final product. That practice, if followed,
would also help to account for high concentrations of firms from a par
ticular country in particular states. It seems unlikely that empirical
work could account for many of these variables. Nonetheless, we will
attempt to account for the concentrations of firms in particular loca
tions, even if we cannot totally explain the reasons for the concentra
tions. Put another way, we also recognize that concentration economies
internal to the firm and other than the industry agglomeration econo
mies that are measured with published data might explain the observed
concentrations of these industries.

Aggregate Foreign Direct Investment Studies

The recent literature on aggregate FDI flows among countries fol
lows two distinct courses. One strand focuses almost exclusively on
U.S. corporate tax policy as a determinant of the volume of FDI in the
United States. A second strand largely ignores corporate tax policy and
focuses on nontax economic determinants of FDI. The main features
and findings of eight major studies that focus on determination of FDI
flows among nations are summarized in table 2.2.
Do Taxes Matter in Aggregate Investment Decisions?

Hartman (1984) has pioneered the recent empirical work on FDI in
the United States, or at least the work that emphasizes the effect of
taxes on FDI flows. His research, while omitting many other determi-
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nants of foreign investment, relates inward U.S. FDI to rates of return
on investment variables and to the relative U.S. tax rates faced by for
eign and domestic investors. Following his distinction between mature
and immature investors (mentioned in chapter 1), Hartman examines
separately investments of existing foreign subsidiaries financed by
retained earnings (mature firms) and investments financed by transfers
of funds from parent corporations. In both cases, however, Hartman
finds that the relative effective U.S. tax rates faced by foreign and
domestic investors significantly affect FDI within the United States. In
all of the regressions that he runs with aggregate data from the 1965 to
1979 period, the elasticities of inward investment flows to the United
States with respect to the relative tax rates are significantly larger than
unity, and in some cases the elasticity estimates are larger than two.
His results reveal a substantial role for corporate tax policy in attract
ing and maintaining FDI flows into the United States. However, the
regressions explaining FDI financed by transfers from parent corpora
tions fit the data less well than the regressions for FDI financed by
retained earnings. The former elasticities are also less statistically sig
nificant compared to the latter case. Nonetheless, while he appropri
ately cautions about the simplicity of the model specification, Hartman
finds that U.S. tax policy significantly affects inward FDI. Hartman's
empirical results are also consistent with his theoretical analysis, which
led him to suggest that there is capital-import, but not capital-export,
neutrality.
Hartman's pathbreaking work in this area set the tone for this line of
research. For example, subsequent papers follow his separate analyses
of investment financed from transfers and from retained earnings. The
research also shares his emphasis on the role of tax policy.
Boskin and Gale (1987) update Hartman's analysis using revised
measures of effective tax rates and conduct the analysis over different
time periods. Their results for the 1965 to 1979 period are similar to
Hartman's, although Boskin and Gale's point estimates of the parame
ters, while still elastic, are somewhat smaller than Hartman's. When
they also analyze U.S. inward FDI during the 1956 to 1984 and the
1965 to 1984 time periods, they find that FDI was more responsive to
tax differentials after 1965, and elasticities of investment with respect
to the various specifications of the tax rates for the 1965 to 1984 period
are similar to the estimates that Hartman finds.

Table 2.2 Results From Studies of the Determinants of FDI Flows Among Countries
Country of analysis and period

Principal findings

Hartman
(1984)

FDI inflows to U.S. from 1965 to 1979. FDI financed
from retained earnings and transfers from parent cor
porations analyzed separately. Variables are relative
return on investments and U.S. tax rates faced by for
eign and domestic firms.

Taxes have a substantial effect on inward FDI flows. Elasticities of
FDI with respect to taxes range from above unity to just above two,
and are generally larger for FDI financed from retained earnings than
from transfers from parents. Equations explaining FDI from transfers
fit less well than those explaining FDI from retained earnings.

Boskin and
Gale (1987)

FDI flows to U.S. from 1956 to 1984. They adapt
Hartman's model by using an updated series on
effective tax rates and adding a GNP variable and a
dummy variable for the 1980s.

For 1965 to 1979 period, results are similar to Hartman's. Augment
ing the model with GNP and other variables does not alter the basic
results. The elasticities of FDI with respect to taxes are higher in the
1965 to 1984 period than in the 1956 to 1984 period. Retained earn
ings fit the equations better than transfers from parents.

Young (1988)

Inward FDI to U.S. from retained earnings and trans
fers using revised data on effective rates of return.
Data are for 1956 to 1984. Basic Hartman models are
augmented with a lagged dependent variable and a
GNP variable.

In the augmented model, elasticities of retained earnings with respect
to tax rates and rates of return are smaller than Hartman and Boskin
and Gale find. Young finds that FDI financed from transfers from
parents are inelastic with respect to both taxes and rate of return vari
ables.

Slemrod
0989)

FDI flows into the U.S. by country of investor: Canada, France, Netherlands, West Germany, Italy,
Japan, United Kingdom. The first four countries
operate territorial tax systems and the last three oper
ate residential tax systems. Also explains total FDI,
FDI financed from retained earnings and from trans
fers from parents. Time period is from 1960 to 1987
or 1962 to 1987 (for two countries).

Variables include GDPin home country relative to GDPin U.S.,
unemployment rate of prime-age males in U.S., real exchange rate of
U.S. dollars relative to the home country's real exchange rate, and the
Auerbach and Hines (1988) measure of the marginal effective corpo
rate income tax rate on fixed investment in the U.S.
Coefficients for real GDP and real exchange rates generally have
the correct signs and are statistically significant. The coefficients on
the tax variables reveal no strong role for taxes in either territorial or
residential tax countries.

Study

Cushman
(1987)

U.S. FDI inflows and outflows to and from five
countries: Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, France,
Germany. Data from 1963 to 1981.

FDI inflows to the U.S. increase with its real GNP, a lower dollar
exchange rate, and a stable exchange rate. However, higher wages in
the U.S. and higher productivity in the home country reduce the FDI
inflow to the U.S.

Culem (1988)

FDI inflows among six industrialized countries
(U.S., Germany, France, United Kingdom, Nether
lands, Belgium), 1969-1982. Analyzes FDI inflows
into all six countries, inflows from U.S. to EEC
countries, inflows from EEC to U.S., and inflows
among EEC countries only.

The pooled results for all countries in the sample indicate that higher
real GDPin the host country, a wider gap between real GDPin the
host and home countries, and higher home country exports to the
host country increase the FDI flow to the host country. Higher labor
costs in the host country reduce FDI inflows, however.
FDI flows from the EEC countries to the U.S. increase with a higher
GDPin the U.S., higher tariff rates in the U.S., and higher exports
from the home country to the U.S.

Ray (1989)

FDI flow into U.S. by industry from these countries:
Japan, Canada, total of EEC countries. 1979 to 1985.

The principal findings suggest that U.S. GNP growth increases FDI
inflow from other countries to the U.S. Except for Japan, where the
exchange rate has no effect on FDI flow, a low-dollar exchange rate
increases FDI inflow to the U.S. Higher growth in a four-digit indus
try within the U.S. leads to more FDI in that same industry.

Mann (1989)

Japanese FDI in U.S. for 12 major manufacturing
groups 1977 to 1987. Examines Japanese investment
in new plants, increases in Japanese equity holdings
in existing manufacturing firms in U.S., and total
investment in new plants and equity increases.

Higher savings in Japan, higher U.S. nontariff barriers, and higher
sales of the product by firms already in the U.S. increase equity, new
plant, and the total of equity and new plant investments. Higher raw
material costs in the U.S. reduce equity investment and total invest
ment, but not specifically new plant investment. Higher world inter
est rates reduce new plant investment and total investment, but not
investment to increase equity.
Dollar-yen exchange rate and labor costs in the U.S. have no effect
on equity and new plant investments in the U.S.
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They then depart from Hartman's empirical specification and aug
ment the right-hand-side tax variables with a GNP variable and a time
dummy variable equal to unity for the 1980s and zero otherwise. How
ever, the new variables do not affect the elasticities for the tax vari
ables. Also consistent with Hartman, Boskin and Gale find that the
regressions examining investment financed by retained earnings fit the
data much better than the regressions examining investment financed
by transferred capital.
Young (1988) further modifies the Hartman model by introducing a
lagged dependent variable and a GNP variable on the right-hand-side.
Young finds FDI financed from retained earnings less responsive to
both the tax and the rates of return variables than both Hartman and
Boskin and Gale. Furthermore, the responsiveness of transferred funds
to both the tax and rates of return variables is less than unity or inelas
tic. Young's results indicate a diminished role for taxation in U.S.
inward FDI financed from transferred funds. His results also imply that
the simple Hartman model might not be the most appropriate for exam
ining FDI flows, especially FDI flows financed by funds transferred
from foreign parent corporations. 1
Slemrod (1989) also tests the influence of taxation on FDI in the
United States during the 1956 to 1984 period. He augments Hartman's
model with additional macroeconomic variables and also tests the
proposition that U.S. taxes have more influence on investors from
countries operating a territorial tax system than investors from coun
tries operating a residential tax system with a credit for foreign taxes
paid. He finds evidence that U.S. taxes affect total FDI and net trans
fers from abroad, but do not affect FDI financed from retained earn
ings. He also finds that whether a country operates a territorial or
residential tax system has little influence on FDI flows.
The recent studies examined here in the end find a limited role for
tax policy in the explanation of the aggregate flow of direct investment
into the United States. For example, when more variables are added to
the original models, the conclusion that taxes have a strong effect on
FDI collapses. In addition, the econometrics used to estimate the mod
els in the later papers is more sophisticated or the estimators are more
efficient and likely to be more accurate. Measures of the tax variables
themselves have also become more sophisticated; earlier tax variable
measures might be erroneous.
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But should not tax factors make a difference? Why should we accept
the findings of no tax effects if our intuition suggests otherwise? Recall
that Gordon and Jun, as well as our argument in chapter 1 describe the
complexity of the taxation of foreign capital flows. The possibilities to
avoid capital taxation through timing of repatriations and adjusting
financial behavior could lead to a neutral effect of taxation on aggre
gate financial flows. However, underneath the aggregate data may be
substantial tax effects on financial transactions that are designed solely
to reduce the tax impact on capital income. Thus, while aggregate stud
ies may fail to identify tax effects, the effects may indeed be substan
tial. We suggest that taxation can affect aggregate capital flows even if
and because corporate financial policy is designed to neutralize the
effects of taxation on capital flows.
Other Influences on FDI Flows

Several researchers perform time-series or pooled cross-section/
time series analyses that all but ignore taxation issues and focus on
other economic dimensions of the foreign investment decision. Several
of the studies examine FDI inflows into the United States as well as
into other major countries, while others confine their inquiry to U.S.
inflows of FDI. Four of these studies are summarized in the latter half
of table 2.2. There is some consensus among the research findings,
although the findings do not always point in the same direction. In
some cases, for example, the conflicting evidence garnered from stud
ies of combined FDI flows from several countries into the United
States is reconciled when the flows are examined by country of origin.
Wage Effects
Earlier empirical literature found no evidence (Dunning 1980) that
higher wages influenced FDI.2 Among the four studies (Cushman
1987; Culem 1988; Ray 1989; and Mann 1989) summarized in table
2.2, Cushman, examining U.S. FDI inflows from and outflows to the
five other major investing countries during the 1963 to 1981 period,
finds that host country wages are a statistically significant determinant
of FDI inflows to countries. A related finding is that higher productiv
ity in the home country of the investor leads to less FDI outflow to
other countries. Similarly, Culem finds that host country unit labor
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costs deter FDI inflows into particular European Economic Commu
nity (EEC) countries. To be specific, unit labor costs did not affect the
aggregate size of the FDI flowing to the EEC, but unit labor costs
determine to some degree the location choice for the FDI or the desti
nation of FDI within the EEC countries. The latter is an important
observation for our research on FDI location within the United States,
because relative wage costs among the states may attract (or deter) FDI
to (from) certain states. More to the point, Culem finds that wage costs
do not influence the aggregate flow of FDI to the United States; he did
not test, however, the location choice of FDI among states.

Market Variables: Gross Domestic Product, Tariffs
Five of six major studies (Cushman 1987; Ohullachain 1984; Mann
1989; Culem 1988; and Ray 1989) find that the level of Gross Domes
tic Product (GDP) and the growth of GDP in the host country attract
FDI especially in the case of the United States (Caves 1982 is the sixth
study). According to these studies, one attraction of FDI is access to
the American market place. The studies are divided about the impor
tance of tariffs and other trade barriers. Caves, Culem and Mann find
that the circumvention of trade barriers is an important incentive to
invest directly in the trade-restricting country, while Ray and Cushman
find no evidence that tariff barriers influence FDI flows.
Exchange Rates
The literature is less divided on the role of exchange rates and
exchange rate stability. While not all studies examine the role of
exchange rates in FDI flows, studies that include exchange rates in the
analyses conclude that devaluation of the host country currency rela
tive to the home country currency accelerates FDI, except in the case
of Japanese investors. Studies examining only Japanese FDI in other
countries find no role for exchange rates.
Levinsohn (1989) points out, however, that a role for exchange rates
in FDI is unexpected. If the U.S. dollar, for example, is low relative to
its equilibrium value, firms could earn profits by arbitrage in the for
eign exchange market for dollars without accelerating FDI. Nonethe
less, in many cases lower-priced dollars accelerate FDI even if the
exchange rate does not influence the location or type and size of the
investment.3
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Lessons for States
What can state policymakers learn from this literature on aggregate
investment flows? First, if wages are important to the investor, they are
more likely to influence the firm's location within the United States
rather than affect the decision about the aggregate size of FDI in the
United States. To be specific, the choice to enter the United States is
mainly determined by the size of the market for the product and by
growth in that market. More populous states or ones near large concen
trations of population may fare better in attracting foreign investors.
United States tariff and nontariff barriers are important influences
on the volume of FDI into the United States. Industries that face signif
icant U.S. trade barriers are particularly good candidates for recruit
ment to a state. In addition, recruiting foreign investment may be easier
when the U.S. dollar is weak relative to other currencies.
According to Ray, FDI in the United States tends to be in those
industries that are also growing domestically in the United States. The
evidence shown in figure 1.4 and table 1.5 of chapter 1 tends to support
the conclusions of Ray's study. Thus, states should not necessarily look
for foreign investors who will replace the dying industries in their
states with those same industries. In all likelihood, the FDI will be in
the very industries that prosper domestically. Thus, states that have a
workforce trained in a dying industry will still want to think about
retraining programs to make their workforce suitable to growing indus
tries within the United States, as opposed to attracting foreign inves
tors who will utilize the existing skills of the displaced workers.
Another implication growing out of Ray's findings is that states will
want to be careful in offering generous tax and other concessions to
attract foreign investors, especially when the concessions could give an
advantage to foreign firms relative to domestic firms in the same grow
ing industries within the state.4
Studies of FDI Location Within the United States
Table 2.3 summarizes seven major studies performed on FDI loca
tion within the United States during the 1980s. With the exception of
the Glickman and Woodward (1987) research, all of the studies use

Table 23 Summary of Selected Studies of FDI Location in the United States from 1980 to 1989____________
Study
McConnell
(1980)

Shetty and
Luger(1985)

Data/time period/sample

1976 cross-section of 2,151 acqui- Dependent variable: share of the
sitions, mergers or new plants.
total investment in each state.
Ordinary Least Squares stepwise regression applied to a list
of right-hand-side variables.

Pools ITAdata, for years 1979,
1981,1982,1983. Total of 76 new
plant start- ups in three industry
groups: SIC 38 (drug manufactur
ing) SIC (355,356 (industrial
machinery) SIC 371 (motor vehi
cle production).
Moore, Steece Net foreign investment in manu
and Swenson facturing assets by state for 1977
(1987)
to 1981.
Glickman and
Woodward
(1987)

Estimation method

Conditional multinomial logit
for locations among states of
new plants in each industry
group

Dependent Variable: net foreign
investment in gross assets by
state. Regressions for each year
from 1977 to 1981

BEA series on U.S. affiliate
Ordinary Least Squares
employment; employment
growth between 1974 and 1983 in
foreign manufacturing plants in
each state.

Variables with statistically significant coefficients and their
effect (+ or -) on FDI
•Agglomeration economies (+)
•Urbanization (+)
•Population Density (+)
•State located in the manufacturing belt (+)
•State and local expenditures per capita (+)
•Index of social well-being (-)
•Distance from New York City (-)
•Federal aid to state and local governments in the
state (-)
•Manufacturing employees per capita (-)
•Retail sales per capita (-)
•Agglomeration economies (+)
•Wages (-) in two of three regressions
•State policy index (+) in two of three regressions

•Business Climate (+)
•Population (+)
•Unemployment (+)
•Worldwide unitary (-)
•Domestic unitary (-)
•Gravity measure of market in state (+)
•Percent change in per capita income (+)
•Right to work law (-)
•State spending per capita (-)
•Montana and Wyoming dummy variable (+)
•Ratio of farm population to manufacturing employment (+)
•Worldwide Unitary Taxation (-)

Ordinary Least Squares per
formed on total, high-tech and
nonhigh-tech manufacturing
plants. Independent variables
averaged over the 1976 to 1986
period.

Friedman,
Gerlowski,
Silberman
(1989)

Number of new manufacturing
plants in states for the 1976 to
1986 period.

Coughlin,
Terza,
Arromdee
(1991)

ITA: Number of FDI investments Conditional logit model.
in each state in 1981, 1982 and
1983. (Investments include new
plants, acquisitions, mergers, joint
ventures, and other investments.)

Woodward
(1992)

Japanese-affiliated manufa during
investments, 1980-1989. Data
from Japan Economic Institute.
Total sample of 540 plants.

Two levels of analysis: Selection of states, selection of
county within state. Uses multinomial logit analysis; indepen
dent variables are for 1980. For
the county-level analysis, the
estimation is performed sepa
rately on a sample of total coun
ties, auto-alley counties and
non-auto-alley counties.

•Market potential (gravity measure) (+)
•Wage (-) (in total and high-tech manufacturing only)
•Scientists and Engineers per capita (+) (in high-tech manufactur
ing only)
•State has a container port (+)
•State dollars spent attracting FDI (+) (for total and non-high-tech
manufacturing)
•State land area (+)
•Income per capita (+)
•Production worker average wage rate (-)
•State unemployment rate (+)
•Manufacturing employment per square mile (+)
•Unitary taxation (-) in two of four equations
•Infrastructure variables (highways, RR miles, and airport facili
ties per square mile) (+)
State Choice:
•Gravity measure of per capita income of state location (+)
•Unionization rate (-)
•Domestic unitary tax (-)
•Worldwide unitary tax (-)
•State office in Japan (+)
•Land area of the state (+)
•Pacific region of U.S. (+)
•East North Central region of U.S. (+)
•East South Central region of U.S. (+)
County Choice:
•Manufacturing agglomeration (+)
•Population density (+) (Total and non-auto-alley only)
•Interstate highway connection (+)
•Poverty rate (-) (total and non-auto-alley only)
•Nonpoor black density (-) (auto-alley only)
•Unemployment rate (-) (total and auto-alley)
•land area (+)
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micro data to analyze location choice. However, the studies vary in
their level of econometric sophistication and disaggregation of the
analysis. For example, in some cases the sample sizes are very small
(Luger and Shetty 1985), making their results potentially unreliable.
Two of the studies, McConnell (1980) and Coughlin, Terza, and
Arromdee (1991), are performed on a single year of data for the
explanatory variables, while the other studies examine growth or start
ups over a multiple-year period. Two studies (Luger and Shetty 1985
and Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman 1989) distinguish new plants
from other investments, but others perform the estimation on the entire
group of new investments mixing acquisitions and joint ventures, for
example, with new plants.
Despite considerable methodological differences among these exist
ing studies, they share several findings. Agglomeration economies,
urbanization economies, and measures of market demand are impor
tant in attracting FDI to states. On the other hand, higher wages and
worldwide unitary taxation deterred FDI within the states. Higher taxa
tion in general, right-to-work laws, and unionization of the workforce,
however, are generally not found to have a statistically significant
effect on FDI in states.
While as a group the above studies reach similar conclusions, it is
premature to regard the results as conclusive. Analysis using other data
sets and further disaggregation of the data might generate different
results for particular industries or home countries. Woodward's 1992
study examines the location of Japanese manufacturing firms within
the United States and is an example of how disaggregation of the data
and the location decision can produce refinements in the conclusions.
It is worth describing his analysis and results in more detail here. He
uses micro data for the 1980 to 1989 period on 540 plant locations
obtained from the Japan Economic Institute and performs two levels of
analysis: state choice and the selection of the county within the state.
For the state analysis, he finds that higher per capita income in the
region, a state economic development office located in Japan, the
state's land area, and the state's location in the Pacific region, in the
East North region, or in the East South region attracts Japanese manu
facturing plants. On the other hand, a high level of unionization of the
labor force in the state and unitary taxation deter Japanese manufactur
ing locations.

Location Choices of New Foreign Plants in the United States

59

For the county-level analysis, he first examines counties in a pooled
analysis and then disaggregates the counties into auto- and non-autoalley counties within the United States.5 The auto-alley countries are
those lying in the states between Michigan and Tennessee. Manufac
turing agglomeration economies, an interstate highway connection,
and counties with larger land areas attract more plants in the pooled
and in each of the auto- and the non-auto-alley county analyses. A
higher population density in a county attracts more plants in the pooled
county-level analysis and in the non-auto-alley analysis, whereas
higher rates of poverty and unemployment deter Japanese manufactur
ing plant locations in these same two types of counties. Property taxes
do not influence plant locations in any of the county-level analyses.
Another finding is noteworthy. A higher percentage of blacks in the
population deters location of Japanese manufacturing plants in the
auto-alley counties. Woodward's finding on spatial discrimination is
somewhat surprising, although racial discrimination by the Japanese
has been the subject of some speculation.
Cole and Deskins (1988), for example, argue that Japanese auto pro
ducers, and possibly other foreign investors, located in the United
States effectively discriminate against blacks. By selecting rural sites
for their plants, they employ fewer blacks than is typical in the indus
try. Furthermore, Cole and Deskins point out that states offering subsi
dies to foreign investors who practice discrimination against certain
minorities by locating in certain rural counties may, in effect, be subsi
dizing discrimination against blacks and other minority populations.
While this is an interesting finding that needs further testing, a statelevel location analysis such as ours is not likely to uncover such dis
crimination patterns. Thus, while our results provide insight into the
location decision at the state level, states should be aware of the poten
tial for more subtle patterns of location within their state and the poten
tial for discrimination.
Comparing the FDl Location Results
with the General Location Literature

Numerous location studies of domestic firms and employment exist.
Bartik (1991) cites 57 interarea studies or those that examine locations
decisions among states or among metropolitan areas. As Wasylenko's
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(1991) review also suggests, the results of these studies vary consider
ably. Most of the studies have focused on manufacturing employment,
and that aspect of the work is consistent with the focus of the FDI stud
ies.
Below we review the major results for the existing studies and point
out consistencies with the results for FDI locations. While certain pat
terns emerge, we emphasize that the results are not uniform across
studies, subjecting interpretations of the results to considerable judge
ment.
Wages
Wages represent a major component of costs and higher wages are
expected to deter growth in manufacturing. A more productive labor
force will lead to higher wages, so that wages must be compared to
productivity measures. The latter variable is generally not observable,
and many researchers develop proxy measures for productivity, such as
the median number of school years completed by the adult population
of an area. The productivity proxy measures are at best imperfect, and
the studies do not adequately correct the measured wages levels for
productivity differentials. Differences in productivity across areas and
across time may account for the variation in results for the wage vari
able among studies.
The majority of location studies find that areas with higher wages
attract fewer manufacturing jobs over time, but in many cases the coef
ficients on the wage variables are not statistically significant. The FDI
studies reviewed here have nonuniform results for wages, suggesting
in about half the cases that differentially higher area wages reduce the
chances of attracting a new foreign manufacturing plant or investment.
The nonrobust results for the wage variable are surprising, given the
significance of wages in the costs of manufacturing. However, when
the coefficients on wages are not statistically significant, other unmea
sured factors, such as productivity or other endowments in the regions,
may help to explain the attractiveness of the regions to some manufac
turers, despite higher wages levels.
Unions
Unions can affect labor costs in several ways. Unions can raise
wage and fringe benefits levels. The former effect should be captured

Location Choices of New Foreign Plants in the United States 61

in the wage variables, but to the extent that unions raise fringe benefit
levels, unionization will have an impact on labor costs not already
reflected in the wage level.
In addition, unionization can create a climate of tension between
labor and management that reduces worker productivity. In some
cases, union effects on productivity are more explicit. For example,
union leaders have at times introduced work rules, such as assignment
of a specific number of workers to a production process, leading to
lower output per worker. A strike can produce an untimely disruption
in the workplace.
The percentage of the U.S. manufacturing labor force that is union
ized declined from 27.3 percent in 1984 to 23.8 percent in 1991 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1992). The decline in unionization has largely
tracked reduced employment in high-wage manufacturing jobs. Efforts
to unionize nonmanufacturing sectors of the economy have not offset
the losses in the manufacturing sector. Global competitiveness has also
induced some unions to become more cooperative with management in
some labor disputes, because both parties have realized that competi
tion threatens corporate profitability and jobs at the corporation.
Unions can also improve the labor environment for management.
For example, Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest that a unionized
firm can have higher productivity due to higher capital-labor ratios,
less worker turnover, and the attraction of higher quality labor to
unionized firms. Lower worker turnover, for example, reduces training
costs and raises plant-specific human capital, which could account for
the observed higher productivity.
The mixed a priori effects of unionization are reflected in mixed
results for the unionization variable in business location studies. Many
location studies find that unionization per se has no effect on business
location or employment growth. Nonetheless, the issue is not settled,
because other researchers find that unionization affects employment
growth in manufacturing industries in general and in foreign manufac
turing locations in particular. However, given the reduced coverage
and influence of unions, their impact on location outcomes, while
unsettled, is probably declining in significance.
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Agglomeration Economies
There is strong and consistent evidence that specific types of firms
are attracted to similar places. Agglomeration may bestow benefits, for
example, from vertical interactions between firms that sell intermediate
inputs and firms that purchase the inputs. The agglomeration of firms
may also result in the attraction of a greater number of skilled workers
to reside near the firms, and the skilled workers may in turn attract
more firms. Thus, measures of agglomeration economies persistently
turn up significant positive coefficients for manufacturing location
decisions in both the general and the foreign manufacturing location
literature.
Fiscal Variables
Fiscal variables have generated more controversy than any of the
other findings. In part, policymakers have direct control over expendi
tures and tax levels and that heightens their interest in the effects of fis
cal variables on job creation. Studies vary significantly in the
sophistication with which they handle fiscal variables. Few studies use
the balanced-budget technique of Helms (1985), which includes all
expenditures and taxes in the estimated equation. Most studies include
a portion of the tax and expenditure variables or leave out the expendi
ture side completely. Thus, the comparability of the results across stud
ies is especially difficult in this case.
In the general literature on business location and employment
growth, tax variables and public expenditure variables are statistically
significant in a number of studies. Bartik (1991) has assessed this liter
ature and concludes that in the majority of studies, tax variables influ
ence business location of manufacturing firms. Wasylenko and
McGuire (1985) contributes to the evidence on significant tax effects.
Many of the studies that find significant effects for fiscal variables in
manufacturing are performed on data from the 1970s. Wasylenko has
attempted unsuccessfully to reproduce the tax results using data from
the 1980s. Carroll and Wasylenko (1993) examine specifically whether
the data for the 1970s follow a different regime than data for the 1980s.
Indeed, the regimes are different and manufacturing employment
growth responds to fiscal variables for the 1970 data but not for the
1980 data. It appears that fiscal differentials narrowed among states in
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the 1980s, making the fiscal differentials less significant as a location
or growth determinant.
Those findings cause us to examine the existing literature on fiscal
effects in a different light. Many of the studies that use 1980 data,
including the studies of FDI reported here, do not find statistically sig
nificant effects for the fiscal variables. Thus, the general level of taxa
tion in a state does not appear to affect FDI. However, none of the
studies includes expenditure variables in the analysis.
Foreign firms are concerned with more than the general level of tax
ation in a state, however. As noted in chapter 1, a state's use of world
wide unitary or domestic unitary taxation affects the taxable status of
the firm's profits in other countries. Most of the FDI empirical studies
examine worldwide unitary taxation and find that states using that form
of taxation to determine taxable profits have a lower probability of
attracting foreign investors. The two studies that include domestic uni
tary taxation in the model find that its use also dampens FDI activity in
the state.
Closer inspection of the states that use domestic unitary taxation
makes us cautious about accepting the conclusion about its dampening
effects. Moore, Steece, and Swenson (1987) list Colorado, Illinois,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah (and in practice
New York) as domestic unitary states. But three of the domestic unitary
states (Montana, Nebraska, and Utah) have virtually no new foreign
plants located in them (see figure 2.1) and three others (Colorado, Kan
sas, and Massachusetts) have a small number of foreign plants in them.
The domestic unitary tax variable may pick up regional effects or iso
late states that have few if any foreign firms for reasons unrelated to
the domestic unitary tax. Put more directly, the results on the domestic
unitary tax variable may be spurious.
In summary, we believe that there are broad similarities between the
existing studies on general firm location and the studies on FDI. How
ever, the latter area is still not thoroughly explored, and further studies
may identify wider gaps between the location decisions of foreign and
domestic firms.
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NOTES
1. In addition, Newlon (1987), as summarized in Shah and Slemrod (1990), replicates the
Hartman and Boskin and Gale models and identifies mistakes in the calculations of rate of return
in the data set used in their analysis. When he applies the corrected data to the 1965 to 1979
period, he finds that the retained earnings equations do not fit as well as when they are fitted with
the unrevised data, but the transfer equations fit somewhat better using the revised data as com
pared to the fits using the unrevised data. However, when Newlon analyzes FDI from 1956 to
1984, none of the coefficients in the transfer equation is statistically significant.
2. For a review of the earlier literature, see Caves (1982).
3. While the review of the literature has focused on FDI into the United States, the Shah and
Slemrod (1990) study of FDI in Mexico deserves mention due to its thoroughness and interesting
findings. Shah and Slemrod examine FDI in Mexico during the 1965 to 1987 period. Their model
accounts for host and home country taxation and incorporates Mexico's tariff policy, credit wor
thiness, and an index of the regulatory environment. In addition, they incorporate Mexico's mar
ginal effective tax rates into their analysis, arguing that marginal tax rates are better indicators of
the incentives to invest. They also include average effective tax rates for the U.S. in their model.
For the transfers equation, the coefficients on the marginal effective tax rate in Mexico and credit
worthiness are statistically significant and indicate that higher tax rates and worse credit ratings
reduce FDI transfers from abroad. For the retained earnings equation, the coefficients on credit
worthiness, marginal effective tax rates in Mexico and average tax rates in the home country are
statistically significant and affect FDI in the hypothesized ways. Thus, Hartman's hypothesis
about the insignificance of home country tax rates is not confirmed. Moreover, Mexico's tariff
structure and its regulatory environment do not influence its inward FDI.
4. A reviewer has pointed out that Ray's finding that FDI industries are similar to industries
growing in the United States may not be particularly robust over time. The reviewer cites the
automotive sector as a counterexample to the Ray conclusion. The reviewer may be correct for
that particular industry. We note, however, that Ray's measure of domestic industry growth is the
increase in the value of product shipped and not employment growth. The implication is that man
ufacturing industries with large productivity gains may experience relatively large gains in the
value of shipments but slow employment growth or even employment losses. If employment is
used to gauge industry growth patterns, the domestic growth industries could appear to be declin
ing rather than growing.
5. To keep the data-gathering manageable, Woodward's sample includes all counties that have
a Japanese manufacturing plant located in them and a random sample of nine counties in each
state that do not have a Japanese manufacturing plant located in them.

Modeling the Location
of New Plants
In principle at least, the choice of a state for the location of a new
plant seems straightforward. The firm would examine the potential
profits to be earned in each state and choose the state that offers the
highest profit.
In practice, the location choice is much more difficult for a host of
reasons. Firms will presumably have a long-range definition of profits
in mind, and in that case the firm will choose states that have favorable
economic variables now and favorable expected economic variables
over the profit horizon of the plant. Firms might use the information on
all past values of the relevant economic variables in an attempt to make
forecasts about their future values. However, unless we know exactly
how this is done, there seems to be little hope that we would be able to
duplicate such a method independently. We therefore assume in our
analysis that the current values of the relevant variables are the firms'
best forecasts for future values.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that we, as researchers, will be able
to identify or use all the relevant variables that go into the firm's deci
sion. Accordingly, we will subsume all of the relevant variables that we
cannot identify or use into a random component that acts like a distur
bance in a linear regression model.
The subjection of profits to a random component allows us to use
econometric methods to identify the influence of each identified inde
pendent variable on the probability of location in a particular state.
However, the choice of an econometric method to use on the problem
is fraught with several ponderous estimation issues.
In this chapter, we first address the conceptual profit maximization
problem and discuss the general class of econometric estimation mod
els that are consistent with the profit maximization problem. After that,
we point out the limitations of the most straightforward econometric
model within the class and then turn to refinements of the basic estima-
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tion model that will lead to more reliable estimates of the model's coef
ficients.

Maximizing Location Choice and a Baseline
Estimation Method

We follow the typical modeling approach to location choice. The
firm selects a state site for a new plant by examining a vector of its
potential profits across the 48 states, n. The firm chooses the state cor
responding to the element in K with the highest profit level. If we let TC/
denote the firm's forecasted profits in state i, then state i is chosen only
if
rc/smaxOCf,...,^).

(3.1)

We, of course, only observe the firm's choice of state for location of
the plant, and do not observe the firm's forecasts of its profits at each
site.
While we do not observe the forecasted profits, we can infer the
important determinants of these profits by analyzing econometrically
the choices that firms actually have made. We postulate a priori that
they are a function of observed characteristics in each state, such as
wages, agglomeration economies, fiscal variables, and other variables
which we will discuss in the next chapter. Write these observed charac
teristics as a vector Xs for state s.
Forecasted potential profits in each state s can now be written as a
function of Xs and a random error, es,
Ks = X£ + es ,

(3.2)

where p is the vector of estimated coefficients. Therefore, a particular
state i is chosen if
X/P + el->Xyp + e, for s*i.

(3.3)
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The standard assumption is that the residuals e, are independently
and identically distributed as a type I extreme-value distribution (also
called a Weibull distribution), which has a cumulative distribution
function of
F(e) = exp (-exp(-e)) .

(3.4)

Then the probability of choosing a given state i can be expressed as
48
/>(/) = exp (Xft)/ Z exp(X,P)
(3.5)
s=J
The baseline estimation is a standard multinomial logit estimation.
Many computer software packages will readily produce estimates of
the p coefficients. However, the standard multinomial logit estimation
method involves a very strong assumption that the addition of a state to
the choice set or the deletion of a state from the choice set does not
affect the relative probabilities of the choice of state i and state j. This
property, known as the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (HA),
means that the relative probabilities of choosing a location in New
York and in Pennsylvania, for example, are not affected when North
Carolina or Texas are removed from the choice set of locations. Put
differently, if, for example, North Carolina is removed from the choice
set of locations, the probabilities of choosing New York and of choos
ing Pennsylvania are changed in the same direction and by an equal
percentage.
The presence of the IIA property can be demonstrated using equa
tion (3.5). The relative probabilities of choosing any two states depend
only on the information in X for the two states in question. In our New
York (NY) and Pennsylvania (PA) example,
/W) / P(PA) = exptXjvyp) / exp^p) .

(3.6)

In moving from (3.5) to (3.6), the denominator on the right-handside of equation (3.5) cancels out of the numerator and denominator of
(3.6). With the elimination of the denominators, the information in the
vector X for North Carolina is removed or becomes irrelevant to the
relative probabilities of locating in New York or Pennsylvania. 1
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From an economic or analytical perspective, the imposition of the
IIA property means that the relative probability over two location
choices does not depend on the existence of close substitutes for either
location. To many analysts such an assumption seems overly restrictive
and unrealistic. Nonetheless, research in this area has applied the stan
dard multinomial logit model to location choices. We examine some
alternative estimation methods below.
Nested Multinomial Logit
For the choice of location among 48 states, the nested multinomial
logit model (NMNL) developed in McFadden (1978) postulates resid
uals that have a generalized extreme-value distribution; the distribution
avoids the IIA assumption. 2 McFadden also showed that the NMNL
model can be derived from a stochastic utility or in our case a stochas
tic profit-maximization model.
The NMNL model takes advantage of a hierarchical decisionmaking
structure. In our problem, for example, we can assume that firms make
location decisions sequentially. They choose a region of the country
and then choose a state within the chosen region. The NMNL model
carries two advantages. The standard multinomial logit model is nested
within it and thus when we estimate the simple NMNL model, we can
detect, based on the value of a parameter, whether the IIA assumption
is appropriate.
To present this advantage in more detail, we present succinctly the
mathematics of the simple NMNL model and relate the analysis pre
sented above to the relevant parameters of the model.
The Simple NMNL Model
The firm will choose a region r and then a state i within the region.
The choice of region and state will then be the probability of choosing
state i given the region r multiplied by the probability of choosing the
region r. In symbols,
(3.7)
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The conditional and marginal probability can be rewritten as
P(i\f) = exp(X,-p) / Z exp(X,P)
ser

(3.8)

and
P(r) = exp(7ra) Z expC^P) / Z
©© exp(X,> P) ,
© exp(yr- a) Z
ser

(3.9)

where the outer summation in the denominator of (3.9) is taken over all
regions r'. Here Yr is the vector of attributes that vary only with
region r.
Now define an inclusive value Ir as follows:
7r = logZexp(X,p).
ser

This allows us to rewrite equations (3.8) and (3.9) as:
P(i\r) = exp(X,p / exp(/r)

(3.10)

and
P(r) = exp(Fra + Ir) I Z
r' exp(i> a + 7r-) .

(3. 1 1)

So far, equations (3.10) and (3.11) simply amount to estimating the
standard multinomial logit model, because the joint choice of region
and state has been broken into a conditional probability framework
(3.7). In a simple NMNL model, a single coefficient on the inclusive
values can take on a value other than unity; this same factor also scales
the deterministic component of each stochastic profit function. Thus,
the simple NMNL model can be written as:
P(i\f) = expf^p/n - o;;/exp(/r)

(3.12)

and
P(f) = exp(7ra + (1 - a)/r) / Z exp(yr> a + (1, - a)/r/) ,

(3.13)
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where the inclusive value is redefined as follows to reflect the scaling
of the deterministic profit components:
7r = logZexp(X,p/(l-a)).
S£T

When a = 0 or (1 - a) = 1, the simple NMNL model becomes the
standard multinomial logit model. When a limits to 1 or (1 - a) limits
to 0, it can be seen from equation (3.13) that the state-specific variables
imbedded in Ir and // play no role in the selection of region r. In that
case, the simple NMNL model implies that the choice of region and
the choice of state within the region are completely separate.
The estimation of the coefficient of the inclusive value will reveal
whether the IIA property and therefore the standard multinomial logit
model is appropriate. A coefficient of unity for (1 - a) suggests that
alternative choices are irrelevant for determining the relative probabili
ties between any two choices. However, if (1 - a) equals zero, statespecific characteristics introduce no interregional dissimilarities at the
choice of region. Therefore, in the econometric literature, the coeffi
cient (1 - a) is referred to frequently as the dissimilarity index or dis
similarity parameter.
McFadden showed that the simple NMNL model is consistent with
stochastic utility or profit maximization as long as a is between zero
and unity (see also Daly and Zachary 1978). If the estimated coeffi
cient value for (1 - a) falls outside of the unit interval or is not between
zero and unity, the estimated coefficients of the model are not consis
tent with the profit maximization framework and the estimation model
may be misspecified.3
The errors are assumed to follow a generalized extreme-value distri
bution function that allows the Weibull errors to be correlated among
states within a region but not among states across regions. Maximizing
the likelihood function based on the generalized extreme-value distri
bution function and estimating the parameters simultaneously and not
sequentially produces full-information. Maximum likelihood estimates
for a, p and (1 - a) are consistent, asymptotically normally distributed
and asymptotically efficient (see Hensher 1986).
The third and final estimation model will relax the assumption that
dissimilarity parameters are constant across regions and permit them to
vary.
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The Generalized NMNL Model

The final model that we will examine in this section is a nested
multinomial logit model that allows each region r to have its own dis
similarity parameter (1 - ar). To simplify the mathematical presenta
tion, we will follow Borsch-Supan and define

er =i-or .
The joint cumulative distribution function of the ejr's for this new
model is given by

F(e) = exp I - 2 [E exp {- e5r} I/8r] flr 1 ,

(3.14)

where e is the vector of all stochastic components of profits across
states. The function F is a member of the generalized extreme-value
class of cumulative distribution functions, and when all 0/s equal one,
it describes the standard multinomial logit model.
From Theorem 1 of McFadden (1978), the cumulative distribution
function in (3.14) with the following new definition of the inclusive
value:
7r =logZexp(X5p/er)
ser

yields the following expression for the probability of choosing a partic
ular region r
P(r) = exp{yra+er/r}/2exp{yr'(x+er'/r'}
r'

(3.15)

in the generalized nested multinomial logit model. The conditional
probability of choosing a particular state i given that its region r has
been chosen is
P(i|r) = exp(X,P / 8r) / exp (7r).

(3.16)

McFadden showed that, in an analogous manner to the simple NMNL,
each of the dissimilarity parameters 0r in the generalized nested multi
nomial logit model must be greater than zero and less than or equal to
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one, if the model is to be consistent with stochastic profit or maximiza
tion.4
To simultaneously estimate a, p, and the dissimilarity parameters,
we maximize the likelihood function to obtain FIML estimates of the
parameters which are again consistent, asymptotically normally dis
tributed, and asymptotically efficient.
We will obtain estimates using all three of the logit models outlined
above. The results are reported in chapter 4 after a description of the
data and an outline of the hypotheses to be tested.
NOTES
1. The HA property is often referred to as the red bus-blue bus problem, because the develop
ment of the standard multinomial logit model is rooted in a choice of transportation mode
(McFadden 1974). In that context, the IIA property means that the probability of taking a red bus
relative to the probability of taking a private automobile is independent of whether there also
exists a close substitute for the red bus, such as a blue bus.
2. The multinomial probit model (MNP) does not impose the IIA assumption, and Hausman
and Wise (1978) have applied the MNP model to a transit-choice problem. However, when more
than four choices are involved, such as in our choice from among 48 states, the MNP model
becomes impractical to apply. See Maddala (1986, p. 62) for a discussion.
3. Borsch-Supan (1990) argues that the condition that the dissimilarity parameter lies in the
unit interval may be too strong. He shows that economic theory can rule out some values for prof
its or utility and then the dissimilarity parameter can be somewhat larger than unity without the
coefficient estimates being inconsistent with the stochastic utility or profit maximization frame
work.
4. Borsch-Supan©s (1990) criticism about the apparent restrictiveness of the theoretical
boundaries on the dissimilarity parameter in a simple NMNL model can also be applied to the
generalized NMNL model case.

4
Empirical Results and Analysis
In this chapter we present the results from our estimation of the sta
tistical models discussed in chapter 3. We attempted several specifica
tions for each of the three logistic models—the standard multinomial
logit and the simple and generalized nested multinomial logit mod
els—on a comprehensive data set containing information on the 1,197
new manufacturing plants built by foreign investing firms in the con
tiguous United States between 1978 and 1987. The data are described
in detail, along with the hypotheses that we are interested in testing in
our statistical analysis.
The estimation results for our preferred model—a standard multino
mial logit specification with the State of California removed from the
Mountain-Pacific region and becoming its own region—are presented
together with the corresponding specification in which California is
included in the Mountain-Pacific region. We also present a synopsis of
results, including those for the simple and generalized nested multino
mial logit models that led to our preferred specification and an analysis
of the predictive ability of that specification. (A more detailed discus
sion of the results for the nested multinomial logit models is presented
in appendix B to this chapter.)

Data and Hypotheses
In this section we outline the foreign investment data used in the sta
tistical analysis, present the construction of the covariates or explana
tory variables used in the logits, and describe the expected signs of the
associated coefficients. The starting point for the foreign investment
data was the information on the 1,197 new manufacturing plants built
by foreign investing firms in the contiguous United States from 1978 to
1987, as recorded by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Besides information on the country
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of origin, the host state, and the year of the investment, the ITA pro
vides information on the two-digit SIC classification code for the new
plant and the investing firm's estimate of the value of the new plant.
We deleted a few observations from our analysis. For example, the
home countries of the firms are from four continents: Europe, Asia,
North America, and South America. To maintain a parsimonious analy
sis of the continent where the foreign investment originated, we
deleted the observation on the single new plant built by a South Amer
ican firm; we also deleted a new plant built by a Mexican firm, so that
in our sample Canadian investors represent the only North American
home country from which new manufacturing plants in the United
States originate. Thus, the countries of origin, besides Canada, could
be classified as coming from two regions, Europe and Asia, with 1,195
new plants left in the analysis at this point.
In addition, of these 1,195 new plants, 640 investing firms provided
information on the investment value of the plant. Because we wanted
to use plant value as one of the explanatory variables, we decided to
attempt predictions for the missing values. As will be described below,
we were able to provide predictions for 544 of the 555 missing cases.
This means that 1,184 new plants were available for use in the logit
analysis.
In the next subsection we describe the state-specific variables, as
well as the expected signs for their associated coefficients. We then
describe the region-specific variables in the following section. An
exact description of all variables used in the analysis is given in table
4.1.
State-Specific Variables
We use wage rate, energy cost, population and fiscal information, as
well as information on agglomeration economies and the proximity of
the country of origin to the prospective host state to model the location
choice among states. The right-hand-side variables are measured in
each state at the time that the new plant is recorded in the ITA data set,
and thus, the values of the covariates change over time.
In preliminary analysis, we included per capita income and growth
in per capita income variables, following the lead of other researchers.
The coefficients for the market variables generally had the wrong signs
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Table 4.1 Variable Definitions
Description
Continuous variables
General state variables

Real Wage

Employment
Agglomeration

Population

Real Electric Bill

Real Gas Bill

Real average hourly production earnings deflated with the
GNP deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, State and Area
Employment, Hours and Earnings, computer tape.
Two-digit SIC industry employment in state divided by
total private employment in state. Varies with state, year
and two-digit SIC code of investing firm. Source: U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Table SA25, floppy disk.
State Population (in millions). Varies with state and year.
Logarithmically transformed in specifications. Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Table SA5, floppy disk.
Average electric bills (in dollars) for the industrial sector
(300 KW - 60,000 KWH) in state, deflated with the GNP
deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration, Federal Power
Commission, Typical Electric Bills, selected years.
Average price per 1000 cubic feet of natural gas (in dollars)
for the industrial sector in state, deflated with the GNP
deflator. Varies with state and year. Logarithmically
transformed in specifications. Source: U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas
Annual, selected years.

State fiscal variables

Intergovernmental Aid

Deficit

State and local aid from the federal government, multiplied
by 100 , then divided by state personal income (obtained
from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Table SA5, floppy disk). Varies with state and
year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Governmental Finances, selected years.
State and local deficit defined as direct general
expenditures minus total general revenues, multiplied by
100, then divided by state personal income (see above).
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
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Continuous variables

Health Expenditures

Highway Expenditures

Primary and Secondary
Education Expenditures

Higher Education
Expenditures

Other Expenditures

Property Tax

Sales Tax

Description

State and local health expenditures, multiplied by 100, then
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with
state and year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, selected
years.
State and local highway expenditures, multiplied by 100,
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
State and local expenditures for local schools, multiplied
by 100, then divided by state personal income (see above).
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
State and local higher education expenditures, multiplied
by 100, then divided by state personal income (see above).
Varies with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
Other state and local expenditures, multiplied by 100, then
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with
state and year. Other state and local expenditures computed
as direct general expenditures minus health, highway,
primary and secondary education, and higher education
expenditures. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, selected
years.
State and local property tax revenues, multiplied by 100,
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
State and local sales tax revenues, multiplied by 100, then
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with
state and year. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances, selected
years.
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Continuous variables

Individual Income Tax

User Charges

Corporate Tax

Other Taxes

Real Transaction Value

Description

State individual income tax revenues, multiplied by 100,
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances,
selected years.
State and local revenues from user fees and miscellaneous
charges, multiplied by 100, then divided by state personal
income (see above). Varies with state and year. Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Governmental Finances, selected years.
State corporate income tax revenues, multiplied by 100,
then divided by state personal income (see above). Varies
with state and year. Source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State Government
Finances, selected years.
Other state and local revenues, multiplied by 100, then
divided by state personal income (see above). Varies with
state and year. Other revenues computed as total revenues
minus property tax, sales tax, corporate tax, individual
income tax revenues and user charges. Source: U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Governmental Finances, selected years.
Transaction value defined as reported total cost of the
investment regardless of the source or timing of funds.
Scale is tens of thousands of dollars. Value is deflated with
GNP deflator for nonresidential investment. Missing
values filled in, where possible, with predictions from a
Box-Cox regression. Varies with investing firm.
Logarithmically transformed in specifications. Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, for 1978-1983, computer tape obtained from the
Department of Commerce; for 1984-1987 entered from
published data.

Indicator Variables

SICnn

Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if firm has
two-digit SIC classification code equal to nn, and is equal
to zero otherwise.
Attractiveness for SIC 28 This variable varies with state and investing firm. It is
equal to unity if the firm has two-digit SIC classification
code equal to 28, and the state is Alabama, Delaware,
Louisiana, New Jersey, or Texas. It is equal to zero in all
other cases.
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Continuous variables

Description

Attractiveness for SIC 35 Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm has two-digit SIC classification code equal to 35,
and the state is Connecticut. It is equal to zero in all other
cases.
Attractiveness for SIC 37 Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm has two-digit SIC classification code equal to 37,
and the state is Kentucky, Michigan, or Ohio. It is equal to
zero in all other cases.
Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
Proximity for Canada
the firm is Canadian and the state shares a border with
Canada, i.e., the state is Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, or Washington. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with state and the investing firm. It is equal to unity
Proximity for Europe
if the firm is European and the state is on the eastern
seaboard, i.e., the state is Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,

Proximity for Asia

Japan
United Kingdom
Other Investor
Unitary

Europe
Asia

Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, or Virginia. It is equal to zero
otherwise.
Varies with state and investing firm. It is equal to unity if
the firm is Asian and the state is on the Western seaboard,
i.e., the state is California, Oregon or Washington. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
Japanese and equals zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
from the United Kingdom and equals zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
not from Japan or the United Kingdom and is equal to zero
otherwise.
Varies with state and year. It is equal to unity if the state
had a world-wide unitary tax system in place in that year,
i.e., California, Idaho, Illinois, Montana and North Dakota,
1978-87; Colorado, New Hampshire, Oregon and Utah,
1978-85; Massachusetts, 1978-83; and Florida, 1983. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
European, and is equal to zero otherwise.
Varies with investing firm. It is equal to unity if the firm is
Asian, and is equal to zero otherwise.

Empirical Results and Analysis

79

and were not statistically significant. We therefore dropped the income
variables from the analysis. We believe that market variables are
important to the decision to invest somewhere in the United States, but
that state market variables are less important in selecting a specific
location within the United States. The percentage of the workforce
unionized is no longer reported on an annual basis, and our initial
attempts to incorporate a unionization variable constructed from inter
polation of existing data revealed little significant role for unioniza
tion. 1 We also estimated models with variables representing the state
minimum wage laws and right-to-work laws, but the coefficients for
these variables were also statistically insignificant. We now present the
state-specific variables used in the final analyses.
Real Wage Rate
We use the state average hourly manufacturing production earnings
deflated by the GNP deflator in the year that the investment is made to
represent the cost of labor in the manufacturing sector for the state.2 In
preliminary analysis, the real wage rate variable performs better statis
tically when the values are logarithmically transformed. For a given
level of productivity, we expect this variable to have a negative effect
on profits, and therefore on the probability of locating in a given state.
We do not have good measures of labor productivity in each state
over time, and a productivity variable is not explicitly included in the
state-level analysis. To the extent that productivity of the workforce
varies across regions and persists over time, the regional dummy vari
ables that we include in the regional choice aspect of the location deci
sion will help account for productivity differentials across regions.
However, our analysis still does not account for the productivity differ
ences among states within regions.

Employment Agglomeration
Employment agglomeration economies for manufacturers are mea
sured as state employment in the two-digit SIC industry of the new
plant as a fraction of total private employment in the state. Manufac
turing firms are expected to be more attracted to states with higher con
centrations of employees in their industry.
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State Population
Although our employment agglomeration variable will capture the
effect of the fraction of the workforce in the industry of the new plant,
it will not capture the effect of the absolute size of the workforce. To
this end, we included the logarithm of population in our specifications.
We expect the probability of choosing a state to increase with popula
tion.
Energy Costs
Average real industrial electric energy bills in the state, deflated
using the implicit GNP price index for private total consumption, were
used to measure the electric costs in the state. Nominal natural gas
prices per 1,000 cubic feet are deflated using the same GNP deflator as
for electric bills. Both variables are logarithmically transformed in the
specifications.
In preliminary runs, the energy cost variables were not statistically
significant. We therefore test whether energy prices affected locations
of plants for two major industry groups, Chemicals and Allied Prod
ucts (SIC 28) and Primary Metals (SIC 33), that use energy intensively.
Accordingly, the energy variables are interacted with two dummy vari
ables representing these two industries. The first dummy equals unity
when the new plant is built for industry group 28 and zero otherwise.
The second equals unity when the new plant is built for industry group
33 and zero otherwise. We expect higher energy costs to decrease the
probability of firms from these two major industry groups locating in a
state.
State Attractiveness
State attractiveness is represented by a set of indicator variables
meant to capture foreign industry-specific agglomeration economies
and other industry-specific economies not directly related to the level
of employment. A state is deemed to be attractive to a particular indus
try group if, out of the 1,197 original observations on new plants, it has
more than eight new plants in that industry group and the number of
new plants for that industry group represented more than 30 percent of
the total for the time period 1978-87. This formula leads to state attrac
tiveness indicators representing three industry groups. If a new plant
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for the Chemicals and Allied Products industry group is built in Ala
bama, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey, or Texas, the first indicator
variable has a value of unity and a value of zero otherwise. The second
indicator variable has a value of unity if the new plant is in the industry
group Industrial Machinery and Equipment and the plant is located in
Connecticut and has a value of zero otherwise. The third indicator vari
able has a value of unity, if a new plant for the industry group Trans
portation Equipment is built in Kentucky, Michigan, or Ohio and has a
value of zero otherwise. Naturally, we expect state attractiveness to
increase the probability of locating in the state.
The state attractiveness variables are our attempt to correct for socalled "spikes" in the residuals even after all the right-hand-side vari
ables are included in the model. The corrections may appear ad hoc
and we have not developed ironclad explanations for each of the three
indicators. However, we have mentioned the tendency of Japanese
firms in particular to locate near suppliers (see chapter 1) and to
develop vertically integrated relationships among suppliers and
between suppliers and the manufacturing assembly plant. Such prac
tices breed regional agglomeration beyond what the standard set of
state-level covariates, such as wage rates and domestic agglomeration
economies, can explain. The location practices will then necessitate
additional variables in the model.
At least the third indicator variable lends itself to the above explana
tion for the attractiveness variable. Most of the new plants in the trans
portation equipment major group are in the automobile manufacturing
industry or are in the parts supplier aspect of that major group. The
new plants are heavily concentrated in three of what Woodward (1992)
names the auto-alley states—Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio. Appar
ently the agglomeration variable for Transportation Equipment already
included as a covariate in our model does not account fully for the
heavy concentration of new foreign transportation equipment plants in
these three states. We speculate that the high reliance of foreign firms
on a hand-selected set of suppliers accounts for the special attractive
ness of transportation equipment plants to those three states. Explana
tions for the other two concentrations are not as obvious to us,
however.
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State Proximity
Based on the location patterns examined in chapter 2, we use three
sets of interactive indicator variables to capture the probable prefer
ence for states located nearer the foreign investor's home country. If
the investor is a Canadian firm, the first set of indicators are unity for
states bordering Canada (see table 4.1 for an exact definition), and zero
otherwise. A second set of indicators have a value of unity when a
European investor builds a new plant in a state on the eastern seaboard
(see table 4.1 for an exact definition) and have a value of zero other
wise. The third set of indicators have a value of unity when an Asian
investor builds a new plant on the western seaboard, i.e., in Washing
ton, Oregon, or California, and are zero otherwise. We expect that the
proximity of a state will increase the probability of locating there.
The state proximity variables are also somewhat ad hoc in nature
and result from the location patterns observed in the maps in chapter 2.
The question we raise is whether the location patterns are explained by
the right-hand-side covariates described above and the fiscal variables
that follow, or whether proximity to home country adds another dimen
sion to the location decision.
Proximity to the home country might be important if executives reg
ularly travel from the parent to the foreign plant. For example, an exec
utive located at a parent corporation in Japan would fly nonstop from
Tokyo to Los Angeles and take a corporate jet directly to the city else
where in California. The extra travel time from Los Angeles would be
short. However, if the plant were located in North Carolina, the same
executive flying from Tokyo would probably add at least one other
commercial flight to the trip. The extra travel might take another five or
six hours in the air in each direction. Moreover, the trip adds to fatigue,
requires more adjustment to time zone differences, and adds probably a
day to the executive's itinerary. For all those reasons, parent firms may
favor locations in states that are closer to the home country, other
things about equal. The same general reasoning applies to European or
Canadian parent firms.
Fiscal Variables
Most research on this topic to date has included total taxes or a par
tial list of taxes as variables in the location models. The tax variable
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specification in this literature is generally an incomplete representation
of the fiscal impacts of location decisions for two reasons. Firms may
react differentially to various taxes, suggesting the disaggregation of
the total tax variable into its component taxes. In addition, most exist
ing empirical models either ignore the expenditure side of the budget
or include only a partial list of expenditure variables. To remedy these
problems, we include expenditures and taxes in the equation using
state and local budget constraints. The state and local budget constraint
includes expenditures, taxes, and the deficit all specified per $100 of
state personal income. The budget constraint is as follows:
Z EXP, - [Z TAXES, + USER + AID] = DEFICIT
where

EXP,

= state and local expenditure per $100 of state personal
income on various functions,

TAX,

= state and local tax variables per $100 of state personal
income,

USER

= user charges and other revenues per $100 of state per
sonal income,

AID

= federal aid to state and local governments in the state
per $100 of state personal income, and

DEFICIT = currrent account deficit per $100 of state personal
income.
The advantage of the budget constraint is that it enables us to
include expenditures, taxes, user fees, intergovernmental aid, and the
deficit3 By obtaining coefficients for each variable, we can simulate
more accurately than others the effect of raising a tax or increasing
expenditure. For example, a tax increase may fund an increase in
expenditure or a reduction in the deficit, or an increase in intergovern
mental aid can be used to reduce taxes, raise spending, or lower the
deficit.
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To be more specific, on the expenditure side, we include variables
for health, highways, primary and secondary education, higher educa
tion, and other expenditures. On the tax side, we include variables for
property, sales, individual income, corporate income, and other taxes
in our empirical analysis.
A feature of the budget constraint, as it is implemented here, needs
additional explanation. All of the expenditure and revenue items can
not be incorporated as right-hand-side variables into a properly identi
fied empirical model, because the budget constraint would create exact
collinearity among the fiscal variables. Therefore, we arbitrarily elimi
nate state and local welfare expenditures from the variables used in the
empirical analysis, as do other researchers using the budget constraint.
The omission of the welfare expenditure variable affects the inter
pretation of the coefficients of the other fiscal variables, however. For
example, an increase in a tax variable, holding all other values of the
included fiscal variables constant, including the deficit, would have to
be used to fund an increase in welfare expenditures. Therefore, a nega
tive coefficient on a tax variable would mean that an increase in the tax
to fund an offsetting amount of higher welfare expenditures would
reduce the probability of a plant location in a state. A positive tax coef
ficient, on the other hand, suggests that a higher tax to fund welfare
expenditures increases the probability of a foreign plant location in the
state. One can also examine the effect of different combinations of tax
increases and expenditure increases in nonwelfare categories of expen
diture, which has the effect of holding welfare expenditure constant.
For example, one can ask the effect of increasing sales taxes by $1 per
$100 of personal income to reduce the deficit by $1 per $100 of per
sonal income by comparing the coefficients on the deficit and the sales
tax variables.
Corporate Tax Complications
As discussed in chapter 2, corporate taxation of multinational firms
has a number of extra dimensions that we need to account for in our
model. For example, corporate income taxes could have different
affects on foreign plant locations when home countries operate resi
dential as opposed to territorial tax systems. To account for the differ
ential effects, we interact the corporate income tax variable with each
of three dummy variables that represent investors from Japan, inves-
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tors from the United Kingdom, and investors from other countries.
Using these interaction dummies with the corporate income tax vari
able, we analyze whether the corporate income tax affects investors
differently across countries.4 Investors in the other country category
are likely to be from countries operating territorial tax systems in
which the investors pay only host country taxes. Investors from territorial-tax-system countries may be more sensitive to host country taxes
than investors from countries operating a residential tax system.
The second feature of the corporate income tax variable specifica
tion involves the allocation of the firm's corporate income among the
states. Firms operating plants both outside and inside of the state typi
cally must allocate income to each state taxing entity using a formula
determined by each state. States also determine the total amount of
income eligible for allocation. During the 1978 to 1987 period, several
states used worldwide profits as a basis for allocating income to the
state (referred to above as worldwide unitary tax states). From the
states' perspective, a worldwide income tax basis significantly reduces
opportunities for firms to use transfer pricing to lower income subject
to taxation. Firms, however, generally prefer a domestic, rather than
the worldwide unitary or a domestic combination system as a basis for
allocating profits to states. The empirical issue here is whether inves
tors tend to avoid states that use worldwide unitary taxation.
To test the effect of worldwide unitary taxation, we interact the cor
porate income tax variable with a dummy variable representing the
states with a worldwide unitary tax system in the year of the invest
ment, and then interact the new variable with dummy variables repre
senting the investor's home country, as above. Thus, up to three
variables represent the unitary tax variable: the real corporate tax per
$100 of state personal income interacted with the state unitary tax
dummy interacted with Japan as the home country of the investor, the
real corporate tax variable interacted with the state unitary tax dummy
interacted with the United Kingdom as the home country of the inves
tor, and the real corporate tax variable interacted with the state unitary
tax dummy interacted with the indicator for another country as the
home country of the investor.5

86 Empirical Results and Analysis

Region-Specific Variables
To get at regional choice, we began by grouping states into five
regions, combining the Bureau of Economic Analysis region defini
tions in some cases. The Mountain and Pacific states—Arizona, Cali
fornia, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming—formed one region, which we
called Mountain-Pacific;6 the West South Central states—Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas—formed the second region, while the
balance of the southern states—Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, West Virginia, and Virginia—were grouped into a third
region, which we identified as South. The New England and Middle
Atlantic states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont—
formed a fourth region, which we called Northeast. The East and West
North Central states—Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Min
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin—were grouped into a fifth region called Midwest. The Mid
west region will represent the baseline region. In other words, the
region-specific component of deterministic profit equals zero for the
Midwest region for all years, and the region-specific component of
deterministic profit for all other regions is expressed as a deviation
from zero.
In the standard multinomial logit models (and the simple nested
multinomial logit models) that we estimated, there are 16 variables that
directly affect the choice of region, four sets of variables for each of
the four regions (excluding the baseline region).7 Three sets describe
U.S. regional location interaction with the world region of the investor.
The first set represents the U.S. region-specific constants, and there are
four indicator variables for this set—one corresponding to each of the
United States regions. In the deterministic component of profit for state
5, the indicator variable corresponding to the region r in which state s
is located is equal to unity, while the remaining indicators equal zero.
The second set determines the differential attractiveness of the regions
for European investors. The four indicator variables in this set equal
the four region-specific constants when the investing firm is European,
and they are all equal to zero otherwise. The third set determines the
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differential attractiveness of the regions for Asian investors. This case
is completely analogous to the previous case, except that the indicators
can be nonzero only when the investing firm is Asian. Canadian firms
represent the base case, and no regional attractiveness indicators are
included for Canada.
The fourth set of variables gives the effect of investment size on
regional preference. The four variables here are given by the products
of the logarithm of the real investment size (transaction value) with the
four indicator variables defining the region-specific constants. Of the
1,195 new plants in our original data, 640 transaction values were
reported. For 544 of the remaining 555 cases, predictions could be sub
stituted from a Box-Cox regression of real transaction value on indica
tors for year, country of origin, and two-digit SIC code using the 640
reported values. The method used to predict the missing values is given
in detail in appendix A to this chapter.
An interpretation of the coefficients for the regional variables is dis
cussed here. For our data, we have defined three world regions as the
source of new plant investments—Canada, Europe, and Asia—locating
in one of the defined U.S. regions. The omitted dummy variable cate
gories are Canada and the Midwest region of the United States. Thus,
the coefficient on the variable corresponding to region r in the regionspecific constant group gives the difference in profit between region r
and the Midwest region for Canadian firms, holding transaction value
constant. The sum of the coefficients on the constant and on the Europe
dummy corresponding to region r gives the difference in profit
between region r and the Midwest region for European firms, holding
transaction value constant. The sum of the coefficients on the variables
corresponding to region r for the constant and the Asia dummy gives
the difference in profit between region r and the Midwest region for
Asian firms, holding transaction value constant. Finally, the coefficient
on the investment size variable corresponding to region r gives the dif
ference in profit between region r and the Midwest region due to the
logarithm of investment size for a given firm.
The results of the estimations are presented in the next section.
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Results from the Standard Multinomial Logit Model

Before we move to the results proper, some preliminaries are in
order. All the logit estimation in this chapter was carried out using the
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell subroutine from version 3 of the GQOPT
subroutine package. The computing was carried out on the IBM 3090
mainframe at Syracuse University and the IBM 3090 supercomputer at
Cornell University. First and second derivatives of the log-likelihood
function used in the estimation process were numerically approxi
mated by GQOPT by means of first and second differences. The diago
nal of the negative inverse of the approximated second derivative
matrix provides asymptotically correct variances for the parameter
estimates. Standard errors are computed as the square roots of these
variances and asymptotically correct f-statistics are given by the ratio
of the parameter estimate (less its hypothesized value) to the standard
error. The appropriate number of degrees of freedom for the f-statistic
is infinite, making our tests equivalent to the usual normal hypothesis
tests where the standard errors are known.
There are two types of hypothesis tests concerning a single parame
ter with which we must be concerned. In the first type, we have no
prior expectation about the sign of the parameter, and a two-tailed test
is appropriate. In this case, whenever the r-statistic is greater than 1.96
(2.576) in absolute value, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the
alternative at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. In the second type of test,
we have expectations about the sign of the parameter, and a one-tailed
test is appropriate. If the estimated and anticipated signs are the same,
we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative at the 5 percent
(1 percent) level if the absolute value of the /-statistic is greater than
1.645 (2.327). However, we do not reject the null hypothesis if the esti
mated sign of the parameter is different than the anticipated sign.
The final preliminary point concerns the interpretation of the param
eter estimates. A positive coefficient on a given variable has the obvi
ous interpretation of an increase in the firm's profit in a given state due
to a unit increase in the given variable. Unfortunately, the profit nature
of this interpretation is not very appealing; a probabilistic interpreta
tion would be preferable. To this end, we introduce three variants of the
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elasticity of the state selection probability with respect to a given vari
able.
Strictly speaking, the elasticity of the state selection probability with
respect to a given continuous variable is defined to be the percentage
change in the state selection probability due to a 1 percent change in
the continuous variable. We use this definition of elasticity when the
continuous variable is logarithmically transformed in the deterministic
component of profit, calling it a Type I elasticity. Then, if we denote
the continuous variable by x, its associated coefficient by 7 and the
state selection probability by Pq, the Type I elasticity is given by
e* = Y(l-fy

(4.D

in the standard multinomial logit model. Unfortunately, when the con
tinuous variable is not logarithmically transformed, the Type I defini
tion of elasticity entails an expression that depends on the value of x. In
the case where the continuous variable is not logarithmically trans
formed, we shall define the selection probability elasticity to be the
percentage change in the state selection probability due to a unit
change in x. We shall call this a Type II elasticity. The formula for the
Type II elasticity in the standard multinomial logit model is identical to
that of the Type I elasticity in equation (4.1). The last case to be consid
ered is when x is an indicator (dummy-type) variable. In this case,
interpretations based on derivatives are not possible. If we let Pql
denote the value of the state selection probability when the indicator is
unity and Pq° the value of the probability when the indicator is zero,
our Type III elasticity is defined to be the difference Pql minus Pq°, as a
proportion ofPq°. The formula for this elasticity is
e* = (exp(Y)-!)(!-/»)

(4.2)

in the standard multinomial logit model.8 It remains to choose values at
which to evaluate the state selection probabilities. One reasonable
value is the reciprocal of 48 (0.021), the theoretical mean value of the
probability. A second reasonable value is the sample mean probability
for California. Of the 1,184 new plants in our sample, 120 are located
in California, giving a sample proportion of 0.101. Other values will be
introduced as they are used.
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Which Logit Model
Our specification search started with the standard multinomial logit
and simple nested multinomial logit models that incorporated all of the
state-specific variables (including the variables for proximity to home
country or continent) and the region-specific variables for four of the
five regions constructed. In both the multinomial logit and simple
nested logit models, the proximity variables performed strongly and
indicated that proximity was a positive attractive force. However, in
the simple nested logit model, the estimated value of the common dis
similarity parameter exceeded unity and therefore violated the DalyZachary-McFadden condition for consistency with stochastic profit
maximization. The amount that the dissimilarity parameter exceeded
unity decreased when the proximity variables were dropped from the
analysis. Accordingly, we decided to delete the proximity variables
from the generalized nested multinomial logit specifications that we
attempted. The results from the generalized nested multinomial logit
specifications suggested a model in which California was separated
from the Mountain-Pacific region (see appendix A to this chapter for
more details). Because the added complexity of the region-specific dis
similarity parameters detracted from the explanatory power of the
covariates, we returned finally to the standard multinomial logit model.
The nested logit results also suggested that the HA assumption was not
violated and the standard multinomial logit model is appropriate for
estimating our model.
The mean values of the right-hand-side covariates are listed in table
4.2. We can now analyze the empirical results for the standard multino
mial logit model, which are presented in table 4.3. The column labeled
Model I contains the results for the preferred specification in which
California has been removed from the Mountain-Pacific region and the
column labeled Model II contains the results in the case where Califor
nia is included in the Mountain-Pacific region.
Wage Rates and Energy Costs
The wage rate variable and the four energy cost variables performed
rather poorly in both Models I and II. Several of these variables did
well, however, in several preliminary specifications of the estimation
models in which we included fewer right-hand-side covariates. All of
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Table 4.2 Selected Variable Means Over the Period 1987-1987
Overall
New York
California
8.309
8.447
9.017
Real Wage (real dollars/hour)
4.809
17.686
25.102
(millions)
Population
3,648.287
6,781.861
4,250.024
Real Electric Bill (real dollars)
3.657
4.279
4.036
Real Gas Bill (real dollars/1000
cubic feet)
3.732
4.209
3.292
Intergovernmental Aid (cents/dollar
state personal income)
-0.953
-1.397
-0.878
Deficit (cents/dollar state personal
income)
1.477
2.028
1.394
Health Expenditures (cents/dollar
state personal income)
1.778
1.164
0.767
Highway Expenditures (cents/dol
lar state personal income)
4.294
4.608
3.563
Primary and Secondary Education
Expenditures (cents/dollar state
personal income)
1.779
1.156
1.709
Higher Education Expendiutres
(cents/dollar state personal income)
8.460
5.955
6.272
Other Expenditures (cents/dollar
state personal income)
3.153
4.618
2.793
Property Tax (cents/dollar state per
sonal income)
2.754
2.331
Sales Tax (cents/dollar state per
2.838
sonal income)
1.634
3.424
2.327
Individual Income Tax (cents/dollar
state personal income)
4.273
3.637
3.588
User Charges (cents/dollar state
personal income)
0.461
0.669
0.877
Corporate Tax (cents/dollar state
personal income)
3.000
2.557
1.463
Other Taxes (cents/dollar state per
sonal income)
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Table 43 Comparison of Two Sets of Multinomial Logit Results for State
and Region Choice by Foreign Investors: 1978-1987
Estimates
Variables
Model II
Model I
General State Variables:
-0.349
-0.402
Log Real Wage
(-0.763)
(-0.873)
15.003
15.121
Employment Agglomeration
(6.449)
(6.445)
1.131
Log Population
1.165
(14.672)
(15.909)
-0.667
-0.557
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 28
(-1.834)
(-1.567)
0.405
0.475
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 33
(0.682)
(0.769)
0.142
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 28
0.133
(0.327)
(0.307)
-0.609
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 33
-0.562
(-0.784)
(-0.609)
1.342
1.337
Attractiveness for SIC 28
(7.016)
(7.032)
1.656
1.691
Attractiveness for SIC 35
(5.490)
(5.548)
Attractiveness for SIC 37
1.906
1.894
(8.792)
(8.718)
State Fiscal Variables:

Intergovernmental Aid
Deficit
Health Expenditures
Highway Expenditures
Primary and Secondary Education Expendi
tures
Higher Education Expenditures
Other Expenditures

0.301
(2.502)
-0.389
(-2.770)
0.151
(0.826)
-0.315
(-1.694)
-0.257
(-1.434)
0.685
(3.550)
0.029
(0.191)

0.270
(2.339)
-0.432
(-3.223)
0.204
(1.162)
-0.271
(-1.497)
-0.176
(-1.085)
0.693
(3.563)
0.070
(0.475)
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Variables
Property Tax
Sales Tax
Individual Income Tax
User Charges
Corporate Tax
Corporate Tax x Unitary
Other Taxes
Regional Variables:
Mountain Pacific
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
West South Central
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
South
Constant
Europe

Estimates
Model I
-0.035
(-0.255)
-0.155
(-1.160)
-0.105
(-0.826)
-0.343
(-2.034)
-0.579
(-2.581)
-0.265
(-1.111)
-0.219
(-1.508)

Model II
-0.061
(-0.447)
-0.190
(-1.470)
-0.141
(-1.147)
-0.399
(-2.508)
-0.669
(-3.155)
-0.360
(-1.631)
-0.247
(-1.739)

-0.289
(-0.326)
-1.146
(-2.015)
-0.956
(-1.694)
0.260
(2.263)

0.693
(1.020)
-1.251
(-2.689)
-0.455
(-0.998)
0.065
(0.772)

-0.805
(-0.922)
-0.246
(-0.407)
-0.522
(-0.851)
0.204
(1.946)

-0.811
(-0.951)
-0.241
(-0.411)
-0.518
(-0.868)
0.198
(1.898)

1.872
(3.226)
-0.459
(-1.200)

1.865
(3.125)
-0.460
(-1.157)
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Estimates

Variables
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Northeast
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
California
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Log-Likelihood
©/-statistics in parentheses.

Model I
-1.222
(-3.081)
-0.057
(-0.762)

Model II
-1.223
(-2.992)
-0.059
(-0.799)

3.650
(6.008)
-1.024
(-2.666)
-1.996
(-4.945)
-0.300
(-3.542)

3.645
(5.747)
-1.026
(-2.575)
-2.005
(-4.760)
-0.299
(-3.533)

1.107
(1.461)
-1.340
(-2.558)
-0.143
(-0.283)
-0.057
(-0.573)
-3816.52

—
~
—
~
-3823.98
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these were expected to have negative coefficients, but none was signif
icant even at the 5 percent level. (In fact, the coefficient on the real
electric bill is significant at the 5 percent level for firms with two-digit
SIC code 28, Chemicals and Allied Products, in Model II and almost
significant at that level in Model I.)
There are at least a couple of reasons for this generally poor statisti
cal performance. First, a higher wage rate is likely to deter state selec
tion only when labor productivity is held equal. Unfortunately, while
our regional indicator variables account for productivity differences
among regions, our only measure of productivity differences among
states is rather indirect—state expenditures on higher education (rela
tive to state personal income) at the time of the investment. This may
be an insufficient control for productivity differences. In our review of
the literature (chapter 2), we found the evidence mixed on whether
wage rates affect location decisions. In fact, other research on FDI
location has infrequently found wages a significant determinant of
location. The domestic location literature produces more mixed results
for wages.
For the energy cost variables, at least part of the problem may be
that we have only electric bill information and not costs per unit of
electricity. The electric bill information will be a less appropriate mea
sure of energy prices to the extent that the composition of energyintensive manufacturing firms varies across states. Locations of
energy-intensive plants would theoretically be more sensitive to higher
state energy prices than other plants. Nonetheless, energy costs are less
important as location determinants generally in research done on loca
tion choices in 1980 or later.

Employment Agglomeration and State Population
The results for industry-specific employment agglomeration and the
logarithm population are extremely strong in both Models I and II. For
Model I, holding employment agglomeration constant, the Type I elas
ticity for population is 1.141 evaluated at the mean probability of 0.021
and 1.047 evaluated at the sample proportion for California. On the
other hand, holding population constant, the Type II elasticity of indus
try-specific employment agglomeration is 14.806 at the mean probabil
ity and 13.588 at the value for California. The calculations are similar
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for Model II. These findings are consistent with other research on the
locations of both domestic and foreign manufacturing plants. In addi
tion to a suggestion that plants find advantages in locations at which
other plants in its industry group have located, the findings reinforce
the view that foreign plants tend to locate in states that already have a
higher concentration of industry in their major group, especially for the
four industries that dominate the new foreign manufacturing plants in
our sample. Thus, foreign plants tend to build on the traditional
strengths in the state. However, those traditional industries may be
declining or growing within the state; our research sheds little light on
the issue of whether foreign plants replace declining industries or com
pete with domestic growth industries. The answer to that question is
likely to vary by industry with Transportation Equipment and Indus
trial Equipment yielding different results.
State Attractiveness
All three state attractiveness variables have positive coefficients that
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both Models I and
II. Type III elasticities for these variables give the percentage differ
ence in the selection probability in moving from an industry that is not
specially attracted to the state to an industry that is. Texas held a spe
cial attraction for the Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC 28) group.
In our sample, the sample proportion for a firm choosing Texas was 88/
1184 or 0.074. Accordingly, the Type III elasticity for the Chemicals
and Allied Products group, evaluated at the sample proportion for
Texas, is 1.238. Connecticut was attractive to the Industrial Machinery
and Equipment (SIC 35) group. Our sample proportion for a firm
choosing Connecticut was 39/1184 or 0.033. This value implies a Type
III elasticity for the Industrial Machinery and Equipment group of
1.635 when evaluated at the value for Connecticut. Finally, Michigan
was especially attractive to the Transportation Equipment group (SIC
37). The sample proportion for a firm choosing Michigan was 31/1184
or 0.026. This value gives rise to a Type III elasticity for the Transpor
tation Equipment group of 1.844, when evaluated at the Michigan
value. As discussed earlier, these variables were added to account for
spikes in our distribution of residuals in initial multinomial logit runs.
We believe that the variables account for agglomeration economies and
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location practices related to vertical integration of manufacturing at
different plants that are not captured in our more traditional agglomer
ation economy measure.

Fiscal Variables
Some of the tax and expenditure variables are significant at the 5
percent level. Excluding for the moment the corporate tax variables,
we find, for both Models I and II, statistical significance in the
expected direction for intergovernmental aid, the deficit variable, and
higher education expenditures at the 1 percent level, and for user
charges at the 5 percent level. In Model II only, other taxes are signifi
cant at the 5 percent level in the expected direction. The case of high
way expenditures is moot. To the extent that highway expenditures are
considered beneficial like any other expenditures, we would expect its
associated coefficient to be positive. However, to the extent that higher
expenditures on highways reflect a general state of disrepair, we might
expect the coefficient to be negative. The coefficient for highway
expenditures in Model I is negative and significant at the 10 percent
level based on a two-tailed test.
Evaluating at the mean probability 0.021, the relevant Type II elas
ticities in Model I are 0.295 for intergovernmental aid, -0.381 for a def
icit increase, 0.671 for an increase in higher education expenditures,
and -0.336 for an increase in user charges, while the Type II elasticity
for other taxes in Model II is -0.242. Evaluating at the sample propor
tion for California, 0.101, the elasticities in Model I are 0.270 for inter
governmental aid, -0.350 for the deficit, 0.616 for higher education
expenditures, and -0.308 for user charges; the elasticity value for other
taxes in Model II is -0.222. The values for higher education expendi
tures are both quite high, and demonstrate the concern foreign inves
tors have for future productivity of the workforce.

Corporate Taxes
Of the two corporate tax variables in each of our final models, the
amount of corporate tax revenue as a proportion of state personal
income is significant at the 1 percent level in both Models I and II. The
Type II elasticity of the corporate tax in Model I is -0.567, evaluated at
the mean probability. Evaluating at the sample proportion for Califor-
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nia (and including the unitary tax system coefficient), the elasticity
reaches -0.758. The large effect of corporate taxes on location is sur
prising in light of other foreign plant location studies that find only
weak (at best) locational effects for the corporate tax variable. Our
more complete specification of the government's budget constraint and
the addition of expenditure and taxes in a consistent manner apparently
improved on the estimation precision for the effects of fiscal variables
on the location of foreign plants. The lack of significance for the uni
tary tax system variables (even though it is close to significant at the 5
percent level in Model II) indicates that foreign firms were not uni
formly concerned about this aspect of the tax system throughout the
1978-87 period. Because plants locate in areas for what is expected to
be the long run, the reduction in the number of states using the world
wide unitary tax system during the 1980s appears to have reduced its
significance as a location deterrent, compared to the findings of other
studies.
Bar charts for the elasticities for the state-specific covariates are pre
sented in figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figure 4.1 contains the results evaluated
at the mean probability 0.021, while the results are evaluated at the
sample proportion for California in figure 4.2.
Region-Specific Variables
In preliminary analysis, we included the state proximity variables
discussed earlier in the specifications, and they were always significant
at the 5 percent level. As explained above, these variables were
removed from the final analysis because the determination of proxim
ity is somewhat arbitrary and because they resulted in estimates of dis
similarity parameters that were not consistent with stochastic profit
maximization. When state proximity variables were included in the
preliminary specifications, regional preferences inferred from the
region-specific variables would be interpreted as being net of effects
due to proximity. When, in the final analysis, state proximity variables
are excluded from the specification, regional preferences inferred from
the region-specific variables include effects due to proximity.
Tlirning first to the log real transaction value variable, we note that
the associated coefficient for the Northeast is negative and significant
at the 1 percent level in both Model I and Model II, indicating again
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Figure 4.1 Tax Elasticities for Mean State Selection Probability
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that larger investments from all world regions have a higher probabil
ity of locating in the Midwest (the excluded indicator variable cate
gory) than in the Northeast. For example, the sample proportion for
firms locating in New York is 81/1184 or 0.068. But the Type I elastic
ity with respect to the real transaction value for locating in New York is
-0.279. In California, on the other hand, for Model I (with California
separated from the Mountain-Pacific region) the transaction value
coefficient is significantly positive at the 5 percent level for the Moun
tain-Pacific region. The finding indicates that larger investments are
more attracted to the Mountain-Pacific region, excluding California,
than the Midwest region. The sample proportion for firms locating in
Washington State is 23/1184 or 0.019. Accordingly, the Type I elastic
ity with respect to the real transaction value for locating in Washington
is 0.255.
The region-specific constants are significant consistently across
models I and II. In general, firms prefer the South and Northeast to
other regions of the United States, when transaction values are held
constant. European firms prefer the Midwest to the Northeast, the
Mountain-Pacific, and California regions, holding real transaction
value constant. European firms are indifferent between the Midwest
region and the remaining southern regions of the United States. Asian
firms tend to avoid the Northeast and the South compared to the Mid
west as locations, all else equal. Moreover, these results suggest Asian
investors have no particular preferences for California over the Mid
west. That result is somewhat surprising in light of our observation in
chapter 2 that Japanese manufacturing was heavily concentrated in
California during the 1978 to 1987 period. However, given the empiri
cal results reported here, we are led to conclude that once agglomera
tion economies, population, wage and energy costs, and fiscal variables
are accounted for, there is little over and above these that Asian firms
find attractive in California.
Predictive Ability
In the next chapter we use the coefficient results from Model I to
perform simulation experiments in which we estimate the effects of
changing policy variables on the probability of locating in a particular
state. We perform the simulations using the data for the entire 1978 to
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1987 period of analysis, for 1979, and for 1987. However, before we
examine state-specific results from simulations, it is useful to know
how well the estimated model predicts location outcomes or probabili
ties of location in various states.
To judge the predictive precision of the estimated model, we com
pare the model's predicted values for states to the baseline or actual
probabilities. The baseline is calculated for 1979, for example, as the
actual percentages of the 173 total foreign manufacturing plants in
1979 that located in each state. Thus, the baseline percentages should
sum to 100. Analogous methods are used to estimate baseline location
percentages for each state in 1987 and for the overall sample. We then
difference the model's predicted percentage of firms locating in each
state and the baseline figure for each state to obtain the prediction
error. A positive value for the prediction error means that the model
overpredicts the frequency with which firms select the given state dur
ing the given time period, while a negative value for the prediction
error means that the model underpredicts the same frequency.
One striking feature of the results, which are presented in table 4.4
(with outliers offset from the column of numbers under the heading
"prediction error"), is that, for the entire sample period, states with the
highest sample proportions (actual percentage) have the lowest relative
prediction errors, where relative prediction error is defined as the pre
diction error divided by the actual percentage. This occurs because the
maximum likelihood estimation technique produces the best fit overall
by fitting the states with the highest sample proportions most exactly. It
is for this reason that California, which has the highest actual percent
age over the period 1978-1987, has a prediction error close to 0 per
cent. The states with the three next highest actual percentages, Texas,
North Carolina, and New York, also have small relative prediction
errors for the period 1978-1987.
The first exception is Georgia, the state with the fifth highest actual
percentage. For the period 1978-1987, the model underpredicts the rel
ative frequency for Georgia by close to 2.5 percentage points. The only
other state with an underprediction of more than 1 percentage point for
the entire sample period is Connecticut. We may conclude that Georgia
and Connecticut hold a special attraction to foreign firms building new
plants that is not captured by our covariates. Turning to overpredictions of the relative frequency, two southern states, Florida and Missis-
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sippi, are among the three states with overpredictions of more than 1
percent for the entire sample period (the third state is Massachusetts).
One possible explanation for the results for Florida and Mississippi is
the omission in our model of controls for interracial relations, and pos
sibly crime associated with a pervasive underclass.
If the relative frequency for a state is substantially overpredicted
(underpredicted) over the entire sample period, then it is reasonable to
expect that their actual percentages will be overpredicted in each of the
years 1979 and 1987. In fact, this pattern holds for all three southern
states mentioned—Georgia, Florida, and Mississippi. For Georgia,
there are underpredictions in excess of 3 percentage points in both
1979 and 1987. For both Florida and Mississippi, there are overpredic
tions in excess of 1.5 percentage points in each of 1979 and 1987. In
the case of Massachusetts, the prediction error is moderate (if not
small) for 1979, but is greater than 2 percentage points for 1987.
Although it is not the only conclusion consistent with the prediction
error pattern for Massachusetts, one strongly suspects that the quality
of the predictions for Massachusetts deteriorate as the sample period
progresses.
There is a final possibility that should be examined. A state might
have a relatively low absolute prediction error over the entire period,
yet have a relatively high absolute prediction error in each of the two
years we examine. There are two reasons that this might occur. The
first reason is a naturally high variance for the prediction error of a
given state. The second possible reason is the omission of economic
factors from the model that might distinguish the state of affairs in the
early part of the period, when the economy performed relatively
poorly, from the state of affairs in the latter part of the period, when the
economy performed relatively well. If the second reason is to be con
sidered valid for a particular state, we would almost certainly expect
the prediction errors to be of opposite signs in 1979 and 1987. Of the
seven states not yet mentioned in this analysis that have prediction
errors greater than 1 percent in absolute value in both years, the pattern
of a sign switch holds for six of them: California, Connecticut, Dela
ware, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas. Only Pennsylvania, which had posi
tive prediction errors in excess of 2 percentage points in 1979 and
1987, did not have a sign switch.

Table 4.4 Analysis of Prediction Errors for Model I (outliers offset to right of column)
Overall
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Actual
percentage
2.524
0.591
0.507
10.135
0.571
3.294
0.760
2.1%
6.672
0.000
4.139
2.534
0.422
0.084
2.534
1.182
0.507
1.858
2.027
2.618
0.760
0.591
1.744

Prediction error
0.947
0.198
0.390
0.000
0.519
-1.005
0.240
2.292
-2.481
0.322
-0.416
-0.301
0.093
0.313
-0.396
-0.300
-0.021
0.159
1.148
0.700
-0.238
1.258
-0.213

1979
Actual
percentage
2.312
0.578
1.734
80.92
0.000
4.624
0.578
2.890
9.827
0.000
2.890
1.734
0.000
0.000
1.156
3.468
1.156
1.156
2.890
1.734
1.734
0.000
0.578

Prediction error
1.852
0.597
-0.714
-1.816
1.488
-2.057
1.187
1.955
-5.106
0.296
0.408
0.645
0.393
0.422
0.257
-1.932
-0.654
0.701
0.000
0.898
-1.134
2.222
0.897

1987
Actual
percentage
3.521
0.000
0.000
9.155
0.704
0.000
1.408
0.000
6.338
0.000
7.042
7.042
0.704
0.704
4.225
0.000
0.000
0.704
4.930
0.000
0.000
0.704

Prediction error
0.608
0.450
0.736
2.981
0.250
1.571
-0.9%
3.101
-3.458
0.493
-3.044
-4.107
0.394
-0.181
-2.007
1.635
0.446
1.969
2.322
-0.956
0.625
1.791
0.973

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

0.000
0.084
0.253
0.169
3.176
0.338
6.841
7.517
0.084
4.054
0.338
1.436
2.956
0.676
3.041
0.084
4.307
7.432
0.422
0.929
3.547
1.943
0.507
1.014
0.000

0.085
0.189
-0.156
0.124
-0.213
-0.134
-0.220
-0.920
-0.039
-0.360
0.484
-0.698
0.886
-0.162
0.183
0.003
-0.988
-0.574
0.188
-0.519
-0.205
-0.400
-0.088
0.270
0.076

0.000
0.578
0.000
0.578
2.890
0.000
4.046
5.202
0.000
1.156
0.578
0.578
1.734
1.734
5.202
0.578
4.046
11.561
1.156
1.734
5.202
1.734
0.578
0.000
0.000

0.117
-0.289
0.135
-0.297
0.386
0.340
5.557
-0.101
0.030
1.993
0.442
0.0932.003
-1.026
-1.570
-0.463
-1.213
-4.028
-0.580
-1.290
-2.459
-0.004
-0.159
1.162
0.155

0.000
0.000
1.408
0.000
3.521
0.000
4.225
7.042
0.000
9.155
0.704
3.521
0.704
1.408
2.817
0.000
7.042
3.521
0.000
0.704
3.521
2.113
0.000
1.408
0.000

0.087
0.421

8
-1.276

0.362
-0.316
0.104
0.823
-0.370
0.065
-3.524
-0.081
-2.187
2.455
-1.056
-0.203
0.070
-3.884
1.968
0.985
-0.538
-0.085
0.691
0.327
-0.440
0.019
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It is hard to suggest definite criteria for an acceptable level of pre
dictive power for a model. The most one can hope for is an insight into
the possible deficiencies of a model. Our preferred model seriously
overpredicts for two states with high racial tensions and/or a high
crime rate, Florida and Mississippi. It also demonstrates a high predic
tion error variance (that may or may not be related to changing eco
nomic conditions over the sample period) for eight other states:
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas.

Summary And Conclusions

In the previous studies on business location decisions, both gener
ally and specifically those that restricted their attention to activity by
foreign firms, there has been little consensus on the determinants of
these decisions. Conclusions concerning the effects of wages, energy
costs, and local tax structure have been mixed. There is considerable
agreement that agglomeration is an important factor in determining
where businesses locate.
In this chapter, we have empirically examined which factors deter
mine the state location of new plants built by foreign firms. Using stan
dard and nested multinomial logit analysis, we estimated several
specifications and variants on a data set collected by the International
Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, spanning
the period from 1978 to 1987. Our results indicate that wage rates and
energy costs are not important determinants of the location decision,
although we acknowledge that these results may be artifacts of insuffi
cient productivity controls for labor productivity in the first case and
unreliable electricity cost data in the second case. As in previous stud
ies, we found agglomeration to be important, but also discovered a
strong effect for the absolute population level.
We found that investors from certain world regions eschewed partic
ular regions of the United States, apparently because of the distances
between them. In preliminary analysis, we did, however, find proxim
ity to be an important determinant of the location decision, but noted
that including proximity variables exacerbated the problem of satisfy-
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ing the technical condition of consistency with stochastic utility maxi
mization in the nested logits. In the nested logit framework, we found
evidence to suggest that California should be considered its own region
and that there may be problems attendant with grouping all the states
from the New England and Middle Atlantic Census regions into a sin
gle region for purposes of analysis.
We move finally to our results for state fiscal structure. We found
several components of state revenues and state expenditures to be
important determinants of where the foreign firms locate their new
plants. Higher deficits were a negative factor. Particularly important on
the expenditure side was higher education, reflecting firms' interest in
maintaining or increasing labor productivity. On the revenue side,
higher user charges worked significantly against state selection. For
eign firms also reacted negatively to higher corporate income taxes. On
the other hand, worldwide unitary tax systems in the host state were
not an important negative factor.
In the next chapter, we simulate the effects of changes in state policy
on the number of foreign firms that choose to locate new plants in that
state.
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Appendix A to Chapter 4
Box-Cox Estimation of Missing Real Transaction Values
As discussed in the text, 555 of our remaining 1,195 observations in the
ITA data have missing values for the real transaction value or the real amount
of the investment. We use a Box-Cox method to estimate an equation from
which to predict the missing real transaction values.
The Box-Cox regression methodology, developed by Box and Cox (1964),
uses a power transformation for the dependent variable to allow a flexible
functional form on the left-hand-side of a regression. The power transforma
tion requires the estimation of a transformation parameter A, together with the
linear coefficient vector p and the disturbance variance a2. Thus, instead of the
usual normal linear regression model

where y,- is the dependent variable for individual i, the X /s are a collection of
regressors, the P/s are elements of p, and e,- is the normal disturbance, the
Box-Cox regression methodology estimates
<y* - 1) / X = ft, + Xfcft + X2,P2 = . . . + XfaB* + e,- .

(4A.2)

The Box-Cox transformation parameter K can be any real number. It produces
a linear regression when X = 1, and as A limits to zero, the left-hand-side of
equation (4A.2), call it y/x\limits to ln(y,-) so that a semilog regression results.
Because of this flexibility for the functional form of the left-hand-side, the
Box-Cox regression methodology is an excellent tool for prediction when the
functional form of the left-hand-side is unknown.9 In the application described
above, we estimated A, p and o2 using the NLIN procedure from version 5 of
the SAS programming language on the IBM 3090 at Syracuse University
using the 640 cases for which the real transaction value (y,) was known. (The
sample mean of the real transaction value over these 640 cases was
$26,542,500.) (See table 4A.1.) For the 544 cases for which the real transac
tion value was missing but could be predicted, we used p and the appropriate
values of the X j& for that observation to predict the left-hand-side of equation
(4A.2), >>j(X). The value for the real transaction value y,- can now be computed
using the inverse Box-Cox transformation
y,- = W° + D(1/X) •

(4A.3)
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In our multinomial logit analysis, we used the actual value of the real trans
action value for the 640 observations for which it was available, and the pre
dicted value for the 544 cases for which a prediction was possible. The
remaining cases were dropped. The sample mean, over the 1,184 cases, of the
real transaction value used in our analysis was $18,377,500.
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Table 4A.1 Box-Cox Parameter Estimates for Prediction of Real
Transaction Value
Value
Value
Transformation Parameter
Year Indicator
0.013
Intercept
-0.593
1979
0.258
Country Indicator
1980
-0.018
Australia
-1.190
1981
0.027
Austria
-0.542
1982
-0.329
Belgium
1983
-0.114
-0.465
Canada
-1.258
1984
0.271
China
-1.102
1985
0.199
Denmark
-0.748
1986
0.342
France
1987
-0.397
0.326
Germany
-0.246
SIC Code Indicator
Greece
-0.016
SIC 20
0.994
Ireland
-1.047
SIC 22
0.736
Israel
-0.638
SIC 23
0.642
Italy
-0.749
SIC 24
0.003
Korea
-0.403
SIC 25
-0.026
Liechtenstein
0.750
SIC 26
1.108
Netherlands
-0.463
SIC 27
0.355
New Zealand
-0.251
SIC 28
0.991
Norway
-0.425
SIC 29
1.704
Saudi Arabia
1.707
SIC 30
0.112
Spain
0.253
SIC 31
0.600
Sweden
0.101
SIC 3 2
0.929
Switzerland
-0.099
SIC 33
1.379
Taiwan
-0.555
SIC 34
0.214
United Kingdom
0.133
SIC 35
0.190
Yugoslavia
-3.038
SIC 36
0.995
SIC 37
0.973
SIC 38
0.094
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Appendix B to Chapter 4
The purpose of this appendix is to provide the reader with a comprehensive
account of the specification search that we conducted involving the standard
multinomial logit, simple nested multinomial logit, and generalized nested
multinomial models. The search included specifications for the simple and
generalized nested multinomial logit models with the complete set of statespecific covariates involved in the estimation of the preferred standard multi
nomial logit models (Models I and II) presented in the main text However,
the specification search also included specifications for all three variants of the
multinomial logit model on a wider set of state-specific covariates than that
used for Models I and n.
The widest set of state-specific covariates used in the specification search
extended to two types of state-specific covariates discussed in chapter 4. The
first type comprised the state proximity variables. The second type comprised
the interaction of the pure corporate tax variable with indicators for Japan, the
United Kingdom and Other Investors, and the interaction of the corporate tax
variable for worldwide unitary states with the same three indicators. Thus,
instead of two corporate tax variables as in Models I and II, the specifications
with the widest set of state-specific variables had six corporate tax variables.
In the standard multinomial logit model, the three proximity variables all
had positive coefficients statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The
same thing was true in the simple nested multinomial logit model. However,
the performance of the six tax variables in the standard and simple nested
multinomial logit models was not as convincing as the performance of the
proximity variables. In the standard multinomial logit model, the only one of
the six that was significant at the 5 percent significance level was the pure
variable interacted with the indicator for Japan. Using a likelihood ratio test in
the simple nested multinomial logit specification, we could not reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficients on the pure corporate tax variables were differ
ent across the three country groups or that the coefficients on the corporate tax
variables for worldwide unitary states were different across the three country
groups.
In all our specifications using the simple nested multinomial logit model,
the estimates for the dissimilarity parameter exceeded unity and therefore vio
lated the Daly-Zachary-McFadden condition for consistency with stochastic
profit maximization. Moreover, they also almost certainly violate BorschSupan's proposed relaxation of the Daly-Zachary-McFadden condition.
Although the dissimilarity parameter estimates were insignificantly differ
ent from unity at all conventional significance levels, obvious methodological
problems would arise if we attempted to use the point estimates from these
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models in simulation experiments. We therefore felt it necessary to examine
the generalized nested multinomial logit model.
It seemed appropriate, before we started our analysis with the generalized
nested logit, to choose a baseline specification for the analysis. In doing this,
we noted that the simple nested logit models without the state proximity vari
ables produced the lower estimates for the dissimilarity parameter. Given this
fact, together with the poor general performance of the tax variables differing
by home country, we chose a set of state-specific covariates that did not
include the proximity variables and did not allow the tax variables to differ by
home country.
The results for the generalized nested multinomial logit model are pre
sented in table 4B.1. Model III presents the results for the baseline specifica
tion with a distinct value for the dissimilarity parameter for each of the five
regions. An examination of the dissimilarity parameter estimates indicates that
the problems arise with the Mountain-Pacific and Northeast regions, where
the estimates are 1.440 and 1.677, respectively, and the latter is significantly
different from unity. This suggests that California and New York do not
belong with the smaller states in their respective regions. To investigate this
possibility, we estimated Model IV, in which California and New York repre
sent separate regions. (In so doing, we normalized the dissimilarity parameters
for the new California and New York regions to equal unity, since these
parameters are not otherwise identified.) The results for Model IV were better
for the Mountain-Pacific dissimilarity parameter (1.011) and for the Northeast
dissimilarity parameter, which is no longer significantly different from unity.
Although the Model IV variant of the analysis appears to have solved the
important problems facing us, there are at least two reasons why we did not
want to end with this specification. First, it did not seem completely appropri
ate to include New York in a region by itself, since both Texas and North
Carolina received more new plants than New York. Second, standard errors
for the coefficient estimates increased substantially over Model HI, especially
on the tax and expenditure variables.
In Model V, we divided the Northeast into its two Census regions, New
England and Middle Atlantic. This estimation only exacerbated the problem—
the dissimilarity parameter estimate for the New England region, which
includes New York, increased in value to 1.993. In a further estimation (not
shown in table 4A.1), we again divided the Northeast into two regions, the
first made up of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Connecticut and
the second containing the remaining Northeastern states. The same type of
problem arose.
Accordingly, we decided on a final generalized nested multinomial logit
estimation, in which six regions were specified—the original five with Cali-
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fornia excluded from the Mountain-Pacific and becoming its own region. The
results are presented in Model VI. The dissimilarity parameter estimate for the
Mountain-Pacific region came out to be 1.101, down from the value of 1.440
in Model III. For the Northeast, the estimate was down to 1.600. This is the
lowest value of the models considered in this analysis, and unlike the result in
Model III it is insignificantly different from unity. Still, the point estimate
clearly violates Bo'rsch-Supan's (1990) necessary condition. Moreover, even
in this model there is an increased lack of precision in the coefficient esti
mates, especially for the corporate tax rate variables. We were led to conclude
that it may be impossible to estimate precisely both the coefficients and the
dissimilarity parameters. Still there was a lesson to be learned from our inves
tigation—it is important to separate California from the Mountain-Pacific
region in the estimation.
NOTES
1. Curme, Hirsch, and MacPherson (1990) have used data from the Current Population Sur
vey to construct the proportion of unionized workers in the private and public sectors by state for
the 1983 through the 1988 period. That data combined with earlier estimates from the same data
source represents a continuous data series of the proportion of the private sector workforce that is
unionized by state. However, neither series has the percentage of workers unionized in the manu
facturing sector. We believe that using the total unionized workforce in the manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing sectors as a proxy variable for unionization in the manufacturing sector would
subject our results to severe measurement error. We, therefore, did not include the union variable
in our analysis. In addition, though, regional dummy variables included in the analysis may help
to capture variations in workforce unionization among regions of the United States.
2. Real values are commonly used in analysis across time to account for the affects of infla
tion or prices. By deflating, we remove the effects of general price increases.
3. Helms (1985) was the first person to include taxes and spending in his empirical work
using the state and local government budget constraint.
4. For a discussion of residential, territorial, and mixed tax systems used in various countries,
see our discussion in chapter 1 and Slemrod (1989).
5. In chapter 2, we noted that the domestic unitary states coincided to some extent with the
states that receive no foreign investment. Because we believe that a domestic unitary tax dummy
variable would pick up the effect of other undesirable factors in these states rather than the effect
of a domestic unitary tax, we have excluded the variable from our model.
6. California was excluded from the Mountain-Pacific region in our preferred specification.
7. In our preferred specification, where California forms its own region, there are 20 variables
that affect choice of region.
8. The elasticity formulas for all three types are more complicated in the nested multinomial
logit models (see Borsch-Supan 1987).
9. While prediction using the Box-Cox methodology is straightforward, inference (hypothesis
testing) is problematic. For discussions of this topic, see Spitzer (1982) and Blackley, Follain, and
Ondrich (1984).
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Table 4B.1 Generalized Nested Logit Results for State and Region
Choice by Foreign Investors; 1978-1987
General State Variables:
Log Relative Wage
Employment Agglomeration
Log Population
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Electric Bill x SIC 33
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 28
Log Real Gas Bill x SIC 33
Attractiveness for SIC 28
Attractiveness for SIC 35
Attractiveness for SIC 37
State Fiscal Variables:
Intergovernmental Aid
Deficit
Health Expenditures
Highway Expenditures
Primary and Secondary Educa
tion Expenditures
Higher Education Expenditures
Other Expenditures

Model III

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

0.179
(0.331)
17.213
(5.096)
1.373
(5.733)
-0.630
(-1.683)
0.417
(0.583)
0.250
(0.581)
-0.614
(-0.795)
1.406
(5.630)
2.261
(4.645)
1.943
(5.215)

0.114
(0.217)
17.213
(5.530)
1.196
(5.120)
-0.529
(-1.428)
0.215
(0.356)
0.161
(0.373)
-0.348
(-0.454)
1.265
(4.905)
2.141
(4.181)
1.696
(4.429)

0.181
(0.296)
15.250
(4.792)
1.252
(5.061)
-0.613
(-1.631)
0.284
(0.429)
0.212
(0.454)
-0.440
(-0.528)
1.322
(4.865)
2.125
(3.916)
1.841
(4.552)

-0.004
(-0.008)
16.014
(4.851)
1.300
(5.509)
-0.551
(-1.470)
0.333
(0.500)
0.228
(0.511)
-0.422
(-0.548)
1.337
(5.114)
2.235
(4.294)
1.822
(4.845)

0.283
(2.061)
-0.401
(-2.455)
0.275
(1.478)
-0.235
(-1.106)
-0.224
(-1.200)
0.563
(2.321)
0.090
(0.563)

0.251
(1.750)
-0.324
(-2.047)
0.164
(0.836)
-0.222
(-0.965)
-0.144
(-0.714)
0.356
(1.568)
0.025
(0.155)

0.271
(1.680)
-0.323
(-1.814)
0.179
(0.854)
-0.274
(-1.052)
-0.210
(-0.975)
0.394
(1.631)
0.041
(0.230)

0.267
(1.840)
-0.370
(-2.285)
0.224
(1.180)
-0.218
(-0.969)
-0.192
(-0.976)
0.462
(1.974)
0.082
(0.503)
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Property Tax
Sales Tax
Individual Income Tax
User Charges
Corporate Tax
Corporate Tax x Unitary
Other Taxes
Regional Variables:
Mountain Pacific
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Dissimilarity Parameter
West South Central
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Dissimilarity Parameter

Model III
-0.154
(-1.061)
-0.059
(-0.382)
0.021
(0.143)
-0.442
(-2.320)
-0.440
(-1.768)
-0.265
(-0.979)
-0.243
(-1.523)

Model IV
-0.170
(-1.120)
-0.067
(-0.398)
0.018
(0.114)
-0.304
(-1.643)
-0.210
(-0.771)
-0.101
(-0.333)
-0.210
(-1.303)

Model V
-0.143
(-0.880)
-0.026
(-0.144)
0.058
(0.347)
-0.322
(-1.627)
0.251
(-0.873)
0.029
(0.076)
-0.235
(-1.284)

Model VI
-0.153
(-1.024)
-0.061
(-0.372)
0.029
(0.193)
-0.372
(-2.029)
-0.354
(-1.291)
-0.235
(-0.808)
-0.215
(-1.310)

0.115
(0.160)
-1.250
(-2.706)
-0.479
(-1.081)
0.063
(0.731)
1.440
(5.122)

-0.163
(-0.149)
-1.144
(-1.958)
-0.977
(-1.688)
0.257
(2.258)
1.011
(3.378)

-0.187
(-0.169)
-1.155
(-1.917)
-0.970
(-1.638)
0.260
(2.247)
1.142
(3.372)

-0.143
(-0.139)
-1.140
(-2.044)
-0.975
(-1.763)
0.257
(2.213)
1.101
(3.492)

-0.066
(-0.070)
-0.263
(-0.449)
-0.504
(-0.861)
0.197
(1.845)
0.797
(4.267)

-0.247
(-0.246)
-0.238
(-0.409)
-0.535
(-0.901)
0.202
(1.912)
0.654
(3.721)

0.046
(0.045)
-0.261
(-0.434)
-0.535
(-0.876)
0.202
(1.869)
0.678
(3.583)

-0.212
(-0.216)
-0.254
(-0.427)
-0.531
(-0.893)
0.202
(1.918)
0.727
(3.989)
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Model HI

Model IV

Model V

Model VI

2.456
(3.474)
-0.453
(-1.134)
-1.227
(-3.051)
-0.063
(-0.839)
0.924
(5.454)

2.382
(3.328)
-0.442
(-1.066)
-1.237
(-2.989)
-0.062
(-0.834)
0.813
(4.864)

2.558
(3.374)
-0.445
(-1.084)
-1.235
(-2.966)
-0.063
(-0.827)
0.852
(4.855)

2.337
(3.443)
-0.448
(-1.149)
-1.228
(-3.093)
-0.061
(-0.804)
0.870
(5.221)

2.582
(3.352)
-1.030
(-2.559
-2.055
(-4.984)
-0.292
(-3.461)
1.677
(5.121)

1.872
(2.182)
-0.340
(-0.737)
-1.464
(-3.061)
-0.285
(-3.019)
1.632
(4.171)

—

2.503
(3.352)
1.023
(-2.632)
-2.045
(-4.962)
-0.293
(-3.443)
1.600
(4.893)

New England
Constant

~

~

Europe

~

-

Asia

—

—

Log Real Transaction Value

--

~

Dissimilarity Parameter

~

~

Middle Atlantic
Constant

—

—

Europe

~

~

South

Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Dissimilarity Parameter

Northeast
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Dissimilarity Parameter

~
—
~

3.096
(3.032)
-0.445
(-0.887)
-1.994
(-3.583)
-0.461
(-3.967)
1.993
(3.535)
2.870
(3.212)
-1.298
(-3.033)

~
—
—

—
~
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Asia

Model III
..

Log Real Transaction Value

_.

Dissimilarity Parameter

..

California
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
New York
Constant
Europe
Asia
Log Real Transaction Value
Midwest
Dissimilarity Parameter
Log-Likelihood
"{-statistics in parentheses.

1.128
(4.980)
-3814.77

Model V
-2.052
(-4.567)
-0.208
(-2.187)
1.349
(2.962)

Model VI
—

0.800
(0.954)
-1.322
(-2.377)
-0.174
(-0.328)
-0.064
(-0.636)

0.708
(0.788)
-1.325
(-2.356)
-0.179
(-0.334)
-0.063
(-0.609)

0.863
(1.112)
-1.332
(-2.520)
-0.178
(-0.352)
-0.063
(-0.643)

4.202
(4.814)
-1.881
H.218)
-2.690
(-5.531)
-0.316
(-2.833)

_

_

~

~

~

~

-

-

Model IV

0.991
(4.372)
-3798.29

1.076
(4.275)
-3800.74

~
—

1.051
(4.740)
-3808.25

5
The Potential Effect
of Changes in the Fiscal Policy
of States on State Selection
In this chapter we present the results of three simulations aimed at
discovering how specific changes in the fiscal policy of individual
states would have affected the likelihood of their being selected by for
eign direct investors over the period from 1978 to 1987. As we dem
onstrated in the preceding chapter, several state fiscal policies have
considerable influence on whether a foreign firm decides to invest in
that state. It is, therefore, valuable for states thatdesire to increase their
share of the total of foreign direct investment to understand which spe
cific components of their fiscal policy attract or impede foreign invest
ment. Having identified these components in chapter 4, the simulation
results presented below help to gauge the amount of foreign invest
ment that is won or lost by the relative levels of these components.
The results from Model I in chapter 4 indicate that corporate taxes
have a strong negative effect on the probability that a state is selected
as a location for a new manufacturing plant, and that this effect is exac
erbated, although insignificantly in a statistical sense, by the presence
of a worldwide unitary tax structure in that state. On the other hand,
using the results from Model I, we learn that individual income taxes
have a small (insignificant) negative effect on state selection probabil
ity. If a given state eliminated its corporate tax and replaced it dollar
for dollar with a higher individual income tax, the effect would be to
increase its selection probability for each foreign investor (assuming of
course that the initial level of corporate taxes was positive and not
zero). This is the scenario for the first simulation, which we call Exper
iment I.
The second simulation, which we call Experiment II, uses the result
from Model I that expenditures on higher education (per dollar of state
personal income) have significant drawing power for new foreign man
ufacturing plants. Because this effect outweighs the effect of increas-
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ing the individual income tax, if the state were to finance a given
increase in expenditures on higher education by raising its individual
income tax, the net effect would be to increase the probability of a
state's selection as a location for a new manufacturing plant. This is the
scenario for the second simulation, in which expenditures on higher
education (as a fraction of state personal income) are increased by 10
percent. This increase in expenditures is financed, dollar for dollar, by
increasing individual income taxes.
The third simulation, which we call Experiment III, represents a
combination of Experiments I and II. In this simulation, corporate
taxes were eliminated for each state, and expenditures on higher educa
tion (as a fraction of state personal income) were increased by 10 per
cent. The combined increase in the deficit resulting from these fiscal
changes was offset, dollar for dollar, by an increase in individual
income taxes. Because Experiment III combines the effect of two fiscal
policy changes that individually have a favorable effect on the state
selection probability, the results from Experiment III must give the
largest improvements in the state selection probabilities (except, of
course, for those states which had no corporate taxes, and for which the
results would be the same as in Experiment II).
Again, we emphasize that, within each simulation, the changes in
the fiscal components for each state are made in such a way that the net
effect of the changes on the overall deficit level is zero. Each simula
tion gives a result for the period from 1978 to 1987 for each state. The
result for a given state assumes that only that state made a change in its
fiscal structure and that all other states left their fiscal structures
unchanged. In the simulations, therefore, we are abstracting from situa
tions in which states might react to fiscal changes by other states to
compete for FDI. Finally, we assume that the fiscal changes for each
state in each simulation had been in place long enough before the
beginning of the sample period so that all foreign firms who invested in
the sample period knew about the altered fiscal status. Thus, we elimi
nate from our simulations considerations of expectations of fiscal pol
icy changes.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. First, we
discuss the way in which state selection probabilities can be expected
to change as a result of the simulations. We then discuss the theoretical
underpinnings for the results and draw some conclusions.
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Simulation Details and Presentation
This section has two goals. The first goal is to describe the manner
in which state selection probabilities are likely to change as a result of
the fiscal policy changes within the simulation. The second goal is to
describe how the simulation results are presented in the next section.
Let us move towards the first goal by asking whether certain simula
tion results are inherent in the design or estimation of the model. The
answer is no. Because we use the multinomial logit model, the state
selection probabilities are a nonlinear function of the deterministic
profit components (and therefore of the covariates which comprise
them). Given the nonlinearity of the relationship, the magnitude of the
effect of a change in a fiscal policy variable depends on its interaction
with other covariates in the model. Thus, the simulations do not yield
results that can be anticipated from the magnitude of the particular
covariate undergoing the policy change. Put differently, the magnitude
of the change is entirely an empirical question.
Having said this, we examine certain situations that may help us
gain a better understanding of the simulation results. The first point to
remember here is that in the model specifications the actual dollar lev
els in the various tax and expenditure categories do not enter the deter
ministic component of the stochastic profit function, which is
ipositively related to the selection probability for that state. Thus, the
fact that the actual dollar levels in the tax and expenditure categories
are higher for New York than for Montana is not a reason that the
selection probabilities for New York will be higher (or for that matter,
lower) than the selection probabilities for Montana. All fiscal variables
enter the deterministic components of stochastic profit functions as a
fraction of state personal income. The fiscal structure of one state is
more attractive to foreign investors than the fiscal structure of a second
state only insofar as the first state generally has the higher values as a
fraction of state personal income in the more favorable fiscal catego
ries. Similarly, the selection probability of one state will change more
than the selection probability of a second state as a result of a simula
tion, all else equal, to the extent that the simulation implies a greater
shift of these fractions to the more favorable fiscal categories for the
first state.
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The second situation which we wish to examine can best be
addressed by asking the following question. Will states with higher or
with lower initial selection probabilities exhibit the greatest percentage
changes in these probabilities in response to a given fiscal policy
change (expressed as a fraction of state personal income)? If, as a
result of a simulated policy change, two states had the same change in
deterministic profit levels, the state with the smaller initial selection
probability will have the larger percentage change in the state selection
probability.
While we show this result formally below, a policy change need not
result in the same change in the deterministic profit levels in any two
states. Thus, whether states with lower selection probabilities have a
greater percentage change in their selection probabilities is in part an
empirical question. Nonetheless, this result will help explain why some
smaller states realize larger percentage changes in their selection prob
abilities under some of the simulations.
To begin our formal derivation of the above results, let us define TC^
to be the deterministic profit level or a given firm in state s. Then the
firm's selection probability for state i is given by
P(i) = exp[rcj / Z expfr^] ,

(5.1)

where the summation in the denominator is over all states s. A simple
calculation gives the derivative of P(i) with respect to n^ as
(5-2)
The right-hand-side of equation (5.2) reaches a maximum at
(5.3)
Because the highest empirical state selection probability is only
slightly greater than 0.1 (in the case of California), we can safely
assume that the greatest increase in the level of the state selection prob
abilities per unit change in the deterministic profit level occurs for
those states with the highest initial selection probabilities. However,
the answer to our question is altered when we examine situations that
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produce the greatest percentage changes in the state selection probabil
ities.
For example, rearranging equation (5.2) by dividing both sides by
P(i), we obtain
(dP(f) I dK^ I (P(i) = (1 - P(0),

(5.4)

which says that the percentage change in the state selection probability
is greater per unit change in the state's deterministic profit level, the
smaller the initial selection probability.
We turn now to a description of the statistics presented in the simu
lation results in the next section. In each of the three simulations, each
of the 1,184 firms in our estimation sample will have a state selection
probability for each state. Needless to say, it is not feasible to present
information on each firm in all states. We present the expectation
(expected value) of the number of firms that chose to locate in the
given state under each fiscal scenario. This expectation is calculated as
the state's average selection probability (or the average probability
over the 1,184 firms evaluated at relevant values of the covariates
using parameter estimates from the Model I standard multinomial
logit) multiplied by 1,184, the number of firms in the sample. For each
state in each simulation, the old expectation given is the expectation
evaluated at the actual (historical) values of the covariates. A new
expectation can then be calculated which is the expectation evaluated
at the new covariate values applicable to the specific simulation. The
percentage change figure that we compute is the difference between
the new expectation and the old expectation divided by the old expec
tation.

Simulation Results

The results of the simulations are reviewed in detail below. As the
empirical results reported in the previous chapter imply, there is signif
icant variation in the responsiveness of FDI location to different fiscal
variables. There is also large variation in the location response among
states to a given fiscal stimulus.
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Corporate Tax Elimination

The first simulation examines the effect on a state's expected num
ber of new foreign plants if that state and only that state eliminates its
corporate income tax and raises the lost revenue through its individual
income tax. The results refer in particular to the percentage increase
in the new plants attracted to a state during the entire 1978 to 1987
period and in each of two years—1979 and 1987. The percentage
changes are reported in table 5.1 along with the baseline or initial val
ues of new foreign plants for each state. In the text, we discuss the
results for the entire period only. The experiment produces relatively
high percentage changes in the number of foreign plants when one
state undergoes the policy change. While the percentage changes imply
very different numbers of plants in states due to different baseline val
ues in each state, the percentage changes appear the best indicator of
the impact of the policy change from the point of view of the individ
ual state.
The percentage change in the number of new plants in each state for
the entire 1978 to 1987 period under Experiment I is illustrated in fig
ure 5.1, where the percentage change results are grouped by quartile.
The elimination of the corporate income tax has powerful effects in a
substantial number of states, if they act alone. The other side of this
issue is that the simultaneous increase in the individual income tax
does not substantially reduce the number of foreign plants, or at least
the net effect of the combined corporate/individual income tax policy
is quite large, The elimination of a state's corporate income tax would
have the largest impact (fourth quartile) for the States of Massachu
setts, California, New Hampshire, Michigan, and North Dakota, Mon
tana, Oregon, Minnesota, Illinois, Connecticut, Delaware, and Idaho.
Seven of these states have relatively high corporate tax rates. However,
the smaller population states among them have corporate tax burdens
around the median value for states. Of course, the policy has no impact
in states without a corporate income tax.
There are two major caveats to this conclusion. States will rarely act
alone. A state that eliminates its corporate income tax will likely have
imitators. Other states will begin to compete by following the same fis
cal strategy, and the first-mover advantages will begin to dissipate as
more states follow the leader. Thus, the estimates reported here over-
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Table 5.1 Experiment I
Percentage Change in Expected Number of Foreign
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Eliminating the State
Corporate Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes,
1978 through 1987,1979 Only, and 1987 Only

State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

1987
Overall
1979
Old
Percent
Percent
Percent
Old
Old
expectation change expectation change expectation change
5.863
17.89
15.80
18.70
41.207
7.204
0.638
20.88
2.033
21.25
23.16
9.344
1.045
28.18
22.05
24.74
10.620
1.765
75.95
17.232
84.41
10.858
67.35
120.000
11.93
22.28
1.355
35.18
2.573
13.149
56.84
2.231
35.69
4.442
38.70
27.096
0.586
49.21
58.99
37.28
11.841
3.053
16.88
4.403
18.62
8.383
15.68
53.136
4.090
25.81
49.620
27.96
8.166
25.11
0.699
48.63
34.27
36.94
3.808
0.513
5.677
34.98
37.48
38.72
44.079
5.706
4.168
14.98
13.43
13.05
4.116
26.434
1.560
26.06
19.35
21.83
6.097
0.680
0.743
18.90
27.08
35.72
0.765
4.703
31.27
3.149
32.41
2.445
27.62
25.310
36.48
18.80
31.28
2.322
10.446
2.657
0.633
26.47
0.868
21.41
21.58
5.747
3.796
18.02
3.213
16.25
16.21
23.883
3.297
86.64
63.02
70.58
37.595
5.364
5.643
64.25
58.47
64.91
4.553
39.286
0.887
56.89
1.037
34.60
40.49
6.180
3.843
19.34
19.14
2.544
21.890
18.18
13.49
2.382
18.477
15.46
2.551
15.79
29.24
49.63
0.110
51.35
0.203
1.006
0.598
18.61
15.22
16.53
3.243
0.500
0.00
0.187
0.00
0.234
0.00
1.152
0.514
45.46
60.53
3.466
80.89
0.486
41.269
2.415

32.07
22.98

5.668
0.589

28.80
22.17

4.552
0.148

35.93
30.24
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State

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Overall
1979
1987
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
Percent
Old
expectation change expectation change expectation change

78.393
78.102
0.540
43.734
9.732
8.741
45.490
6.085
38.173
1.035
39.306
81.201
7.225
4.857
39.576
18.260
4.957
15.192
0.898

32.59
28.88
50.25
19.04
16.39
41.01
33.73
29.54
27.89
5.88
25.01
0.00
22.14
26.55
16.53
0.00
15.62
35.75
0.00

16.614
8.826
0.052
5.447
1.765
1.161
6.465
1.224
6.284
0.198
4.902
13.031
0.997
0.769
4.746
2.993
0.777
2.010
0.268

34.29
30.42
47.79
26.17
19.49
67.06
43.05
38.32
34.38
2.51
29.02
0.00
25.83
33.10
21.46
0.00
9.01
43.46
0.00

7.168
9.475
0.093
7.995
0.885
1.895
4.486
0.500
3.711
0.100
4.485
7.795
1.398
0.236
4.879
3.981
0.464
1.375
0.027

33.82
33.14
33.24
13.59
10.07
18.29
28.66
30.63
23.51
13.92
24.17
0.00
15.87
26.25
16.12
0.00
22.55
36.69
0.00

Figure 5.1 Experiment I
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Eliminating
the Corporate Income Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987

Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes v^:!
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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state what would happen if many or all states eliminated their corpo
rate income tax. In addition, the model does not capture any feedback
effects when the state raises its individual income tax to compensate
for the revenue lost by elimination of the corporate tax. For example,
population outmigration might result when individual income taxes are
increased in a state. That, in turn, could affect the attractiveness of a
state to foreign investors, especially if skilled workers migrate in sig
nificant numbers.
One cannot, therefore, take the simulation results too literally. We
draw the conclusion that corporate income taxes are powerful deter
rents to foreign firms. High corporate taxes reduce the probability of
attracting a foreign firm. Nonetheless, other advantages in the state can
offset an unfavorable corporate income tax position. For example, Cal
ifornia has attracted significant foreign investment, despite having a
worldwide unitary tax (although it was eliminated in 1988) and a rela
tively high effective corporate tax rate.
Increasing Higher Education Expenditures
We ran another simulation in which higher education expenditures
are increased 10 percent in a particular state and the extra expenditures
are financed through higher individual income taxes. The higher edu
cation policy simulation is run very similarly to the corporate income
tax policy simulation, as described above. It was run for the overall
1978 to 1987 period and then for each of two years, 1979 and 1987. In
addition, the simulation assumes that a state increases its higher educa
tion expenditures and finances it with higher individual income taxes
with no corresponding action in other states. The results are reported in
table 5.2, and the results are illustrated in figure 5.2 by quartile of per
centage changes.
The first observation is that the percentage changes for Experiment
II are not large relative to those for the corporate income tax. This is
explained in part by the fact that the change in higher education expen
ditures only requires only about one-half of the increase in individual
income taxes compared to what the elimination of the corporate
income tax rate requires. Even adjusting for the magnitude of the pol
icy change, however, the increase in higher education expenditures in
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Table 5.2 Experiment II
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing State Higher
Education Expenditures Financed by Higher Individual
Income Taxes, 1978 through 1987,1979 Only, and 1987 Only

State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

Overall
1979
1987
Old
Percent
Old
Old
Percent
Percent
expectation change expectation change expectation change
41.207
5.863
12.44
12.50
7.204
12.19
0.638
14.71
2.033
14.36
9.344
14.66
10.620
9.46
1.765
8.88
1.045
10.64
8.45
7.232
120.000
8.59
10.858
7.841
13.149
1.355
11.22
11.54
2.573
12.90
4.442
2.231
27.096
4.23
4.25
4.30
11.841
14.51
3.053
0.586
14.91
13.52
53.136
4.97
6.19
8.383
6.64
4.403
4.090
49.620
7.69
8.19
8.166
8.56
0.699
3.808
14.79
12.35
0.513
10.07
4.079
7.23
5.706
5.677
6.45
8.00
26.434
4.116
4.168
10.54
9.36
12.15
6.097
14.60
0.680
12.67
1.560
16.43
4.703
11.95
0.765
12.16
0.743
12.31
25.310
10.64
2.445
11.30
3.149
10.91
10.446
10.18
2.657
9.65
2.322
10.79
5.747
8.35
0.868
8.78
7.82
0.633
23.883
8.70
3.213
3.796
9.3 1
8.52
37.595
4.36
5.364
4.33
3.297
5.30
39.286
4553
10.85
10.11
5.643
11.77
6.180
10.87
1.037
10.01
0.887
13.02
21.890
3.843
13.83
13.84
2.544
13.27
18.477
7.38
2.551
6.73
2.382
9.05
1.006
10.11
0.203
0.110
11.34
9.91
3.243
12.30
0.500
12.07
0.598
13.59
1.152
7.12
0.234
6.86
0.187
7.25
3.466
6.85
0.486
7.68
0.514
5.88
41.269
2.415

5.04
16.68

5.668
0.589

5.03
16.56

4.552
0.148

5.69
15.64
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1987
1979
Overall
Percent
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
Old
expectation change expectation change expectation change
State
6.66
7.168
6.11
16.614
6.26
78.393
New York
12.51
9.475
8.826
12.14
12.13
78.102
North Carolina
19.35
0.093
13.41
0.052
17.20
0.540
North Dakota
9.03
7.995
7.70
5.447
8.41
43.734
Ohio
11.34
0.885
10.81
1.765
11.44
9.732
Oklahoma
13.29
1.895
11.81
1.161
12.93
8.741
Oregon
4.86
4.486
4.29
6.465
4.41
45.490
Pennsylvania
7.81
0.500
9.14
1.224
8.86
6.085
Rhode Island
13.24
3.711
6.284
12.72
12.17
38.173
South Carolina
11.60
0.100
13.80
0.198
11.77
1.035
South Dakota
9.43
4.485
8.73
4.902
9.01
39.306
Tennessee
10.42
7.795
8.62
13.031
9.47
81.201
Texas
20.72
1.398
18.07
0.997
19.00
7.225
Utah
0.236
14.15
15.57
0.769
4.857
14.96
Vermont
9.58
4.879
9.55
4.746
9.16
39.576
Virginia
11.21
3.981
11.78
2.993
11.48
18.260
Washington
10.38
0.464
11.09
0.777
10.14
4.957
West Virginia
13.84
1.375
13.16
2.010
13.98
15.192
Wisconsin
19.88
0.027
12.61
0.268
14.62
0.898
Wyoming

Figure 5.2 Experiment II
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing
Higher Education Expenditures Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987

Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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larger states has smaller effects relative to the elimination of the corpo
rate income tax.
The states that have the largest percentage changes in new foreign
manufacturing plants as a result of changing their higher education
expenditures are low population states that spend a larger proportion of
their income to support public higher education. The states with the
largest effects, for example, include Utah, North Dakota, New Mexico,
Vermont, Arizona, Wyoming, Iowa, and Delaware. While the-two
caveats that apply to the corporate income tax apply in this case, it is
the smaller states for which the higher education strategy would appear
to pay off the most.
Elimination of Corporate Income Tax
and More for Higher Education
We have also performed a simulation in which we eliminate the cor
porate income tax and increase higher education expenditures by 10
percent, financing that package with higher individual income taxes.
The results of the simulation reflect the effect for an individual state
when it alone enacts the fiscal policy change. As such, the caveats
mentioned above apply here as well.
In effect, the combined policies represent almost a linear combina
tion of the two separate simulations reported above. The results of the
combined simulation are reported in table 5.3 and are illustrated in fig
ure 5.3. The corporate income tax effect is the dominant of the two pol
icies and the rank order of the states from adopting the combined
policy changes are not much different from the rankings reported for
the simulation of the corporate tax elimination policy.
Other Policy Levers
Based on our results, states have relatively few policy levers to
attract foreign investment. For example, states have almost no direct
control over their agglomeration economies and their population (or
market) size that prove to be very dominant factors governing the loca
tion choices of foreign manufacturers. Moreover, in our analysis, fiscal
variables, except for the corporate income tax and higher education
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Table 53 Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign
Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing State Higher
Education Expenditures and Eliminating the State Corporate
Tax Financed by Higher Individual Income Taxes, 1978
through 1987,1979 Only, and 1987 Only
Overall
1979
1987
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
State
expectation change expectation change expectation change
33.40
7.204
Alabama
41.207
32.11
5.863
30.06
41.22
2.033
38.17
Arizona
9.344
0.638
39.00
36.49
1.765
Arkansas
10.620
39.52
1.045
35.01
California
120. 000
79.82
10.858
97.50
7.232
88.91
Colorado
36.40
2.573
52.48
13.149
1.355
24.46
Connecticut
44.46
4.442
41.40
27.096
2.231
63.33
56.79
Delaware
11.841
3.053
68.71
0.586
82.47
Florida
24.05
26.42
53.136
8.383
4.403
21.40
35.22
8.166
38.73
Georgia
49.620
4.090
35.39
Idaho
3.808
53.76
0.513
63.56
54.08
0.699
Illinois
4.079
48.56
5.706
43.56
5.677
48.27
4.116
Indiana
26.434
25.33
23.58
4.168
28.87
Iowa
6.097
39.55
0.680
42.00
1.560
38.90
Kansas
42.23
0.765
4.703
52.19
0.743
33.51
Kentucky
25.310
41.05
2.445
47.25
3.149
45.42
44.52
Louisiana
10.446
2.657
49.52
2.322
31.56
Maine
5.747
31.70
0.868
36.34
0.633
32.05
26.28
Maryland
23.883
3.213
28.96
3.796
26.10
Massachusetts
37.595
77.76
5.364
94.44
3.297
71.47
Michigan
39.286
75.01
4553
81.08
5.643
82.66
55.67
Minnesota
6.180
1.037
72.53
0.887
52.08
Mississippi
35.53
3.843
34.46
21.890
2.544
35.10
Missouri
18.477
21.85
2.551
23.20
26.23
2.382
Montana
1.006
64.65
0.203
66.33
0.110
43.90
Nebraska
30.84
3.243
0.500
32.71
0.598
30.86
Nevada
7.12
1.152
0.234
6.86
0.187
7.25
New
3.466
71.58
0.486
94.74
0.514
53.99
Hampshire
New Jersey
41.269
38.60
5.668
35.18
4.552
°43.48
43.46
New Mexico
2.415
0.589
42.37
0.148
50.60
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Overall
1979
1987
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
Old
Percent
State
expectation change expectation change expectation change
40.62
16.614
42.12
42.50
New York
78.393
7.168
44.12
8.826
45.92
9.475
49.30
North Carolina
78.102
76.11
0.052
67.60
59.01
North Dakota
0.540
0.093
5.447
Ohio
28.90
35.75
7.995
23.69
43.734
26.67
1.765
32.38
22.55
Oklahoma
9.732
0.885
59.10
1.161
86.66
1.895
33.96
Oregon
8.741
6.465
Pennsylvania
45.490
39.51
49.06
4.486
34.83
40.99
1.224
Rhode Island
6.085
50.91
0.500
40.81
43.26
6.284
South Carolina
38.173
51.17
3.711
39.73
18.30
0.198
16.66
27.14
South Dakota
1.035
0.100
Tennessee
36.17
4.902
40.18
4.485
35.77
39.306
9.47
8.62
Texas
81.201
13.031
7.795
10.42
45.26
0.997
48.51
Utah
7.225
1.398
39.83
45.44
Vermont
0.769
53.78
0.236
4.857
44.09
Virginia
39.576
27.14
4.746
32.98
4.879
27.17
11.48
2.993
11.78
Washington
18.260
3.981
11.21
West Virginia
27.36
0.777
21.09
0.464
4.957
35.26
Wisconsin
54.60
15.192
2.010
62.21
1.375
55.52
14.62
0.268
Wyoming
0.898
12.61
0.027
19.88

Figure 5.3 Experiment in
Percentage Change in the Expected Number of Foreign Manufacturing Plants Induced by Increasing
Higher Education Expenditures and Eliminating the Corporate Income Tax Financed by Higher
Individual Income Taxes, 1978 to 1987

Quartile of Smallest Percentage Changes
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
Quartile of Largest Percentage Changes
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expenditures, have limited impacts on foreign investors location deci
sions.
States typically use a number of economic development strategies
and incentives in attempts to attract firms, such as explicit tax incentive
packages, worker training allowances and programs, and subsidized
interest loans (Bartik 1991). While the magnitude of the effects of
these programs on location is largely unknown, states use them regu
larly to attract major companies to their state. Our results do indicate
that such programs offering corporate income tax relief may affect the
location of foreign firms, but that generally speaking states do not have
a wide array of policy handles available to attract foreign firms. States
with agglomeration in that industry or a sizable population in or near
the state will likely remain attractive locations for foreign manufactur
ing plants.

6
Conclusions
and
Policy Implications
The conclusions that emerge from our investigation of foreign direct
investment are put together here with those of other researchers to for
mulate what we believe is a coherent body of information about FDI in
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period. While using results
garnered from analysis of a decade of data to characterize foreign
direct investment can be somewhat risky, we believe that the consis
tency of many of our results with the findings of other researchers
lends credibility to the conclusions we draw. In this chapter, we focus
on our major results and policy conclusions. We also focus, where
appropriate, on the facts that state and local policymakers should con
sider when they bid to attract foreign direct investors.
We reiterate that most of the total (portfolio and direct) foreign
investment in the United States is done by four countries: United King
dom, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada, listed in order of their total
assets in the United States. These four countries dominate in each of
the portfolio and foreign direct investment categories of investment.
However, during the 1980s Japan had the highest rate of growth of
assets in the United States.
The United States still maintains a surplus (outward minus inward)
position in FDI, but it has decreased in recent years with inward invest
ment flows dominating outward flows. By contrast the United States
has had a negative position in its portfolio investment since 1985.
Benefits and Costs of FDI: Restrictions on Capital Inflows
We have weighed several arguments about the benefits and potential
costs of FDI in the United States. On balance, we believe that it has
helped to stabilize our economy, providing jobs for 9.3 percent of the
U.S. manufacturing workforce. Moreover, the new foreign manufac135
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turing plants built in the United States between 1978 and 1987 were
overwhelmingly concentrated in four major industry groups: Chemi
cals and Allied Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Elec
tronic and Other Electric Equipment, and Transportation Equipment.
In 1992, for example, workers in two of the major industry groups,
Chemicals and Allied Products and Transportation Equipment, typi
cally earned more than 20 percent per hour more than the average
worker in manufacturing. Workers in the Industrial Machinery and
Equipment major group earned 6 percent more than the average in
manufacturing, while workers in the Electronic and Other Electric
Equipment major group earned 6 percent less per hour than the average
in manufacturing. Despite the earnings in the last category, we con
clude that FDI in manufacturing creates largely well-paying jobs.
We acknowledge, however, that continued dominance of worldwide
investment by investors other than Americans would, over time, make
us relatively less well off as a people. Thus, we share the concern that
many advocates for increased worldwide investment by Americans
have expressed.
Nonetheless, the present debate on U.S. trade policy includes argu
ments for restricting capital inflows to the United States for purposes
of gaining strategic advantage in negotiations that would allow Ameri
can producers access to some foreign markets. Such a policy, if
adopted, would put existing state efforts to recruit new plants at odds
with federal policy. States have every incentive to keep recruiting for
eign investors, because the advantages of attracting foreign plants to
any particular state's citizens are likely to mask the nationwide eco
nomic costs of increased foreign investment when all states pursue
their narrow interests and continue efforts to attract foreign investors.
We caution, however, against restricting states' activities to attract
foreign investment. We believe that for a variety of reasons, such
restrictions would do more harm than good, even in the longer term.
Our rationale, simply put, is that investment decisions are increasingly
made in a global economy. U.S. investors may find investments in
Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere relatively more rewarding in the near
future than they have in the past. In addition, economic income from
investment will be determined from ownership of global capital rather
than of domestic capital only. Thus, restricting foreign investment in
the United States may set up uneconomic incentives for U.S. capitalists
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to invest here rather than abroad and induce misallocation of America's
capital and lower its long-term income growth. Moreover, the creation
of American jobs by foreign firms speeds the transfer of technology
and managerial knowledge to this country.
Aside from the economic arguments, restrictions on FDI appear dif
ficult to implement, because states engage in direct recruitment efforts.
To control investment, states might have to submit proposals for FDI to
a federal review board, where appropriate controls could be imposed.
A lengthy review process would add to the costs of FDI and, depend
ing on whether each state was given a particular number of FDI
projects, could induce inefficient location patterns.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the imposition of restric
tions on FDI is not good policy. Policies undertaken to increase domes
tic saving and, in turn, investment here and abroad will yield better
long-term income growth in the United States and avoid inefficiencies
associated with capital inflow restrictions.
Where Should States Seek FDI?
We have focused, in this monograph, on new manufacturing plants
built in the United States between 1978 and 1987. The home countries
of investors building new foreign manufacturing plants in the United
States are somewhat different from the above list of major investors,
however. In order of their importance, Japan, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Canada built most of the new manufacturing plants in
the United States during the 1978 to 1987 period, with Japan and Ger
many responsible for over one-half of the new plants in our data. States
searching for investors might be tempted to begin with these countries
as the potential sources of direct investment. However, with the recent
recombination of West and East Germany, German investment in the
1990s may be more concentrated in Germany than in the United States.
At this time, Japanese direct investment in the United States has also
dampened. Thus, states should seek investors with new ideas and effi
cient production techniques in the state's major industries. Countries
that have high productivity will likely generate significant domestic
saving that can be invested abroad. These countries can also reap the
first-mover advantages associated with early penetration into a new
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country or market. Also, if the United States imposes trade restrictions
in certain goods, FDI or production in the United States represents an
opportunity to circumvent those restrictions. Thus, federal trade
restrictions create FDI opportunities for states.
While new foreign plants were constructed in 19 of the 20 major
manufacturing industry groups, plants were primarily built, as
mentioned above, in four major industry groups: Chemicals and Allied
Products, Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Electronic and Other
Electric Equipment, and Transportation Equipment, listed in order of
the number of plants built. Investors from Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and Canada also tended to dominate as the major builders
of new plants in these four major groups. However, investors from
Switzerland and France were major new plant builders in several of
the four major groups.
The location of new plants was concentrated in relatively few states.
Staying with the four major industry groups cited above, Texas, North
Carolina, and New Jersey captured a major share of the new foreign
plants in Chemicals and Allied Products, while California and Georgia
captured a major share of the new plant investment in Electronic and
Electrical Equipment. New plants in the Industrial Machinery and
Equipment major group tended to locate in North Carolina, California,
Connecticut, and Georgia. Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, California, and
Illinois captured a major share of the new plants in the Transportation
Equipment major group.
When all industries and all home investor countries are considered,
California, Georgia, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
Tennessee each received 50 or more new foreign plants during the
1978 to 1987 period. The locations of most of the rest of the new plants
were concentrated in the eastern half of the United States.
What Attracts FDI to States?
FDI is driven by market size, agglomeration economies, and, to a
lesser extent, cost and fiscal factors. In what follows, we review the
major findings of the study, and, where appropriate, compare them to
those in the recent literature on FDI location.
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Markets
First, we do not find that per capita income and the growth of per
capita income in a state are important variables for attracting foreign
investors. While other authors have found that per capita income is sig
nificant in determining state location choice, their conclusions are gen
erally based on cross-sectional data rather than a pooled cross-section
time-series sample. Still, our results suggest that regional markets are
not significant variables in the determination of new plant locations,
and that requires further explanation.
Two explanations for the above result are possible. First, drawing on
the results in a separate literature on the determinants of aggregateinvestment flows to the United States, we suggest that the sizable mar
ket in the United States as well as international trade barriers that pre
vent certain goods from entering the United States determine the
willingness of investors to build new manufacturing plants somewhere
within the United States. One might conclude that most of the new
plants are producing for the U.S. market in general and, once the deci
sion to locate in the United States is made, the per capita income of a
particular state has little, if any, influence on the investor's decision to
locate a new manufacturing plant in that state. Production for a U.S.
market may be especially the case for the plants in the four major
industry groups that dominate the sample.
An alternative explanation is that the population size of the state,
which has a significant coefficient and relatively large elasticity for
FDI location, has measured market potential in the model rather than
the per capita income level or growth variables. Thus, population size
represents regional market potential as well as an available workforce.
Wages
We do not find that real wages in a state influence the location of a
new foreign plant in a significant way. We are somewhat surprised by
that result. We reason that investors might regard U.S. wages as high
relative to the rest of the world and, in the case of the United States,
wages do not play a significant role in decisions of foreign investors to
locate here. Carried one step further, wage variation within the United
States is not of sufficient consequence to foreign investors to influence
their state location choices. Added to our evidence is that other
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researchers have not uniformly found that wages influence FDI loca
tion decisions among states or within states. For example, one
researcher (Woodward 1992), who has examined the state as well as
the county locations of Japanese investments, does not find that wages
are a significant determinant of the state location or the county location
choice within the state. Other variables apparently drive the location
choices of foreign plants. For example, the set of states with the speci
fied desirable characteristics may not have significant variation in
wage rates among them. The caveat is that we and others are unable to
account completely for labor productivity differences across states, and
that could bias the results on the wage variable.
Agglomeration
Agglomeration economies measured here as a high concentration of
employment in the major industry group within a state have proved a
powerful locational determinant for foreign manufacturing plants. So
powerful are the agglomeration effects in three industries that in the
estimation we have had to take special account of the attraction of
Chemicals and Allied Products to Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana,
New Jersey, and Texas, of Industrial Machinery and Equipment to
Connecticut, and of Transportation Equipment to Kentucky, Michigan,
and Ohio.
The findings about agglomeration economies are interesting and
need interpretation. To some extent, the finding implies that FDI in
manufacturing plants typically occurs in the traditional areas of manu
facturing strength in a state. However, a large share of the FDI in man
ufacturing plants has located in 10 relatively highly populated states.
Thus, the relative concentration of the industry group in question as
well as the fact that the industry group has a relatively large presence
in a relatively large state economy, measured by number of employees
or capital investment, makes a state attractive as a location for a for
eign manufacturing state. Access to the skilled labor pool in that indus
try, proximity to similar firms or to networks of intermediate input
suppliers, and availability of information about market trends and tech
nological change in the industry represent the major advantages con
ferred by agglomeration. However, a less populated state, such as
Delaware or Wyoming, for example, might have a relative agglomera
tion in a major group and still not attract FDI. Those states may not
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have enough of any industry to reap the substantial gains that arise
from the absolute size of an industry's presence.
Another implication of the results for the agglomeration economies
variable concerns the fact that foreign investors compete with firms in
the state's traditional major industry group. At the national level, Ray
(1989) argues that FDI may displace traditional domestic industries,
and there is some question as to whether such foreign investment
should be encouraged. However, from an individual state's vantage
point, the new foreign manufacturing plant will probably locate some
where within the United States (perhaps in a neighboring state) and
compete with the domestic producers located in the state in question
anyway. Thus, not inviting the new plant to a particular state will not
substantially reduce the competition its existing firms face in the global
or even the national economy. A state would be wise to capitalize on its
comparative advantage in a particular industry group and recruit simi
lar types of firms to build plants in the state.

Fiscal Effects
We have also done a significant amount of work modeling the fiscal
effects of state and local expenditures and taxes on location choice.
Taxation of foreign corporations is an especially complicated area,
because whether taxes in the host country matter at all depends on
home country tax policy toward foreign investment, as well as a large
number of factors that underlie the effective tax rate of the foreign
plant. We have employed Helms (1985) budget constraint in our
model, modified by the state's stance on taxation of multinational
firms. Helms' method requires choosing a numeraire and interpreting
the coefficients relative to the numeraire. Following Helms, we have
chosen welfare spending as the numeraire and find that states with a
higher deficit or higher user charges to finance higher welfare spending
deterred the location of new foreign plants. Lower spending on higher
education to finance welfare expenditure is also a deterrent to location
of new foreign plants. States with higher corporate income taxes will
deter new foreign plants from locating within them.
The results for the corporate income tax are so strong that we have
devised simulations to explore the effect on the probability of attract
ing more foreign plants if in any single state the corporate income tax
were eliminated and the revenues were raised using the state personal
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income tax instead. The simulations suggest that the shift away from
the corporate income tax would have a very strong positive effect on
the number of foreign plants locating within a state. We emphasize,
however, that tax policy changes of this magnitude typically have a
large number of other implications that affect firm and household deci
sions about locating within the state. Our simulations could not take
into account many of the other implications of eliminating the corpo
rate income tax. Our results are, therefore, suggestive of the strong
influence that corporate income taxes have on the location of foreign
plants. Put another way, reducing corporate taxes would make the state
more attractive to foreign manufacturing plants, but eliminating the
corporate income tax would surely have behavioral repercussions that
could dampen the strong effect that we report in the simulations.
The magnitude of our results for the corporate income tax effect dif
fers substantially from the weak role that other researchers find. We
attribute the difference to our more careful modeling of the state and
local budget. Most other research partially models state and local
taxes, and virtually ignores the expenditure side of the fiscal picture.
Apparently, the improved modeling of the fiscal sector leads to our
more precise results.
Another dimension of tax policy is unitary taxation. During certain
times in the 10-year analysis period, as many as 11 states used a world
wide unitary definition of the income of foreign corporations. A tax,
such as worldwide unitary, that is specifically directed at FDI might be
expected to deter FDI substantially. Nonetheless, we do not find, as
other researchers have, that the use of worldwide unitary taxation had a
significant effect on the locations of new foreign plants. We attribute
our finding to using a longer period of analysis and the fact that many
states were phasing out worldwide unitary taxation during the time
period of our analysis. For example, a substantial number of new man
ufacturing plants located in California during the 1978 to 1987 period,
and California operated a worldwide unitary tax system during that
period. However, in 1988 California eliminated its worldwide unitary
tax and moved to a water's edge unitary definition. 1 Foreign investors
probably anticipated its elimination and thus the unitary tax was not a
deterrent to location in California during a significant portion of our
analysis period. In Florida, the worldwide unitary tax was abolished
after one year. Similar stories can be told in other states.
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To close, we believe that FDI has significant employment effects in
states. States seeking to attract such investment might look beyond the
traditional four countries, because Germany and Japan may not now
have the substantial pools of domestic saving to invest here. States will
find opportunities for FDI from countries with high productivity which
has typically produced high savings rates. These countries may be
looking for first-mover advantages in investing abroad or for avoid
ance of tariff or other trade barriers that may have been imposed on the
importation of their products. Those situations seem to produce high
potential for FDI.
Furthermore, states can make themselves more attractive to FDI by
reducing corporate income taxes and maintaining a high-quality sys
tem of higher education. However, populous states with large concen
trations of the FDI industry in question have received most of the FDI
in manufacturing. We expect size and agglomeration will continue to
play a major role in state-level FDI location decisions.
NOTE
1. The Wall Street Journal (Tax Report, August 4, 1993, page 1, and Politics and Policy,
August 19, 1993, page A12) has recently reported that controversy still surrounds California©s
unitary system. Barclays Bank has appealed to the Supreme Court to reject the unitary system. A
spokesperson for Price Waterhouse commented that California©s modified approach (water©s edge
unitary) did not appease all critics.
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